Analyst Highlights Relevance of Tenure Limits in the Presidential System
Senior political analyst Boni Hargens proposes a two-term limit for members of the Indonesian DPR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat). He argues the limit is essential to prevent the monopolisation of power and to ensure healthy political regeneration in parliament.
In a presidential system, Boni says, there is a legal and political logic for term limits that should apply to all publicly elected positions chosen directly by the people at elections.
“Presidents are limited to two terms, and regional heads to two terms. The principle is to prevent power monopolies derived from the people’s mandate. In this context, the DPR’s term should also be limited to a maximum of two terms,” he said in a written statement on Friday (22 May 2026).
He lamented the reality in Senayan where several legislators have remained in office for more than four consecutive terms. “That is more than 20 years in the parliament. In a system that proclaims itself democratic and representative, such durations raise serious questions about the true quality of representation,” he said.
This phenomenon of veteran figures staying on for decades prompts critical questions. Boni questioned whether their repeated election is truly a reflection of the people’s will or whether it is supported by political finance dominance and patronage networks entrenched in Indonesia’s electoral system.
He also pointed to the DPR’s recent push to cap the tenure of the Police Chief (Kapolri) at three years on grounds of organisational refreshment. Boni says the DPR is applying double standards.
“If the DPR wishes to cap the Kapolri’s tenure on grounds of regeneration, then logically and consistently the DPR should first set tenure limits for its own members, as applies to the president and regional heads. Without this, such a proposal risks being seen as a selective political manoeuvre,” he asserted.
Boni explained that law enforcement institutions such as Polri and the TNI operate under a very different logic of regeneration from political institutions. Career progression within security institutions rests on rank, internal promotion, performance evaluations, and retirement ages, not five-year electoral cycles.
Mixing these logics is conceptually incorrect and risks undermining established governance. Boni argued that if the DPR is serious about strengthening accountability and professionalism within the Bhayangkara Corps, the route is not to cut the president’s prerogative through tenure limits on the Kapolri.
“A more appropriate mechanism is to strengthen external oversight, ensure transparency of track records in the Kapolri selection process, and implement a measurable performance-evaluation framework, not tenure limits that are constitutionally counterproductive,” he concluded.