ASEAN deals with China's ambition

By Hilman Adil

JAKARTA (JP): A conference on defense and security in Singapore recently attended by representatives of think tanks from ASEAN has expressed growing apprehension over the growth of China's economic and military might.

They generally agreed that ASEAN's decision to accept Myanmar as a member was greatly influenced by China's growing military capacity and prowess.

Opinions aired in and outside the conference reflected trepidation about China's intentions. For example, that ASEAN could not discount the possibility of China exercising the rights of a Middle Kingdom or about possible hegemonic ambitions of China in the region, especially since it has clearly said it would modernize its army. Another cause of ASEAN apprehension is Beijing's claim to all the islands and reefs in the South China Sea. This has caused several disputes with ASEAN members. As a result, distrust of China is now visibly rising despite its assurance that it will not undertake any unilateral action that could cause tension which could destabilize the region.

The question now is how should ASEAN react? The conference concluded that ASEAN should adopt a policy of caution towards China, although China still has to learn how to behave. There is still hope that by its opening and its integration into the society regionally and globally, China might become an important and a responsible partner in the Asia-Pacific.

This view was also reflected in a recently published book "Living with China: U.S-China Relations in the Twenty-First Century", edited by Ezra Vogel, a Columbia University Professor, and written by a number of China specialists, which sees China's rise in world affairs as a growing power and not as a threat, but also as an opportunity for other powers to establish stable, workable relations with one-quarter of the world's population and to integrate China peacefully and constructively into the norms and institutions of the global community.

They contend that a prosperous and stable China will be in the interests of stability in the Asia-Pacific, and that a China fully integrated into the international system is far less destabilizing than a China isolated from it. There are, of course tough issues which China should address, like for example, Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, nuclear proliferation, Korea, the South China Sea, regional security and environmental concerns which the writers discussed comprehensively and in depth.

The contributors, therefore, advocate working with China to address and resolve these and other issues, rather than criticizing China's behavior.

On the other hand, there are those who argue that historical evidence has shown that a rising great power will challenge the world order of the preceding great power. And picking up where Huntington left off in The Clash of Civilizations, they assert -- with the looming China threat in the background -- that an eventual armed conflict between the U.S. and China should not be discounted as China's arrival on the economic and more than likely military scene as a major superpower early in the next century is unprecedented in its challenge to the international system. It also arrives on the international scene complete with a range of cultural, linguistic, and racial ties and with traditional allies encompassing much of Asia.

This spectrum of opinion which was expressed in "The Coming Conflict With China" written by Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, asserts that Beijing has concluded that the U.S. is its main strategic enemy and that all policy instruments should be directed at reducing American hegemony and power. It sees China's strategies for dealing with both Taiwan and Japan as part of Beijing's larger design to dominate and become the paramount power in East Asia.

This view is disputed by those who are more inclined to adopt a constructive approach towards China. They question the premise on which this view is based not only in terms of Beijing's intentions, but particularly because China will lack the military capabilities to do so for at least a quarter century. This constructive approach, based on dialogue and engagement with China, or as ASEAN members like to call it "constructive engagement", may be effective in the short term as China will pursue its irredentism carefully as Beijing can be restrained by concerns over high political risk and superior countervailing force.

But even in the short term, this pattern of creeping Chinese assertiveness was shown in three incidents. In early 1995, we saw the seizure of Mischief Reef from the Philippines, in March 1996, it made bellicose threats against Taiwan's electoral process; and in March 1997, China occupied a Vietnamese gas field. Each of these events demonstrated a single clear pattern and lesson for East Asia and Southeast Asia, i.e. that an unconstrained China will take what it claims as its own, albeit carefully.

It only pauses when it meets superior power. This was clearly demonstrated by the events surrounding Chinese threats to Taiwan in March 1996. The deployment of two American aircraft carrier battle groups -- the largest American deployment in East Asia since the Vietnam war -- forced Beijing to back down.

The conflict with Vietnam over the disputed gas field is another case in point. When China put its Kan Tan III drilling rig 90 kilometers off Vietnam's Chan may Dong Cape, it was only a small, 50 kilometer step from the yacheng gas field (with an estimated 3.4 trillion cubic feet of gas), which lies south of Hainan Island, where China is building a pipeline for gas supplies to the mainland and Hong Kong. Hainan's booming economy is in great need of increasing energy supplies.

Not only would the specific Yacheng field make far more commercial sense if more gas supplies could be found in the region, but China as a whole knows it must secure vast new energy resources to fuel its economic growth.

The pattern of creeping Chinese assertiveness by taking small steps forward, create new facts, and wait patiently for an opportunity to move further is evidenced by events surrounding the Paracel Islands in the 1970 which now is entirely under Chinese control. The same pattern of action might be applied towards the Spratley Islands which has become the focus of Beijing's attention.

All these patterns of action clearly violate the agreement ASEAN thought it had with China, i.e. that further change in the status of these territorial disputes would be by mutual agreement. Similarly, despite Chinese assurances to the Philippine government that it would not use force in the dispute over the Mischief Reef, Filipino fishermen were forcefully ejected from that area. More than two years after that incident, ASEAN is still trying to get China's public promise to adhere to ASEAN's 1992 Manila Declaration, which calls for only peaceful solutions to the South China Sea disputes.

China's behavior towards the islands in the South China Sea and after the conflict over the Senkaku Islands erupted in 1996, also is increasingly a major concern for Japan. A Gallup poll in March this year showed a 22-point rise (to 44 percent) in the percentage of Japanese who in the past year identified China as a threat. When Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto visited Vietnam while visiting ASEAN countries in January 1997, he reportedly had fruitful discussions on security issues, most prominently on the China problem. The two governments agreed to strengthen their military exchanges and security dialogue about China.

An important motive for Vietnam joining ASEAN in July 1995, most likely was to deter China through association with allies. This strategy has so far had only the slightest impact. Therefore Vietnam needs stronger allies, at least in the short-term, beyond ASEAN. It is interesting to note in this context the steady improvement in U.S. military relations which is intended to give a clear signal to China.

The visit by Admiral Prueher, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command on March 20 to March 22 was described by the admiral as a "nascent military relationship without an end-game in sight". In discussions with the Vietnamese, the range of topics dealt with were among others, arms sales, training exchanges (including jungle warfare), and tactical discussions. Admiral Prueher's visit came only a few weeks after a mission of Vietnamese officers went to U.S. facilities in Hawaii and Washington.

ASEAN is now having to decide how to make sure that a policy of "constructive engagement" toward China can be effective given ASEAN's reluctance to publicly express its strong displeasure about another Asian state's behavior and instead choosing to deal with it in an "ASEAN" way. Another constraint for ASEAN as a regional organization for getting support from a superior power in restraining China, is the principle of non-interference by outside powers in Southeast Asian affairs.

There seems, however, among ASEAN members a growing support for sending signals which could constrain China's creeping assertiveness. For example, Indonesia whose Natuna gas fields in the southern Spratley Islands are the world's largest, has come to appreciate that it too might suffer "a Mischief Reef" if it does not look after its own security. The Agreement on Security with Australia in 1995 and large-scale military maneuvers in the Natuna area in 1996 were signals that constraining China was needed.

The wilder scenarios mentioned before about the coming war with China, e.g. Samuel Huntington's concluding chapter in "the Clash of Civilizations" are wide of the mark. Although these fictional accounts of a war with China begin with a Vietnamese- Chinese clash over energy resources in the South China Sea, they grossly exaggerate China's military power. Equally significantly, they seriously minimize the relative ease with which a currently relatively weak China can be constrained, if only China's current and prospective victims would not be so self-constrained.

Dr. Hilman Adil is Director Center of Social and Cultural Studies at the Indonesian Institute of Sciences.

Window: Similarly, despite Chinese assurances to the Philippine government that it would not use force in the dispute over the Mischief Reef, Filipino fishermen were forcefully ejected from that area.