Beijing as friend is safer bet

Beijing as friend is safer bet

Insights from social psychology show that initiatives like the
ASEAN Regional Forum to engage China are steps in the right
direction.

By Nikolas Busse

SINGAPORE: Towards the end of July, some 21 Foreign Ministers
from the Asia-Pacific are scheduled to meet in Kuala Lumpur for
the fourth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Regardless of what they
will agree or disagree upon, one result can safely be predicted:
as in previous years, the gathering will invite criticism from a
growing number of academics and policy-makers who doubt the merit
of this ASEAN-sponsored effort at building a new region-wide
security dialogue. In the eyes of these critics, the fundamental
"realities" of political and security relations in the Asia-
Pacific demand a tougher policy against China and not an exercise
in co-operative security.

Are the critics right? Is the ARF a waste of time and money,
given the complex security problems of the region? This article
will argue that this view is premature. New insights from social
psychology show that international institutions such as the ARF
have a potential for preserving peace among nations.

At first glance, the critics have a strong case. The ARF was
created to engage China as a newly rising power, sustain the U.S.
commitment to Asian security, and give Japan a role in regional
security discussions for the first time after World War II. The
recent behavior of China may raise legitimate doubts as to
whether this formula works. Chinese gunboat diplomacy in the
Spratlys and last year's war games off the Taiwanese coast were
only two examples which conveyed the impression that Beijing is
prepared to adopt a more assertive stance in the region. Hence,
measures for the containment of China, often disguised behind
calls for a "new balance of power", seem more appropriate than
the soft-pedaled ARF.

The fundamental problem with this approach is that it ignores
the interactive nature of world politics. New research in
international relations theory shows that states, very much like
human beings, hold identities which serve as the basis for their
behavior. Every state has one or more, sometimes even
conflicting, identities which influence its foreign policy
behavior. The U.S., for instance, sees itself as a promoter of
free trade and human rights, whereas Germany and Japan became
trading nations after World War II, and some Middle East
countries try to develop a Muslim foreign policy. The interesting
point is that these identities do not only come from within
states, as in the cases mentioned, but are also shaped by
interactions between them.

International institutions play a very important role in that
process, because they show a state how others see it and what
identity is conferred on it by the international community. If an
alliance is created against a state, that state is likely to
adopt an adversarial identity in relation to other states. Being
treated as an enemy, it might start to pursue a confrontational
foreign policy itself. Domestic factors, such as power struggles
within the elite, or economic imperatives may remain unchanged.
The crucial point is that it is only the behavior of other states
which may drive the target state into an adversarial foreign
policy.

This scientific evidence clearly speaks against a
confrontational approach in dealing with China be it in the form
of an anti-China alliance or by means of ever-increasing defense
expenditure in neighboring countries, unless it is clear that
China is embarked on a path of aggression or expansionism and
there is little or no prospect of change from such a bent.

China is currently in a process of acquiring a new identity
and it is by no means preordained that this will be the identity
of an aggressive Asian hegemony or a global troublemaker. The
process is open-ended and only partially influenced by domestic
developments, such as rapid economic growth.

Other states' actions will also determine the outcome. If
China is openly treated like a threat, it will most probably
incorporate a feeling of enmity towards the leading Western and
Asian proponents of that strategy into its new identity.

States that take part in inclusive international institutions
like the ARF may also acquire a collective identity over time.
This clearly happened in the case of ASEAN. The members of the
grouping still see themselves as individual states but have also
accepted some common rules for international behavior. Norms
which are enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation are
now part of these states' understanding of foreign policy.

In the case of China, the ARF and similar initiatives to
engage China are steps in the right direction. The chances of
influencing China are now higher than they might be in the
future, exactly because the Chinese identity is in a stage of
transformation.

If China gets enough exposure to international norms it may
change its "Middle Kingdom" mentality and become a reliable and
co-operative member of the international community.

This approach takes time, of course, and it may cost money.
But it comes cheaper than arming the West and Southeast Asia for
"the coming conflict with China", as recently suggested by the
American journalists Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro.

Nikolas Busse is with the Department of Political Science at
Free University Berlin. Currently, he is a Visiting Associate at
the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.