ASEAN deals with China's ambition

ASEAN deals with China's ambition

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): A conference on defense and security in
Singapore recently attended by representatives of think tanks
from ASEAN has expressed growing apprehension over the growth of
China's economic and military might.

They generally agreed that ASEAN's decision to accept Myanmar
as a member was greatly influenced by China's growing military
capacity and prowess.

Opinions aired in and outside the conference reflected
trepidation about China's intentions. For example, that ASEAN
could not discount the possibility of China exercising the rights
of a Middle Kingdom or about possible hegemonic ambitions of
China in the region, especially since it has clearly said it
would modernize its army. Another cause of ASEAN apprehension is
Beijing's claim to all the islands and reefs in the South China
Sea. This has caused several disputes with ASEAN members. As a
result, distrust of China is now visibly rising despite its
assurance that it will not undertake any unilateral action that
could cause tension which could destabilize the region.

The question now is how should ASEAN react? The conference
concluded that ASEAN should adopt a policy of caution towards
China, although China still has to learn how to behave. There is
still hope that by its opening and its integration into the
society regionally and globally, China might become an important
and a responsible partner in the Asia-Pacific.

This view was also reflected in a recently published book
"Living with China: U.S-China Relations in the Twenty-First
Century", edited by Ezra Vogel, a Columbia University Professor,
and written by a number of China specialists, which sees China's
rise in world affairs as a growing power and not as a threat, but
also as an opportunity for other powers to establish stable,
workable relations with one-quarter of the world's population and
to integrate China peacefully and constructively into the norms
and institutions of the global community.

They contend that a prosperous and stable China will be in the
interests of stability in the Asia-Pacific, and that a China
fully integrated into the international system is far less
destabilizing than a China isolated from it. There are, of course
tough issues which China should address, like for example,
Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, nuclear proliferation, Korea, the
South China Sea, regional security and environmental concerns
which the writers discussed comprehensively and in depth.

The contributors, therefore, advocate working with China to
address and resolve these and other issues, rather than
criticizing China's behavior.

On the other hand, there are those who argue that historical
evidence has shown that a rising great power will challenge the
world order of the preceding great power. And picking up where
Huntington left off in The Clash of Civilizations, they assert --
with the looming China threat in the background -- that an
eventual armed conflict between the U.S. and China should not be
discounted as China's arrival on the economic and more than
likely military scene as a major superpower early in the next
century is unprecedented in its challenge to the international
system. It also arrives on the international scene complete with
a range of cultural, linguistic, and racial ties and with
traditional allies encompassing much of Asia.

This spectrum of opinion which was expressed in "The Coming
Conflict With China" written by Richard Bernstein and Ross H.
Munro, asserts that Beijing has concluded that the U.S. is its
main strategic enemy and that all policy instruments should be
directed at reducing American hegemony and power. It sees China's
strategies for dealing with both Taiwan and Japan as part of
Beijing's larger design to dominate and become the paramount
power in East Asia.

This view is disputed by those who are more inclined to adopt
a constructive approach towards China. They question the premise
on which this view is based not only in terms of Beijing's
intentions, but particularly because China will lack the military
capabilities to do so for at least a quarter century. This
constructive approach, based on dialogue and engagement with
China, or as ASEAN members like to call it "constructive
engagement", may be effective in the short term as China will
pursue its irredentism carefully as Beijing can be restrained by
concerns over high political risk and superior countervailing
force.

But even in the short term, this pattern of creeping Chinese
assertiveness was shown in three incidents. In early 1995, we saw
the seizure of Mischief Reef from the Philippines, in March 1996,
it made bellicose threats against Taiwan's electoral process; and
in March 1997, China occupied a Vietnamese gas field. Each of
these events demonstrated a single clear pattern and lesson for
East Asia and Southeast Asia, i.e. that an unconstrained China
will take what it claims as its own, albeit carefully.

It only pauses when it meets superior power. This was clearly
demonstrated by the events surrounding Chinese threats to Taiwan
in March 1996. The deployment of two American aircraft carrier
battle groups -- the largest American deployment in East Asia
since the Vietnam war -- forced Beijing to back down.

The conflict with Vietnam over the disputed gas field is
another case in point. When China put its Kan Tan III drilling
rig 90 kilometers off Vietnam's Chan may Dong Cape, it was only a
small, 50 kilometer step from the yacheng gas field (with an
estimated 3.4 trillion cubic feet of gas), which lies south of
Hainan Island, where China is building a pipeline for gas
supplies to the mainland and Hong Kong. Hainan's booming economy
is in great need of increasing energy supplies.

Not only would the specific Yacheng field make far more
commercial sense if more gas supplies could be found in the
region, but China as a whole knows it must secure vast new energy
resources to fuel its economic growth.

The pattern of creeping Chinese assertiveness by taking small
steps forward, create new facts, and wait patiently for an
opportunity to move further is evidenced by events surrounding
the Paracel Islands in the 1970 which now is entirely under
Chinese control. The same pattern of action might be applied
towards the Spratley Islands which has become the focus of
Beijing's attention.

All these patterns of action clearly violate the agreement
ASEAN thought it had with China, i.e. that further change in the
status of these territorial disputes would be by mutual
agreement. Similarly, despite Chinese assurances to the
Philippine government that it would not use force in the dispute
over the Mischief Reef, Filipino fishermen were forcefully
ejected from that area. More than two years after that incident,
ASEAN is still trying to get China's public promise to adhere to
ASEAN's 1992 Manila Declaration, which calls for only peaceful
solutions to the South China Sea disputes.

China's behavior towards the islands in the South China Sea
and after the conflict over the Senkaku Islands erupted in 1996,
also is increasingly a major concern for Japan. A Gallup poll in
March this year showed a 22-point rise (to 44 percent) in the
percentage of Japanese who in the past year identified China as a
threat. When Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Vietnam
while visiting ASEAN countries in January 1997, he reportedly had
fruitful discussions on security issues, most prominently on the
China problem. The two governments agreed to strengthen their
military exchanges and security dialogue about China.

An important motive for Vietnam joining ASEAN in July 1995,
most likely was to deter China through association with allies.
This strategy has so far had only the slightest impact. Therefore
Vietnam needs stronger allies, at least in the short-term, beyond
ASEAN. It is interesting to note in this context the steady
improvement in U.S. military relations which is intended to give
a clear signal to China.

The visit by Admiral Prueher, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of
the Pacific Command on March 20 to March 22 was described by the
admiral as a "nascent military relationship without an end-game
in sight". In discussions with the Vietnamese, the range of
topics dealt with were among others, arms sales, training
exchanges (including jungle warfare), and tactical discussions.
Admiral Prueher's visit came only a few weeks after a mission of
Vietnamese officers went to U.S. facilities in Hawaii and
Washington.

ASEAN is now having to decide how to make sure that a policy
of "constructive engagement" toward China can be effective given
ASEAN's reluctance to publicly express its strong displeasure
about another Asian state's behavior and instead choosing to deal
with it in an "ASEAN" way. Another constraint for ASEAN as a
regional organization for getting support from a superior power
in restraining China, is the principle of non-interference by
outside powers in Southeast Asian affairs.

There seems, however, among ASEAN members a growing support
for sending signals which could constrain China's creeping
assertiveness. For example, Indonesia whose Natuna gas fields in
the southern Spratley Islands are the world's largest, has come
to appreciate that it too might suffer "a Mischief Reef" if it
does not look after its own security. The Agreement on Security
with Australia in 1995 and large-scale military maneuvers in the
Natuna area in 1996 were signals that constraining China was
needed.

The wilder scenarios mentioned before about the coming war
with China, e.g. Samuel Huntington's concluding chapter in "the
Clash of Civilizations" are wide of the mark. Although these
fictional accounts of a war with China begin with a Vietnamese-
Chinese clash over energy resources in the South China Sea, they
grossly exaggerate China's military power. Equally significantly,
they seriously minimize the relative ease with which a currently
relatively weak China can be constrained, if only China's current
and prospective victims would not be so self-constrained.

Dr. Hilman Adil is Director Center of Social and Cultural
Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

Window: Similarly, despite Chinese assurances to the Philippine
government that it would not use force in the dispute over the
Mischief Reef, Filipino fishermen were forcefully ejected from
that area.