After the Hajj Queue Drops to 14 Years, What Next?
News from the Palace on Monday (28/09/2026) felt like an oasis for millions of Muslim families who have spent years setting aside resources to perform the pilgrimage at the Kaaba. Following a meeting with President Prabowo Subianto, the Minister and Deputy Minister of Hajj and Umrah announced that the Hajj queue, which was previously 49 years and later reduced to 26 years, has now averaged only 14 years. While this news is certainly cause for gratitude, because it is good news, it is worth examining with a cool head. Now that the queue has become 14 years, what follows?
This figure resulted from what is known in policy terms as ‘data cleansing’. Out of 5.7 million names in the queue, approximately 400,000 were declared invalid, some suspected to belong to deceased prospective pilgrims and others being duplicate entries. The Deputy Minister of Hajj and Umrah estimates that the initial deposit funds related to this amount reach Rp 10 trillion. The Hajj Financial Management Agency (BPKH), the authority responsible for managing initial deposits and their investment returns, has ensured that these funds remain intact.
Unfortunately, such certainty does not yet answer public questions. How many have actually passed away, and how many are merely duplicates? In which accounts is this money stored, and where has the investment benefit flowed all this time? How are heirs notified, and how long must they wait for the return of deposits or the transfer of their portion? These questions are not suspicions, but rather the rights of pilgrims regarding the trust they have placed in the state.
It should also be noted that the 14-year figure is the average waiting period for pilgrims departing this year, not an estimate for those registering this week. If this distinction is not clearly explained, good news could turn into false hope. Reports suggest the President has also ordered a forensic audit of Hajj finances. If true, this momentum should be used to open up queue and deposit data periodically, by province, and accessible to everyone.
Institutional Capability
The 2026 Hajj season, the first under the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah, actually left positive notes. The number of deceased pilgrims dropped by almost half, and the pilgrim satisfaction index according to BPS reached 83.28. However, there were also frustrating notes, as old stories repeated themselves: hotel rooms did not match capacity, facilities were broken, pilgrims were separated from their families, and Mina tents were overcrowded. The Minister of Hajj and Umrah even admitted to being ‘far from satisfied’ with the implementation in Mina.
Reflecting on this, these issues invite us to re-examine the concept of ‘istita’ah’ (capability) as taught in classical Islamic texts. When interpreting QS Ali ‘Imran [3]: 97, regarding the obligation of Hajj for those who are ’able to undertake the journey’, classical commentators link this to having the necessary provisions and transport. Scholars like Sheikh Ahmad al-Sawi expand this to mean being able to arrive without extreme hardship, with soul and wealth being safe. Sheikh Nawawi al-Bantani further emphasises that capability includes sufficient provisions, safety of travel, and providing for the family left behind until the pilgrim returns.
Interestingly, today, ‘transport’ and ‘road safety’ are no longer entirely in the hands of the pilgrims. Everything is determined by quotas, visas, service provider contracts, airlines, and even tent plots in Arafah and Mina. This means part of the burden of capability has shifted to the shoulders of the state, which I call ‘institutional capability’.
Saudi Arabia has set a disciplined timeline for the 2027 Hajj without dispensations. Consequently, the government must move quickly yet measuredly. Agreements for Hajj arrangements and airline contracts must be finalised by 8 November 2026, while service package contracts through Nusuk Masar must be completed by 23 January 2027. The Rp 4 trillion advance payment proposed by the Ministry of Hajj and Umrah to secure tent positions should be supported, provided oversight is transparent. It would be advisable for the Ministry to release a periodic readiness dashboard so the public knows which contracts have been signed and the key contents of each agreement.
The same applies to costs. The 2027 Hajj Fee (BPIH) proposal averages Rp 107.34 million, an increase of about Rp 19.9 million, with a 40 percent portion from pilgrims and 60 percent from investment benefits. The President subsequently suggested a composition of approximately 52 to 48 to avoid burdening prospective pilgrims. Certainty regarding these figures must not be delayed, as last season’s second payment phase lasted only one week and the third phase only three days. It must be remembered that the investment benefits are sourced from the funds of millions of pilgrims still in the queue; every rupiah is a multi-generational trust.
Health capability must also be resolved at the source. Medical examinations should be completed before final payment, results from community health centres should be randomly audited, and pilgrims whose departures are delayed must be given certainty regarding their portion, funds, and options for ‘badal’ (proxy). Similarly, placement data must be locked in early. The case of pilgrims being separated from their spouses and companions in 2026 stemmed from unsynchronised data. Therefore, before the data input deadline of 28 January 2027, data regarding mahram (family members), elderly companions, and flight groups must be integrated with the contracts.