Africa-Asia conference -- Bandung spirit, dead myth

Africa-Asia conference -- Bandung spirit, dead myth

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta

Indonesians love myths that have a "massaging effect" on our
ego. It is conventional wisdom that Indonesia achieved
independence through a "revolution". The notions of glory and
grandeur, dedication and sacrifice associated with this
"revolution" led to an overemphasis of its violent dimensions,
while the less romantic and spectacular, but equally decisive,
dimensions became obscured.

These overlooked dimensions were "diplomacy". The armed
struggle was often violent and bitter. However, as the late Gen.
TB Simatupang put it, it was a combination of diplomacy ("first
line") and force of arms ("second line") that ultimately won
Indonesian independence.

The role and function of the U.S., as a "third party" under
the banner of the UN, in our diplomacy with the Dutch, played a
vital part in helping Indonesia achieve independence. The
American shift from somewhat ambivalent to positive toward our
struggle was due to Indonesia's success in crushing a communist
revolt of 1948 without external aid. This was important in the
early post-World War II years, with the "Communist threat" at the
onset of the Cold War.

The "Bandung spirit" of anticolonialism and imperialism is
another myth. The Bandung African-Asian conference of 1955 was
used by Sukarno to gain international support for our struggle
against the Dutch in West Irian.

In the end, however, failing in that effort, Sukarno again
applied the experience of the struggle for independence. Foreign
minister Subandrio said before the UN Assembly in 1961: "The
United Nations, unable, or more correctly not wanting, to lend
its assistance in the solution of this problem, left my
government with no other alternative than to find our own way ...
My Government thus embarked on a policy of confrontation vis-a-
vis the Netherlands, not only politically but also economically
and militarily."

On another occasion he said, "We have always pursued a
confrontational policy against colonialism and imperialism in all
its manifestations ...."

More important was, as before, Sukarno's use of a "third
party", the U.S. This time he created what appeared to be a
possible situation containing the danger of a confrontation
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, at a time when the Cold
War was marked by a "balance of terror", in consequence of the
development of nuclear weapons. Sukarno used the tactic
effectively to "brandish the Soviet saber" to induce the role of
the U.S. as a mediator, again under the banner of the UN,
resulting in a solution in favor of Indonesia.

What the U.S. probably did not realize was that the Soviets
did not really provide Indonesia with adequate arms to win a war
against the Dutch, which would have meant U.S. military
intervention. Khrushchev repeatedly warned Sukarno of the danger
of escalation.

Nor did the U.S. seem to be ready to take advantage of the
worsening Sino-Soviet dispute, which had broken open at the start
of the 1960s. Hence the success of Sukarno's maneuver, which
failed later in his confrontation against Malaysia, when China
was not in a position to be a power Sukarno thought he could use
to induce another mediation by U.S. to his advantage.

The third myth, though created by other countries rather than
Indonesia itself, is one in which Indonesia is regarded as a
pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement. Either Indonesian leaders
have short memories, not properly learning from history, or they
simply ignore historical facts.

The fact is that Sukarno was the most insistent on having a
second Bandung conference despite developing tensions among a
number of Asian and African countries. Yet, despite failing to
set up a second Bandung conference, he wanted to see the African-
Asian gathering expand to include Latin American countries.

Worse, Sukarno developed the bizarre idea of a new
bipolarization of the world into the so-called Old Established
Forces and the New Emerging Forces. The former were to consist of
the capitalist Western countries, and the latter of African,
Asian and Latin American countries -- all of them developing
nations -- plus socialist countries.

Sukarno first introduced that dream before the UN General
Assembly in September 1960, in his speech To Build the World
Anew. The main thrust of this speech was repeated at the first
summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in October 1961.
In fact, the idea of the Non-Aligned Movement was introduced by
Josep Tito of Yugoslavia. As a socialist state, Yugoslavia was
expelled from Cominform in 1947. She could not join the Western
Bloc. As a European country, she could not be a member of the
African-Asian group. Therefore, Tito proposed the idea of a
political principle rather than geographical boundaries as a
basis of cooperation. This explained his idea of non-alignment.
Sukarno, however, disagreed with Tito and Nehru on the role to be
played by the non-aligned group.

The myth of the Bandung spirit is dead. So to convene another
grandiose African-Asian summit, to be attended by about 50 heads
of state and government, their foreign ministers, senior
officials and other members of their delegations, with doubtful
aims and purposes, is just a waste of resources in the midst of
appalling poverty in Indonesia, besides other urgent and serious
problems faced by the nation.

In foreign policy, even within the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has serious problems with
Malaysia over territorial disputes and illegal immigrants, and
with Singapore just agreeing belatedly on an extradition treaty.

ASEAN as a whole has yet to prove its will and ability to
bring pressure to bear on Myanmar to prove its worthiness to
remain a member of the association by taking serious steps toward
democracy, starting with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi.
Otherwise, the Americans would be right in their reluctance to
attend the next meeting with ASEAN, when Myanmar is due to chair
the group.

Given the circumstances, it is unrealistic and pretentious to
envisage a wider and more complex African-Asian framework of
cooperation. Such thoughts are no more than an expression of
either megalomaniac nostalgia or nostalgic megalomania.

The writer is a political analyst.