Assessing Taiwan's 'southward policy'

Assessing Taiwan's 'southward policy'

Samuel C.Y. Ku analyses whether Taiwan has bitten off more than it can chew in striving for a diplomatic breakthrough in Southeast Asia.

In November 1993, Taiwan launched its "Southward Policy". According to an "Operation Outline", enunciated in March 1994, the Southward Policy intends to achieve four key objectives.

The first objective is to expand two-way economic, trading and investment relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Second, the policy aims at assisting Taiwanese enterprises in sourcing beneficial production and distribution bases in Southeast Asia, expanding their management sizes, and ultimately reducing Taiwan's trade dependence on mainland China.

Third, it intends to assist Southeast Asian countries economically, based on the principle of mutual benefit through creating job opportunities, raising annual incomes and encouraging economic prosperity, thus strengthening Taiwan's relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Finally, through the Southward Policy, Taiwan hopes to participate in the activities of international economic organizations in Southeast Asia.

As is obvious, the first three stated objectives of the policy are economic in orientation, while the last appears more political. Superficially and officially, the Taipei government's Southward Policy is focused on economic goals.

In reality, however, the overall objective of the policy is to strengthen economic ties with Southeast Asian countries in exchange for Taiwan's political participation in international organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.

Taiwan's economic achievements have been recognized worldwide, but its political status in international society has not paralleled those achievements. Though it is true that Taiwan needs to maintain and expand its economic development in order to survive in the increasingly competitive world economy, it is even more important for it to obtain an equivalent political standing in the global community. It is here that the Southward Policy comes into play.

The leading advocate of the policy has been Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, who through pragmatic diplomacy, has been attempting to create more diplomatic space for Taiwan. Although the policy has been in place for only a short while, it is worthwhile evaluating its effect thus far.

Because of the looming shadow of China, Taiwan's Southward Policy has not achieved its apparent political goals. The PRC strongly holds to the "One-China policy", whereas Taiwan denounced this rigid policy in 1991 when the Mobilization and Anti-Communist Act was suspended. Taipei's efforts to upgrade its political standing in the international community have been viewed by Beijing as a direct challenge to Chinese sovereignty and to the One-China policy.

As such, Beijing has successfully checkmated Taipei's pursuit of the political goals underlying the Southward Policy. This was exemplified by the mixed results of the Taiwanese leader's visits to three Asean countries in early 1994.

In those visits, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand reacted in a lukewarm, if not negative, fashion to President Lee's requests, including his desire for Taiwan to become a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, seen by Taipei as crucial in elevating its security dilemma to an international level. Moreover, he expressed a desire to be invited to the annual APEC summit meetings, but again to no avail.

Clearly, the ASEAN countries' deference to China was the key factor constraining any breakthrough by the Taiwanese President and exemplified the difficulties of achieving any political success for the Southward Policy. In that respect, if Taiwan anticipates obtaining better results from the policy, several things need to be done.

Firstly, there must be a recognition that any improvement in bilateral political relations with Southeast Asia needs to be built upon better mutual economic and social relations over a long timeframe.

Secondly, when developing economic relations with the ASEAN countries, it is important to have direct involvement by Taiwanese private enterprises, rather than just state-owned and KMT-owned corporations.

Thirdly, the Southward Policy should integrate all possible resources in Taiwan, and should not be seen as merely the objective of the Taipei government, but of the Taiwanese themselves.

And finally, there must be a recognition that while exerting efforts to upgrade its political status, Taiwan will have no way to avoid intervention by Beijing, but can minimize its effect. In that respect, it is fundamental for Taiwan to promote rational and practical relations in its dealings with the mainland. This would be non-provocative and beneficial not just to the two sides, but also to the wider Asia-Pacific community which has an interest in cordial relations among all states in the region.

Dr. Samuel C.Y. Ku is Associate Professor at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University in Taipei.