Beijing as friend is safer bet

Beijing as friend is safer bet

Insights from social psychology show that initiatives like the ASEAN Regional Forum to engage China are steps in the right direction.

By Nikolas Busse

SINGAPORE: Towards the end of July, some 21 Foreign Ministers from the Asia-Pacific are scheduled to meet in Kuala Lumpur for the fourth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Regardless of what they will agree or disagree upon, one result can safely be predicted: as in previous years, the gathering will invite criticism from a growing number of academics and policy-makers who doubt the merit of this ASEAN-sponsored effort at building a new region-wide security dialogue. In the eyes of these critics, the fundamental "realities" of political and security relations in the Asia- Pacific demand a tougher policy against China and not an exercise in co-operative security.

Are the critics right? Is the ARF a waste of time and money, given the complex security problems of the region? This article will argue that this view is premature. New insights from social psychology show that international institutions such as the ARF have a potential for preserving peace among nations.

At first glance, the critics have a strong case. The ARF was created to engage China as a newly rising power, sustain the U.S. commitment to Asian security, and give Japan a role in regional security discussions for the first time after World War II. The recent behavior of China may raise legitimate doubts as to whether this formula works. Chinese gunboat diplomacy in the Spratlys and last year's war games off the Taiwanese coast were only two examples which conveyed the impression that Beijing is prepared to adopt a more assertive stance in the region. Hence, measures for the containment of China, often disguised behind calls for a "new balance of power", seem more appropriate than the soft-pedaled ARF.

The fundamental problem with this approach is that it ignores the interactive nature of world politics. New research in international relations theory shows that states, very much like human beings, hold identities which serve as the basis for their behavior. Every state has one or more, sometimes even conflicting, identities which influence its foreign policy behavior. The U.S., for instance, sees itself as a promoter of free trade and human rights, whereas Germany and Japan became trading nations after World War II, and some Middle East countries try to develop a Muslim foreign policy. The interesting point is that these identities do not only come from within states, as in the cases mentioned, but are also shaped by interactions between them.

International institutions play a very important role in that process, because they show a state how others see it and what identity is conferred on it by the international community. If an alliance is created against a state, that state is likely to adopt an adversarial identity in relation to other states. Being treated as an enemy, it might start to pursue a confrontational foreign policy itself. Domestic factors, such as power struggles within the elite, or economic imperatives may remain unchanged. The crucial point is that it is only the behavior of other states which may drive the target state into an adversarial foreign policy.

This scientific evidence clearly speaks against a confrontational approach in dealing with China be it in the form of an anti-China alliance or by means of ever-increasing defense expenditure in neighboring countries, unless it is clear that China is embarked on a path of aggression or expansionism and there is little or no prospect of change from such a bent.

China is currently in a process of acquiring a new identity and it is by no means preordained that this will be the identity of an aggressive Asian hegemony or a global troublemaker. The process is open-ended and only partially influenced by domestic developments, such as rapid economic growth.

Other states' actions will also determine the outcome. If China is openly treated like a threat, it will most probably incorporate a feeling of enmity towards the leading Western and Asian proponents of that strategy into its new identity.

States that take part in inclusive international institutions like the ARF may also acquire a collective identity over time. This clearly happened in the case of ASEAN. The members of the grouping still see themselves as individual states but have also accepted some common rules for international behavior. Norms which are enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation are now part of these states' understanding of foreign policy.

In the case of China, the ARF and similar initiatives to engage China are steps in the right direction. The chances of influencing China are now higher than they might be in the future, exactly because the Chinese identity is in a stage of transformation.

If China gets enough exposure to international norms it may change its "Middle Kingdom" mentality and become a reliable and co-operative member of the international community.

This approach takes time, of course, and it may cost money. But it comes cheaper than arming the West and Southeast Asia for "the coming conflict with China", as recently suggested by the American journalists Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro.

Nikolas Busse is with the Department of Political Science at Free University Berlin. Currently, he is a Visiting Associate at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.