Indonesian Political, Business & Finance News

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Returning power to national
development planners

Owen Podger
Jakarta

One of the last deeds of the House of Representatives (DPR)
for the 1999-2004 period was to pass Law 25/2004 on the national
system of development planning. While this is not the return of
the new order, it is a return to national development planning of
the wrong order altogether. The new planning system works against
international trends in national planning. It contrasts with Law
17/2003 on state finances which is close to state of the art.

The purpose of long term planning should not be to constrain a
new President's reforms. This is undemocratic.

Long term planning should be to determine what policy and
action is needed now -- not in the long term -- to avoid
undesirable future scenarios. Long term planners uses science to
help politicians determine priorities on specific complex issues.

Bappenas (National Development Planning Agency) has already
drafted a long term plan. But this draft plan has no projection
of population growth, no projection of land needed for food crops
to feed future generations, and no projection of urbanisation or
projection of how much irrigated land will need to be converted
to urban uses. There is no mention of the greenhouse effect.

The purpose of medium term planning should not be to spend
just three months in every five years preparing strategic plans
-- or limit ministers to less than two months to finish their
strategic plans. And why should we call a strategic plan a
development plan? Is the current title of Bappenas so important?
Why not forget the old term development planning, and have
strategic planning that will look at every aspect of planning
needed to perform? Not just development, but also human
resources, outsourcing and insourcing, alternative financing,
risk, application of technology.

And why not make Bappenas into a strategic institution, that
helps the President? Which is more important, a new law which
hinders the President in being strategic in running the country,
or using all that expertise in Bappenas to help a new President
fulfil his promises to the people?

Bappenas has also already drafted a medium term plan. It is
terrible. It plans a reduction in the share of funds for regions,
for government investment, and even for civil servant salaries.
It plans a 10 percent budget surplus for 2009. But the sectoral
plans show no less responsibility of regions, no frugality in
investment, and no plan to cut salaries or staff. There is no
connection between the opposite sides of the balance sheet. This
is not a plan, but a dream. From cover to cover there is no
strategy.

Modern medium term planning focuses on continual improvement.
The starting point of medium term planning should be the
President's own strategy, that will evolve throughout his
presidency, demanding each minister's plan also to push the
limits of corporate performance. If Bappenas is given the job to
help elucidate his policy, that is a wise application of his
prerogative, provided that responsibility for the development of
planning in each sector is handed over to the ministers who are
responsible.

Each minister needs his or her own time to develop detailed
strategies and policies. Two months for strategic planning are
ridiculous.

For example, the law on the national system of education is
over a year old, and the ministry has still not announced how
finances are to be shared between the three levels of government.
It is a complex issue that the new minister will not be able to
resolve within two months, and maybe not for another year.

A strategic plan allows time to develop policy. This new law,
by not giving time, is not strategic, and compliance with it will
result in bad plans, and bad performance.

In strategic planning, development planning is not separated
from other policy. The minister for education, for example,
should have not have half his policy in education legislation and
the other half in a separate piece of legislation. All education
policy, beneath the guiding strategy of the President, should be
stipulated in education legislation.

There is no need for Bappenas to coordinate planning.
Ministers should do their own coordination, and should be held
accountable for it. Bappenas would be more successful in
achieving coordination for the President if it gave advice to the
President when sectoral ministers fail to perform -- supporting
the "West Wing".

For example, the minister for education should be responsible
for integrating education policy with the policies of related
industries, isolated regions, agriculture, and so on, negotiating
with those ministries as required to continually improve
effectiveness and efficiency.

Each minister should also be responsible for assuring that his
or her policies are acceptable to stakeholders. This requires far
more than holding one multi-sector mass gathering of stakeholders
in a national planning conference once every five years. It
requires packaging of concepts into public announcements,
consultations across the country over time, research into user
needs, professional policy impact assessments, on a continual
basis so that the minister always knows how his policies respond
to community needs.

The third type of plan in the new planning law are the annual
development plans. These are prepared before the annual budget
process starts. No argument is provided why the Medium Term
Expenditure Framework used successfully in so many other
countries and adopted in Law 17/2003 cannot work on its own in
Indonesia. In other countries, the type of annual planning in
this law is just not needed. What is needed is a statement by the
government on general policy linked to the budget of each
ministry. This is already covered by Law 17/2003 on state
finances, which calls for such a policy to be agreed with the
House and the Council of Regional Representatives (DPD).

The driving force of change is the process of continual
performance review. This process starts with every public
official reviewing his or her own performance. This will lead to
program reviews to update strategic plans. Cabinet reviews will
keep the President's strategy on target. And at the top of the
review process, the House and DPD reviews will lead to better
budgets and better performance. This happens at least once a
year. And nothing less is good planning.

Whether long term planning, medium term planning, stakeholder
participation, annual planning, strategic planning, integration
with budgeting, or performance review, this new planing law has
got it wrong. What a pity!

The new minister of planning will hopefully recognize that
behind this dreadful display of ignorance of good planning,
Bappenas is still a national treasure of brilliant people, and
should not be judged by this law.

The writer is a free-lance consultant on governance reform,
and co-author of ADB's Country Governance Assessment Report of
the Republic of Indonesia soon to be released. He can be
contacted at micah68@centrin.net.id

Arafat, the father of his nation

Jonathan Steele
Guardian News Service

In the days when Britain was being forced to give up one
colony after another, the phrase "father of the nation" was much
in vogue. Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Archbishop Makarios in
Cyprus, and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia were among the many who won
this informal title - not just from journalists in search of a
label but, more importantly, from their own people. As teachers,
clerics or trade unionists who became political leaders, they
were seen as the chief architects of the struggle for
independence.

Forty years on from the age of decolonization, Yasser Arafat
is the last man who can claim that status. In many ways his title
is even more deserved. He had to win recognition of the fact that
there was such a thing as a Palestinian nation at all. For
decades, the Arab states and the British, who initially had the
mandate to run Palestine, and the Israelis, who moved into the
land, refused to accept there were Palestinian people, let alone
a nation.

Unlike other independence leaders, Arafat was not working in a
situation when the settler community had reached its peak and the
metropolitan governments that supported them were starting to
lose heart. He had to fight against a constantly expanding
settler tide linked to a determined government and a rock-hard
military, both of which were backed, or at least not opposed, by
a world superpower. Nor was the definition of the territory
fixed. It was under constant threat of shrinkage - and is to this
day.

To hold firm in these conditions, to maintain political unity
and keep up his people's morale and resistance under conditions
of siege, house demolitions and assassinations, was
extraordinary. To move from defensive consolidation and start to
build a nation was nigh impossible. That Arafat managed to do it
and retain the affection of his people, not just as a symbol of
independence but as a respected and approachable human being, is
a tribute to his greatness.

Many Palestinians are convinced that Ariel Sharon, the
implacable opponent with whom he had first dueled in exile in
Lebanon, had a hand in Arafat's collapse. They remember Sharon's
statement earlier this year that he no longer felt bound by his
promise "not to harm" Arafat. In a cunningly vague but vicious
article in The Jerusalem Post his confidant, Uri Dan, recently
hinted that Sharon "eliminated" Arafat via one of his chefs. So
it is not surprising that rumors are swirling that Arafat was
surreptitiously poisoned or infected.

On one point he was helped by Sharon. The Israeli prime
minister's blindness over the past three years in refusing to
deal with Arafat and getting George Bush to try to marginalise
him backfired at home and around the world. It increased Arafat's
stature. In spite of all the obstacles, the pilgrimage by foreign
diplomats to Arafat's quasi-prison continued.

The demand that before any negotiations take place Arafat must
first "reform" the Palestinian state and "control" the suicide
bombers was equally pointless. In the midst of a cycle of
violence for which Israel's provocative incursions are the main
motor, it is absurd to expect any leader to act freely.

With or without Arafat, the imperative is for a ceasefire and
a resumption of talks with whoever succeeds him. European
governments, as members of the quartet alongside Russia, the U.S.
and the United Nations, must insist that Sharon's unilateral
pullout from Gaza proceed but be embedded in the so-called road
map.

An Israeli withdrawal from Gaza cannot be used as a way of
"buying" the right to retain any of the illegally occupied
territories. Nor can it be done without an internationally
accepted document that clearly specifies Gaza's borders, provides
the link with the West Bank on which previous draft agreements
insisted, and lays down some form of demilitarization that would
disqualify Israeli forces from re-invading.

Talks also need to resume on all the West Bank issues,
including the right of refugee return and the territory's final
status. Otherwise Israel's attempts to turn the West Bank into a
series of overcrowded bantustans without a functioning economy
will continue unchecked.

George Bush's election victory offers a window in which
American policy could, in theory, change. A second-term president
is less fettered politically. Bush should end his encouragement
of Sharon's unilateralism and return unambiguously to the road
map that on paper he still claims to support.

Arafat's demise will be both a tragedy and an opportunity. He
is the father of the nation but not yet the father of the
Palestinian state. It will be up to others to fulfill that task.
But the Palestinians have to be the ones to choose them. Leaders
selected or anointed by outsiders will never gain the necessary
stature.

More from 10 November 2004 โ†’

Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/b-1447899208-1451790)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post
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