Assessing Taiwan's 'southward policy'

Assessing Taiwan's 'southward policy'

Samuel C.Y. Ku analyses whether Taiwan has bitten off more than
it can chew in striving for a diplomatic breakthrough in
Southeast Asia.

In November 1993, Taiwan launched its "Southward Policy".
According to an "Operation Outline", enunciated in March 1994,
the Southward Policy intends to achieve four key objectives.

The first objective is to expand two-way economic, trading and
investment relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Second, the policy aims at assisting Taiwanese enterprises in
sourcing beneficial production and distribution bases in
Southeast Asia, expanding their management sizes, and ultimately
reducing Taiwan's trade dependence on mainland China.

Third, it intends to assist Southeast Asian countries
economically, based on the principle of mutual benefit through
creating job opportunities, raising annual incomes and
encouraging economic prosperity, thus strengthening Taiwan's
relations with Southeast Asian countries.

Finally, through the Southward Policy, Taiwan hopes to
participate in the activities of international economic
organizations in Southeast Asia.

As is obvious, the first three stated objectives of the policy
are economic in orientation, while the last appears more
political. Superficially and officially, the Taipei government's
Southward Policy is focused on economic goals.

In reality, however, the overall objective of the policy is to
strengthen economic ties with Southeast Asian countries in
exchange for Taiwan's political participation in international
organizations in the Asia-Pacific region.

Taiwan's economic achievements have been recognized worldwide,
but its political status in international society has not
paralleled those achievements. Though it is true that Taiwan
needs to maintain and expand its economic development in order to
survive in the increasingly competitive world economy, it is even
more important for it to obtain an equivalent political standing
in the global community. It is here that the Southward Policy
comes into play.

The leading advocate of the policy has been Taiwanese
President Lee Teng-hui, who through pragmatic diplomacy, has been
attempting to create more diplomatic space for Taiwan. Although
the policy has been in place for only a short while, it is
worthwhile evaluating its effect thus far.

Because of the looming shadow of China, Taiwan's Southward
Policy has not achieved its apparent political goals. The PRC
strongly holds to the "One-China policy", whereas Taiwan
denounced this rigid policy in 1991 when the Mobilization and
Anti-Communist Act was suspended. Taipei's efforts to upgrade its
political standing in the international community have been
viewed by Beijing as a direct challenge to Chinese sovereignty
and to the One-China policy.

As such, Beijing has successfully checkmated Taipei's pursuit
of the political goals underlying the Southward Policy. This was
exemplified by the mixed results of the Taiwanese leader's visits
to three Asean countries in early 1994.

In those visits, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand
reacted in a lukewarm, if not negative, fashion to President
Lee's requests, including his desire for Taiwan to become a
member of the ASEAN Regional Forum, seen by Taipei as crucial in
elevating its security dilemma to an international level.
Moreover, he expressed a desire to be invited to the annual APEC
summit meetings, but again to no avail.

Clearly, the ASEAN countries' deference to China was the key
factor constraining any breakthrough by the Taiwanese President
and exemplified the difficulties of achieving any political
success for the Southward Policy. In that respect, if Taiwan
anticipates obtaining better results from the policy, several
things need to be done.

Firstly, there must be a recognition that any improvement in
bilateral political relations with Southeast Asia needs to be
built upon better mutual economic and social relations over a
long timeframe.

Secondly, when developing economic relations with the ASEAN
countries, it is important to have direct involvement by
Taiwanese private enterprises, rather than just state-owned and
KMT-owned corporations.

Thirdly, the Southward Policy should integrate all possible
resources in Taiwan, and should not be seen as merely the
objective of the Taipei government, but of the Taiwanese
themselves.

And finally, there must be a recognition that while exerting
efforts to upgrade its political status, Taiwan will have no way
to avoid intervention by Beijing, but can minimize its effect. In
that respect, it is fundamental for Taiwan to promote rational
and practical relations in its dealings with the mainland. This
would be non-provocative and beneficial not just to the two
sides, but also to the wider Asia-Pacific community which has an
interest in cordial relations among all states in the region.

Dr. Samuel C.Y. Ku is Associate Professor at the Institute for
Interdisciplinary Studies at the National Sun Yat-sen University
in Taipei.