Amending Indonesia's Human Rights Law and the Struggle for Moral Authority
Criticism over the revision of the Human Rights Law and the position of Komnas HAM again reveals a familiar pattern in Indonesia’s democratic discourse: any change to state institutions is immediately suspected as an attempt to weaken democracy (Lev, 1990; Aspinall, 2010). An article titled ‘Amendment Human Rights Bill won’t strengthen Komnas HAM’ fits this pattern. The message is clear: the law revision is framed as a threat to Komnas HAM’s independence and a state move to control the human rights agenda (Observer ID, 2026).
In the state system, Komnas HAM is not a primary branch of power like the legislature, executive, or judiciary. It is a state auxiliary body—a supporting institution tasked with monitoring, investigation, mediation, human rights education, and providing recommendations (Asshiddiqie, 2006). Its independence cannot be interpreted as complete separation from state coordination.
In modern governance, inter-agency coordination is fundamental for implementing human rights policies involving multiple sectors. Problems arise when independence is viewed absolutely, as if any government relationship automatically equates to co-optation. This perspective leads to placing Komnas HAM above public scrutiny, making criticism of its effectiveness and institutional design easily dismissed as a threat to democracy.
Most criticism of the Human Rights Law revision remains shaped by the psychological legacy of the 1998 Reformasi, when the state was seen as a threat to civil liberties and Komnas HAM positioned as a moral bulwark. This perspective has strong historical roots in the transition from authoritarianism.
However, the current situation has grown far more complex, where human rights issues no longer solely concern state repression but also the inefficacy of the human rights bureaucracy itself—such as piled-up complaints, unimplemented recommendations, weak inter-agency coordination, and recurring jurisdictional conflicts (Komnas HAM RI, 2024).
An under-discussed issue is Komnas HAM’s limited authority within Indonesia’s legal system. The public observes a recurring pattern: investigations are conducted, recommendations issued, yet legal processes often stall without effective follow-up. Consequently, Komnas HAM functions more as a moral authority and political pressure generator than an institution with strong enforcement power in human rights implementation.
It is also crucial to critique that attention to human rights issues reveals stark imbalances: cases receiving focus are those with political and media appeal. Everyday human rights concerns—such as racial discrimination, limited access to clean water, elderly vulnerability, disability exclusion, structural poverty, environmental degradation, and digital economic exploitation—receive comparatively little attention.
This imbalance stems from a public attention structure easily drawn to symbolic issues, political conflicts, and high-media-appeal cases.
The assumption that the state and human rights are inherently in conflict is an outdated view. In modern governance theory, human rights fulfillment depends on the state’s capacity to provide effective regulation, public services, budgets, and bureaucracy (Sen, 1999; Fukuyama, 2013).
Some conflicts between Komnas HAM and the Ministry of Human Rights may stem from inter-agency jurisdictional competition. Sigmund Freud described the ‘narcissism of small differences’, where intense conflicts often occur between closely aligned groups (Freud, 1930/1961).
Since both operate within human rights issues, inter-agency competition for influence and legitimacy is inevitable. In this context, some criticism may not be purely about democracy but also institutional anxiety (Bourdieu, 1991).
These concerns are not entirely unfounded. The gradual weakening of independence through bureaucratic mechanisms has occurred before. Budgetary dependence, administrative pressure, and government political priorities can erode an HAM institution’s critical capacity, leading to technocratic human rights—reduced to administrative reports, performance indicators, and bureaucratic procedures without social transformative power (Habermas, 1975; Foucault, 1991).
Therefore, independent oversight remains vital. However, healthy oversight requires proportionality. Inter-agency coordination does not automatically equate to co-optation; it is a normal and necessary aspect of modern state governance.
Past political trauma is important for learning, but when all proposed changes are framed as threats, debate becomes irrational, defensive, and loses focus on public human rights interests. Human rights issues are shifting from dominant political violence concerns to social challenges like poverty, illiteracy, inequality, vulnerability, and weak social protection.
These challenges cannot be resolved through moral criticism or rhetoric. Effective human rights enforcement requires implementation capacity, functional bureaucracy, inter-agency coordination, and effective public policies (Weber, 1978; Fukuyama, 2013).
Debates on the Human Rights Law revision should focus on balancing independent oversight, state administrative capacity, and public accountability based on facts and evidence. In this context, the revision should serve as a collective evaluation space to build more rational, effective human rights governance focused on solving real societal issues. (H-4)
Media plays a crucial role as a bridge for articulation between the people and authorities. Natalius Pigai assesses the importance of collaboration with the press in