Assessment of ASEAN's achievements at 30

Assessment of ASEAN's achievements at 30

Lee Poh Ping examines ASEAN's achievements after 30 years.

SINGAPORE: One would not think that the circumstances behind the formation of ASEAN in 1967 were particularly auspicious. Indonesia had just ended a period of confrontation with Malaysia and Singapore. The Republic had just separated from the Federation in an acrimonious atmosphere while there was still simmering a territorial dispute between Kuala Lumpur and Manila over the Sabah claim.

Neither was the then fledging regional grouping facing a benign international environment. Perceived in many quarters as an American inspired grouping, ASEAN faced hostility from communist powers such as the Soviet Union and China.

The "substructure", if the above could be considered the political "superstructure", of the ASEAN states was also not conducive to regional unity. Many of the divisions of mankind were found among the populations of ASEAN such as those that pertained to religion, race, ethnicity, tribalism and regionalism.

Compounding these was the economic and physical gap among the ASEAN countries. The economic gap was illustrated by a more advanced Singapore compared with a less advanced Indonesia. As for the physical gap, ASEAN constituted probably the only case of a regional grouping where many of its major countries are separated by fairly large expanses of water (the Philippines and Indonesia are not connected by land to Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) and are also island groupings themselves (the Philippines and Indonesia).

Almost all other regional groupings, successful or otherwise, were mostly land- or continent-based then, for example the organizations for African and American unity.

The European Common Market then was also continent-based. It is perhaps no accident that the subsequent inclusion of its offshore islands in the form of Great Britain was not a small source of discord in the search for European unity.

One should not exaggerate the potency of water-based divisions in this modern era of advanced communications. Nevertheless, the fact remains that there has always been a divide between island South-east Asia and mainland South-east Asia (then represented by Thailand but which also includes Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia) which could adversely affect ASEAN unity.

Yet 30 years hence in 1997 ASEAN has not only survived but has developed into an important force in the international relations of the area. Indeed in some quarters it is held up as a model of regional unity worthy of emulation.

To be sure, tensions between ASEAN countries on a bilateral level still flare up. Also, ASEAN has nowhere reached the level of unity of a European Union or even a North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) though ASEAN hopes to be a free trade area in the not too distant future.

Nevertheless, the development of an ASEAN spirit has gone a long way to ameliorate any bilateral tensions, and to enable the association to present a united front on many issues that affect the external relations of its member countries.

Examples of the former include the normalization of relations between Singapore and Malaysia after separation, the dropping of the Sabah claim by Marcos and, recently, the decision to resolve the territorial claims of Singapore and Malaysia and Malaysia and Indonesia through the mechanism of the world court.

This is not to say that the ASEAN spirit was the sole reason for such successes (there were also other compelling bilateral reasons). Nevertheless, the recognition that ASEAN unity could be destroyed if bilateral problems were not resolved probably acted as a constraint on such bilateral problems going out of control.

Of the latter, the most striking example has been the forging of a common ASEAN front against the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s despite reported disagreements among the member countries as to which communist power represented the long-term threat to South-east Asia.

If it were China (Indonesia and Malaysia purportedly held the view at that time), then Vietnam should not be resisted as it could be used against China. If it were Russia, resistance against Vietnam was justified as it was then perceived to be a Russian proxy. Bangkok and Singapore held this view, and because Thailand was the "frontline" state, the other ASEAN states deferred to it.

There are enough of other such examples for outside powers to take ASEAN seriously as a grouping. Indeed some powers, such as Japan, have always valued its close ties with ASEAN while former adversarial powers like Russia and China now seek ASEAN friendship. Such is ASEAN success in cultivating good relations with the big powers that China has said that it is comfortable in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) so long as it is under ASEAN "leadership" as it is confident the ARF would not turn into an anti-China forum.

To what factors can one attribute the success of ASEAN? There are primarily three.

The first are the careful and deliberate attempts by all members to maintain an ASEAN spirit on any issue touching the region.

The casual observer may see many of such attempts no more than formalistic if not unpleasant (golfing and five star hotel functions) exercises, lacking in real substance. The casual observer may be right in his perception of the inordinate amount of time spent in such exercises but may miss the fact that they do go some way in building confidence and reducing conflict among members.

The ASEAN way is, however, more than a mere process. It is also rooted in certain principles. One of these is the non- interference by ASEAN in the internal affairs of any member country, even if that country undertakes measures which can be construed as undemocratic.

ASEAN has assiduously stuck to this principle all along as it knows full well any breach of it could lead to the slippery slope of recriminations that will eventually destroy ASEAN unity.

Another important principle is the emphasis on the social and economic aims of ASEAN and the downplaying of any military objective. For this reason, ASEAN has avoided a collective defense agreement despite some voices within and outside it advocating such.

The second factor is the ability to adapt to changing circumstances. This can be seen in three examples.

One is the Bali Summit in 1976, which was a response to the American withdrawal from Vietnam and the economic recession in the mid-1970s ASEAN had to demonstrate collective resolve then to meet the possible challenge of instability in South-east Asia.

Another example is the attempt to enhance economic co- operation through NAFTA as a new glue for ASEAN unity once supplied by the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia.

The third example is the establishment of the ARF which demonstrates ASEAN recognition of the changed strategic circumstances as a result of the end of the Cold War.

But instead of forming a collective defense pact, ASEAN believes that the fluid power situation of post-Cold War Asia gives ASEAN an opportunity to introduce the ASEAN way if not to determine the ultimate power balance, at least to influence it.

While it remains to be seen whether ASEAN has successfully adapted to the changed circumstances, the fact that it is constantly attempting to do so helps to keep it from being an outmoded organization.

Finally, the success of ASEAN is to some extent a result of the success of its member countries in achieving impressive economic growth and relative political stability. While the whole cannot be said to be the sum of its parts, ASEAN as a group can nevertheless bask in the reflected glory of its member countries.

Dr. Lee Poh Ping was, until recently, professor in the Division of Public Administration, University of Malaya, Malaysia.