Assessing the Design of Separate Elections

General Elections (Pemilu) in Indonesia always seem to be a matter of trial and error. Every time we intend to change them, there is always a shifting constitutional justification. We can observe the sequence of facts since elections directly involved the people (direct democracy).

First, in the 2004, 2009, and 2014 elections, the presidential and vice-presidential elections were held separately from the legislative elections (DPR RI, DPD RI, and DPRD). Afterwards, regional head elections were held at different times according to the end of each term of office.

Second, it was only in 2019 and 2024 that the legislative elections and the presidential and vice-presidential elections were held simultaneously. After that, regional head elections were carried out in three stages according to the end of terms of office as a form of engineering, until in 2024 all elections were held simultaneously in the same year, from legislative elections, presidential and vice-presidential elections, to regional head elections.

Third, since the Constitutional Court issued Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024, the discourse on simultaneous elections has shifted towards simultaneous national and local elections. The constitutional implications are certainly different. In practical terms, the DPR RI and DPD RI elections will be synchronised with the presidential and vice-presidential elections, while the Provincial/Regency/City DPRD elections will be synchronised with the regional head and deputy regional head elections. For those who believe that Constitutional Court decisions are final and binding, this electoral model will begin to be implemented in 2029 and beyond.

I personally do not agree with the content and considerations of Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 because of several constitutional reasons. The main reason is the firm provision in Article 22E paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution regarding elections to elect members of the DPR, DPD, President and Vice President, and DPRD which are held every five years. In addition, as the Constitutional Court itself has held, the authority to determine the electoral system should rest with the legislature.

If we examine the history and models of electoral system changes, the impetus has always originated from Constitutional Court decisions. On this occasion, I will not debate which is the most supreme because that is a classic debate that continues to this day. Within the constitutional framework of the 1945 Constitution, the President, the DPR RI, and the Constitutional Court each hold their own powers and authority under the principle of checks and balances.

As a member of the DPR RI who holds legislative power, I believe our elections must indeed be separated. The vast territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI), the large number of voters, and the tiered government units from provinces, regencies, to cities with decentralised authority demand a separated model. This is not only from a constitutional aspect, but also from the technical side and the burden of administration.

If I had the opportunity and ability to choose the electoral model and system, I would choose legislative elections that are separate from the presidential and vice-presidential elections. After that, regional head and deputy regional head elections would be held simultaneously.

The reason is, why do we have many political parties and spend expensive election administration costs if after the election the public only discusses the programmes of the elected president and vice president. There is no differentiation among political parties, and the public’s focus before, during, and after the election is solely on the presidential and vice-presidential election and its programmes.

I believe that from the outset the 1945 Constitution did not intend this kind of presidentialism model. The 1945 Constitution places political parties as constitutional institutions with a broader purpose, not merely as overseers of the president and vice president, but also expects the DPR RI to be in an equal position to fight for the people’s interests. Likewise with regional heads and deputy regional heads who are directly elected.

Therefore, the discussion on electoral models and systems must be opened as widely as possible, not limited to Constitutional Court Decision Number 55/PUU-XVII/2019 concerning the five-box election or Constitutional Court Decision Number 135/PUU-XXII/2024 which divides national and local elections.

Especially for the President and the DPR RI as legislators, we must open our minds to various best alternatives without being constrained by those decisions. As C.F. Strong said in his book on modern political constitutions, a constitution is dynamic, open, and the result of a compromise of social and political forces of its time so that it remains relevant to the times.

Ahmad Irawan. Member of Commission II & the Legislation Body of the DPR RI, Golkar Party faction.