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Assessing the Competitiveness of Indonesia’s Defence Market Today

| Source: CNBC Indonesia Translated from Indonesian | Business
Assessing the Competitiveness of Indonesia’s Defence Market Today
Image: CNBC Indonesia

During the third decade of the 21st century, Indonesia has allocated more than US$70 billion in foreign loans for weapons procurement programmes. The figure could rise further if the government increases the Ministry of Defence’s foreign-loan quota over the next year.

Domestic loans for the decade have also totalled nearly Rp100 trillion. Annual state-budget allocations for capital spending from domestic funds should also be taken into account, as should State Budget General Treasurer (BA BUN) allocations for defence spending.

With such substantial funding, Indonesia has rapidly become an attractive market for international defence manufacturers. This is evident from the past five years, during which foreign manufacturers that had previously shown little interest in Indonesia’s defence market suddenly devoted considerable resources to marketing campaigns in the country.

Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) making their first appearance in Indonesia have sometimes secured contracts from the Ministry of Defence. Other arms manufacturers that already had a foothold in the domestic market have unexpectedly benefited from the expansion of products they can sell, following the ministry’s decision to acquire particular weapons systems.

This was the situation under the 2020–2024 Minimum Essential Force (MEF), when Indonesia’s defence market was relatively competitive, open and transparent to all foreign players. Competition between defence manufacturers was relatively open, although decision-makers showed some preference for weapons systems from particular countries in certain product categories.

There was still a level playing field during the 2020–2024 MEF period, allowing several OEMs to offer Indonesia their best solutions. Indonesia was also willing to abide by the rules governing defence trade followed by some arms manufacturers, including requirements relating to good governance and compliance.

The situation began to change when Indonesia entered the 2025–2029 Optimum Essential Force (OEF) period. A defence market that was relatively competitive and open to all foreign players has become a thing of the past. Preferential treatment has become commonplace, with no direct correlation between decision-makers’ preferences and the quality of the defence products offered to Indonesia.

The level playing field has also become a thing of the past, as only defence equipment manufacturers from certain countries are given priority for procurement. As for good governance and compliance, current conditions suggest that international firms adhering to these practices have little chance of winning Indonesian contracts.

The Ministry of Defence’s decision to keep the procurement list in the 2025–2029 Special Blue Book and its supporting documents under wraps has made Indonesia’s defence market even less transparent. At least since the Reformasi era, the Special Medium-Term Foreign Loan Plan List (DRPLN-JM) has never before consisted solely of lump-sum allocations, without any details of the programmes involved.

The lack of transparency leaves foreign defence manufacturers operating in Indonesia uncertain, since they do not know whether the solutions they offer are included in the Ministry of Defence’s procurement plans. Transparency is closely linked to good governance and compliance, which are fundamental principles for OEMs from developed countries.

How, then, will Indonesia’s defence market be structured through the end of this decade in terms of competitiveness? And how will that structure affect Indonesia’s defence capabilities from the 2030s onwards?

How can the country pursue its ambition to strengthen its domestic defence industry when the choice of potential foreign partners is so limited? Is there still any hope of making Indonesia’s market attractive to the majority of global arms manufacturers?

First, the structure of the defence market. At least until the end of this decade, Indonesia’s defence market is unlikely to be competitive for OEMs from Western Europe and the United States. Several factors account for this, including decision-makers’ preferences and the shift from direct Government-to-Government (G-to-G) and Government-to-Business (G-to-B) procurement to indirect acquisition involving brokers.

This shift in procurement arrangements also affects the application of good governance and compliance. Companies from developed countries cannot compromise on these requirements because they face potential legal risks.

Second, the impact of the market structure. In the medium and long term, an uncompetitive defence market will affect Indonesia’s defence capabilities. The quality of imported weapons systems is a major question in the absence of transparent procurement plans. The integration of a range of military equipment from different countries, with varying levels of quality, also needs attention.

A key to victory in current and future warfare is the integration of defence equipment. Indonesia, however, continues to prioritise acquiring platforms rather than integrating different platforms to establish unified command and control.

Third, the ambition to strengthen the national defence industry. To date, offset programmes that have made a significant contribution to improving the capabilities of Indonesian defence firms have come from several countries with stringent rules governing defence trade.

Decision-makers’ preference for defence products from particular countries, combined with changes to procurement arrangements, raises questions about whether offset programmes linked to weapons-system acquisitions will make a significant contribution.

Moreover, offset programmes from countries favoured by decision-makers have so far made no significant contribution to increasing the capacity of the domestic defence industry.

There is little reason to hope that Indonesia’s defence market will become attractive to most international OEMs unless diplomatic pressure is applied by countries whose defence products are gradually being sidelined by decision-makers’ preferences and procurement arrangements that undermine a level playing field.

Government-to-Government procurement models such as Foreign Military Sales and Excess Defense Articles may still be possible if the United States can encourage Indonesia to adopt them. Government-to-Business acquisition is also not out of the question if a country, or a group of countries producing defence equipment, can persuade Indonesia to use that approach. Without diplomatic engagement, it will be difficult to expect G-to-G and G-to-B models to be applied in defence trade with Indonesia.

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Cite this article
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/assessing-the-competitiveness-of-indonesias-defence-market-today-1792644666)
Originally published by CNBC Indonesia (https://www.cnbcindonesia.com/opini/20261022102453-14-778499/mengukur-daya-saing-pasar-pertahanan-indonesia-saat-ini), translated from Indonesian
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