[b]
Hardline Islam thrives in Indonesia
Merle Ricklefs
The Straits Times
Asia News Network/Singapore
There has recently been a major upsurge in the ongoing contest
between Islamic liberals and conservatives in Indonesia. Its
course and current state may help us to judge which way the
religious wind is blowing there.
The immediate issue has been a group known as the Ahmadiyah.
This goes back to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (circa 1839-1908), who
provoked great controversy when he declared that he was the
Islamic Messiah. By some interpretations, he also claimed to be a
new prophet.
Orthodox Muslims, who accept the teaching of the Koran that
Muhammad was the last of God's Prophets, judged Ghulam Ahmad to
be a heretic. After independence, violence broke out between
Ahmadis and more orthodox Muslims in Pakistan. Ahmadiyah has been
banned in several Muslim-majority nations over the past half-
century.
Ahmadiyah arrived in Indonesia in the 1920s and attracted
criticism from mainstream Muslims from the beginning. Their
numbers are relatively small by Indonesian standards, about
200,000. Only recently has there been significant violence
against them.
Indonesia's national-level Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI, or
Indonesia Religious Scholars Council) issued a fatwa in 1980
declaring Ahmadiyah a deviant sect outside the bounds of Islam.
The Ahmadis, however, continued their low-profile activities.
Meanwhile, the public face of Indonesian Islam came
increasingly to be dominated by two conflicting trends. On one
side were liberals, represented strongly in the Islamic higher
education system, the major national-level organizations
Muhammadiyah (about 25 million members) and Nahdlatul Ulama (35-
40 million followers), and in a small group called JIL (Jaringan
Islam Liberal, or the Liberal Islamic Network).
On the other side were extremists of various hues:
fundamentalist Salafi movements that thrived in the late stages
of the Soeharto regime and in the more open political environment
after that.
These include Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia, groups like Laskar Jihad and the Islamic Defenders
Front (FPI) which were willing to engage in violence and, most
notoriously, Jamaah Islamiyah.
A third leadership group seemed to have lost control of the
agenda altogether: The conservative, literalist, not extremist
but also not liberal, religious scholars known as ulamas.
The elections of 2004 even demonstrated that however much
respect ulamas might receive from ordinary Indonesians, most
people were not prepared to take their advice about whom to vote
for.
In the middle of 2005, religious conservatives sought to
reassert authority. Their first victory was in Muhammadiyah, a
modernist organization founded in 1912. Modernism in Islam
embraces scientific and secular knowledge and modern social
styles, but it also goes back to the basic texts of Islam, the
Koran and Hadith (Prophetic traditions), unmediated by the
interpretations of the orthodox schools of law, so it also has a
literalist, puritan side.
The MUI was just then in the process of issuing new fatwas. On
July 28, it issued 11 of them, two of which are of interest to us
here. They condemned, firstly, pluralism, liberalism and
secularism as against Islam, and secondly, Ahmadiyah as heretical
and its followers as murtad (apostates, whom it is lawful to kill
according to some interpretations of Islamic law).
The authorities in West Java sealed Ahmadiyah properties in
Kuningan, the target of attack in 2002.
In Garut, Ahmadis had machetes put to their necks and were
forced to say they had returned to the true Islam. In Bogor, the
Ahmadi complex was attacked. The FPI, under its leader Habib
Rizieq Shihab, returned to prominence in the West Java anti-
Ahmadiyah actions.
The FPI has also been active in forcing the closure of over 20
Christian churches in West Java over the past year. So much for
freedom of religion in that part of Indonesia.
In Padang, West Sumatra, religious leaders told Ahmadis they
had a week to disband, but elsewhere nothing seems to have
happened.
In Jakarta, the authorities sealed an Ahmadi mosque in order
to prevent violence, but in Solo and Yogyakarta all was quiet.
In Tawangmangu, Central Java, the local MUI branch said it had
no intention of doing anything for there had never been problems
between Ahmadis and their neighbors.
So the impact of the MUI fatwa denouncing Ahmadiyah varied
from place to place. Where there was a historical background of
conflict, as in West Java, it was taken as justification for more
action. Elsewhere, it rarely had an impact.
Liberal figures rallied against the MUI fatwas. Ulil Abshar
Abdalla of the Liberal Islam Network (JIL), with his unerring
gift for infuriating conservatives, called the fatwas tolol,
plain stupid.
On Aug. 5, the FPI attempted to lead an attack on the JIL
headquarters in Jakarta. The JIL was defended by several hundred
people: students from the State Islamic University, Nahdlatul
Ulamas youth militia, Muhammadiyah's Security Command, local
residents and some 200 police. The mob backed off.
This was an ominous development for the MUI: Conservative and
reactionary ulamas might wish to regain the agenda from the
liberals and the extremists, but few would wish to see their
cause associated with extremist violence. Yet that was what
happened: the extremists in a back-handed way were assisting the
liberals to discredit the MUI.
Former president Abdurrahman Wahid, major Islamic leaders and
other public figures condemned the fatwas and asked why the MUI
refused to issue one condemning violence.
Newspapers lauded Indonesia's plural social heritage.
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono said nothing at all.
Where does this conflict stand now? Conservatives and
reactionaries dominate two important organizations, the MUI and
Muhammadiyah, to a greater extent than before. But the MUI fatwas
so far seem to have been effective only in one area, West Java,
where there was already a history of conflict.
Pluralism is a fact of life in Indonesia which the MUI can't
wish away. Liberalism is deeply embedded in the educational
system and has strong cultural roots. It is probable that the
Islamic thugs in robes have assisted the liberal cause by
associating the MUI fatwas with anarchic violence. This is a good
way to persuade Indonesians that your cause is unacceptable.
This is a perpetual story without endings, but there are
grounds for thinking that the progressive liberalism of Indonesia
has withstood the attack. With its reactionary fatwas, the MUI
may indeed have sidelined itself from the rapidly changing
society around it.
We must now wait to see what is done by Din Syamsuddin and his
colleagues in Muhammadiyah, an organization of immense importance
to Indonesia's future. Will they try to push a conservative
agenda even more vigorously?
The writer is a professor at the National University of
Singapore. He may be contacted at polrmc@nus.edu.sg.
2. Dyer -- The vanishing babies
2 x 21
The worrisome decline of
the Japanese population
Gwynne Dyer
London
The Japanese have known it was coming for years, but it still
arrived sooner than anyone expected. The Japanese population has
gone into absolute decline, and there will be at least 60,000
fewer Japanese at the end of this year than there were last
January. In coming years, the decline will only accelerate.
It's the same elsewhere in East Asia. Last week, the National
Statistical Office in Seoul announced that South Korea's total
fertility rate (the number of babies the average woman has in a
lifetime) has now plummeted to 1.16, even lower than Japan's.
China's looks better at 1.7, but that is deceptive because there
is a 15 percent surplus of boys over girls in the youngest
population groups. All these countries' populations are going to
start falling steeply over the next generation.
The obvious explanation is that the East Asian countries, as
they educate their people and turn into fully developed
societies, are simply following the well-beaten path first
traveled by the European countries. Italy, after all, has a total
fertility rate of only 1.4, and Russia's is
down to 1.3: If these trends persist, there will 15 million fewer
Italians by mid-century, and 40 million fewer Russians. But the
obvious explanation is probably wrong, because not all developed
countries have collapsing birth-rates.
In countries that have attract large numbers of immigrants,
like the United States, Canada and Australia, the population will
continue to grow or at least remain stable, but they are not
relevant to the East Asian case. China, Japan or Korea could
easily attract immigrants in large numbers, but they could not
integrate them: Their citizens simply cannot believe that a new
arrival from the Philippines, Iran or Ethiopia could ever become
a full member of the host society. However, some European
countries are holding their populations without mass immigration.
The average fertility rate in France, to pick the most
striking example, is 1.9. That is not quite enough in itself to
keep the population stable over the long term, as the
"replacement" rate is 2.2, but it is close enough to the
replacement level that a relatively small flow of immigrants
guarantees continued growth in the population. The French
population, now close to 60 million, is forecast by the United
Nations to be 63.5 million in 2025. So what are the French doing
right?
France and Japan are both fully industrialized, highly
urbanized, very well-educated countries with generous social
services. They are both places where it is very expensive to have
children. And both countries have experienced extreme
fluctuations in their birth-rates in response to changing
conditions.
Japan's population almost doubled in the half-century after
1945, from 70 to 125 million. If current trends persist, it will
be back down to 70 million before the end of this century.
France's population, by contrast, was already 40 million in 1840,
but it then stopped growing for a hundred years, mainly because
it remained a largely rural country and generations of farmers
limited their children in order to keep the land together. Then
the rapid post-war urbanization of France ended the obsession
with land, and in the past half-century the population has grown
from 40 to 60 million. It is still growing, albeit slowly. Why?
The biggest difference between France and Japan is the status
of women. Japanese women have a low status in the family, and
despite the occasional female high-flyer they have an even lower
status in the workforce (which they are generally expected to
leave after they marry). As a result, they have effectively gone
on strike: The average age of Japanese women at marriage is going
up by several months each year, and the birth-rate has collapsed.
In France, by contrast, the traditional male-dominated family
is all but dead -- almost half of all French children are born
"out of wedlock" -- but informal new styles of family living give
women more control over their lives while still providing secure
environments for most children. And the main thing women do with
their freedom is to stay in the workforce: 80 percent of French
women between 24 and 49 work, the highest rate in the EU.
It's not just about money; it's about independence and
satisfaction with one's life. The French government helps its
female citizens with free child-care (even for the very young),
with subsidized vacation camps during the school holidays, and
with tax breaks and family allowances for bigger families, but
other countries do the same with much less impact on the birth-
rate. The three-child family is still a normal phenomenon among
the French middle class because French women do not feel they
must choose between motherhood and a real life outside the house.
There are no immediately useful lessons in this for East Asian
societies, since changing popular attitudes on gender roles take
decades or generations. For the many countries that are still in
the "demographic transition" and working to get their birth-rates
down to 3.0 or even 4.0, it is bound to seem a distant,
hypothetical problem. But there is a lesson for everybody here.
The lesson is this: If you don't want your country's
population to fluctuate like a yo-yo on a fifty-year string, pay
attention to women's status inside and outside the family.
The writer is a London-based independent journalist.
3. Islan -- Manipulating numbers
2 x 21
Misinformation about the
the conflict in Sri Lanka
Haris de Silva
The Island
Asia News Network/Colombo
The Sri Lankan government media on Aug. 22 said: "It has been
reported that a total number of around 3,140 ceasefire violations
have been reported from both sides since the Ceasefire Agreement
(CFA) was signed in February 2002".
Would that number provide a true picture of the CFA violations
"by both sides", particularly, in the context of the Government
of Sri Lanka's (GOSL) declaration to "review" the CFA with the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (and Norway).
Why couldn't the government media also show the number of
violations by each side? Wasn't it this same frame of mind,
concealing the truth and servility to the LTTE that had preceded
the CFA and the Post Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-
TOMS) aka Joint Mechanism (JM) of recent date.
Honesty and transparency, and loud mouth denunciation of LTTE
terrorist atrocities are only for election times.
Once a party get to power they are forgotten and the
"Honorable Members" become shameless invertebrates, crawling and
clinging onto any dirt that will sustain them in power. The
country: To hell with it!
The mantra of the government is that the Southerners are
against "other communities" -- read Tamils -- and it deceives the
world by saying that the hindrance to a just settlement is the
"simplistic jingoism" and "chauvinism" of these Southerners. For
that purpose they make no distinction between the total Tamil
population and the LTTE terrorists. Thus, by implicating those
who are against the terrorists, are against the Tamils.
Simplistic indeed!
For the government and their media personnel, anyone who does
not fall in line with their falsehoods, nor approve of their
imbecility is a "chauvinist" or "extremist".
Well, we do understand the plight of these government media
personnel: They also have families to support and they do not
want to be unemployed.
If A does not comply, there will be B to do the bidding. Yet,
isn't there a limit to such knavery, and in hurling abuse at the
so-called "chauvinists" and "extremists"
The LTTE which engages in ethnic cleansing, violates every
moral and international dicta, and brooks no opposition even from
the people of their own community, are admired, respected and
facilitated in their activities! All in the name of Peace!!
If Australia, Britain and the U.S. call terrorists,
terrorists, it is the rightful thing, if they take arms against
them, it is in their undeniable right of defense, and a rightful
means to negate them. But, if we call the terrorists, terrorists,
we are "chauvinists"!
War is the last thing any Sri Lankan would want. Thus, it is
the responsibility of the government to formulate strategies to
deal with the LTTE.
That cannot be done by obfuscating facts and by equating them
with the entire Tamil population. It is wrong and immoral.
Both, Kumaratunga and Wickremesnghe are neck deep in that
quagmire of a utopian world consisting of "gentlemen terrorists"!
That the terrorists are hand in glove with the infamous quislings
are not only ignored, but their presence is encouraged.
The reasons for such myopic behavior is known only to them.
Did they say something about transparency?
Unless the government takes into confidence the people of this
country, be honest and open with them, our people, be they
Sinhala, Tamil or Muslim will continue to be murdered by the
LTTE, notwithstanding any CFA, Peace Process, or JM.
Time will come when even the Colombo-based great and
vociferous bootlickers of that dictator and his outfit would be
liquidated in establishing a mono-ethnic totalitarian state in
this thrice blessed country.
Thus, let us hope at least the new negotiators will be men of
integrity, ability and honesty, who will have the interest of
this country at heart.
They are stringent qualities difficult to meet, but SL still
does not lack such men.
But, the question is will Kumaratunga or Wickremasinghe want
any such men as negotiators. Or, are we once again going to give
time to the terrorists and their godfathers, the Norwegians, to
strengthen their armory in preparation for the destruction of
this country.
As far as we are concerned we can only express our anguish,
and wait and see!
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/b-1447899208-1170042)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post