Assessment of ASEAN's achievements at 30

Assessment of ASEAN's achievements at 30

Lee Poh Ping examines ASEAN's achievements after 30 years.

SINGAPORE: One would not think that the circumstances behind
the formation of ASEAN in 1967 were particularly auspicious.
Indonesia had just ended a period of confrontation with Malaysia
and Singapore. The Republic had just separated from the
Federation in an acrimonious atmosphere while there was still
simmering a territorial dispute between Kuala Lumpur and Manila
over the Sabah claim.

Neither was the then fledging regional grouping facing a
benign international environment. Perceived in many quarters as
an American inspired grouping, ASEAN faced hostility from
communist powers such as the Soviet Union and China.

The "substructure", if the above could be considered the
political "superstructure", of the ASEAN states was also not
conducive to regional unity. Many of the divisions of mankind
were found among the populations of ASEAN such as those that
pertained to religion, race, ethnicity, tribalism and
regionalism.

Compounding these was the economic and physical gap among the
ASEAN countries. The economic gap was illustrated by a more
advanced Singapore compared with a less advanced Indonesia. As
for the physical gap, ASEAN constituted probably the only case of
a regional grouping where many of its major countries are
separated by fairly large expanses of water (the Philippines and
Indonesia are not connected by land to Malaysia, Singapore and
Thailand) and are also island groupings themselves (the
Philippines and Indonesia).

Almost all other regional groupings, successful or otherwise,
were mostly land- or continent-based then, for example the
organizations for African and American unity.

The European Common Market then was also continent-based. It
is perhaps no accident that the subsequent inclusion of its
offshore islands in the form of Great Britain was not a small
source of discord in the search for European unity.

One should not exaggerate the potency of water-based divisions
in this modern era of advanced communications. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that there has always been a divide between island
South-east Asia and mainland South-east Asia (then represented by
Thailand but which also includes Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia)
which could adversely affect ASEAN unity.

Yet 30 years hence in 1997 ASEAN has not only survived but has
developed into an important force in the international relations
of the area. Indeed in some quarters it is held up as a model of
regional unity worthy of emulation.

To be sure, tensions between ASEAN countries on a bilateral
level still flare up. Also, ASEAN has nowhere reached the level
of unity of a European Union or even a North America Free Trade
Area (NAFTA) though ASEAN hopes to be a free trade area in the
not too distant future.

Nevertheless, the development of an ASEAN spirit has gone a
long way to ameliorate any bilateral tensions, and to enable the
association to present a united front on many issues that affect
the external relations of its member countries.

Examples of the former include the normalization of relations
between Singapore and Malaysia after separation, the dropping of
the Sabah claim by Marcos and, recently, the decision to resolve
the territorial claims of Singapore and Malaysia and Malaysia and
Indonesia through the mechanism of the world court.

This is not to say that the ASEAN spirit was the sole reason
for such successes (there were also other compelling bilateral
reasons). Nevertheless, the recognition that ASEAN unity could be
destroyed if bilateral problems were not resolved probably acted
as a constraint on such bilateral problems going out of control.

Of the latter, the most striking example has been the forging
of a common ASEAN front against the Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s despite
reported disagreements among the member countries as to which
communist power represented the long-term threat to South-east
Asia.

If it were China (Indonesia and Malaysia purportedly held the
view at that time), then Vietnam should not be resisted as it
could be used against China. If it were Russia, resistance
against Vietnam was justified as it was then perceived to be a
Russian proxy. Bangkok and Singapore held this view, and because
Thailand was the "frontline" state, the other ASEAN states
deferred to it.

There are enough of other such examples for outside powers to
take ASEAN seriously as a grouping. Indeed some powers, such as
Japan, have always valued its close ties with ASEAN while former
adversarial powers like Russia and China now seek ASEAN
friendship. Such is ASEAN success in cultivating good relations
with the big powers that China has said that it is comfortable in
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) so long as it is under ASEAN
"leadership" as it is confident the ARF would not turn into an
anti-China forum.

To what factors can one attribute the success of ASEAN? There
are primarily three.

The first are the careful and deliberate attempts by all
members to maintain an ASEAN spirit on any issue touching the
region.

The casual observer may see many of such attempts no more than
formalistic if not unpleasant (golfing and five star hotel
functions) exercises, lacking in real substance. The casual
observer may be right in his perception of the inordinate amount
of time spent in such exercises but may miss the fact that they
do go some way in building confidence and reducing conflict among
members.

The ASEAN way is, however, more than a mere process. It is
also rooted in certain principles. One of these is the non-
interference by ASEAN in the internal affairs of any member
country, even if that country undertakes measures which can be
construed as undemocratic.

ASEAN has assiduously stuck to this principle all along as it
knows full well any breach of it could lead to the slippery slope
of recriminations that will eventually destroy ASEAN unity.

Another important principle is the emphasis on the social and
economic aims of ASEAN and the downplaying of any military
objective. For this reason, ASEAN has avoided a collective
defense agreement despite some voices within and outside it
advocating such.

The second factor is the ability to adapt to changing
circumstances. This can be seen in three examples.

One is the Bali Summit in 1976, which was a response to the
American withdrawal from Vietnam and the economic recession in
the mid-1970s ASEAN had to demonstrate collective resolve then to
meet the possible challenge of instability in South-east Asia.

Another example is the attempt to enhance economic co-
operation through NAFTA as a new glue for ASEAN unity once
supplied by the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

The third example is the establishment of the ARF which
demonstrates ASEAN recognition of the changed strategic
circumstances as a result of the end of the Cold War.

But instead of forming a collective defense pact, ASEAN
believes that the fluid power situation of post-Cold War Asia
gives ASEAN an opportunity to introduce the ASEAN way if not to
determine the ultimate power balance, at least to influence it.

While it remains to be seen whether ASEAN has successfully
adapted to the changed circumstances, the fact that it is
constantly attempting to do so helps to keep it from being an
outmoded organization.

Finally, the success of ASEAN is to some extent a result of
the success of its member countries in achieving impressive
economic growth and relative political stability. While the whole
cannot be said to be the sum of its parts, ASEAN as a group can
nevertheless bask in the reflected glory of its member countries.

Dr. Lee Poh Ping was, until recently, professor in the
Division of Public Administration, University of Malaya,
Malaysia.