Africa-Asia conference -- Bandung spirit, dead myth

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Jakarta

Indonesians love myths that have a "massaging effect" on our ego. It is conventional wisdom that Indonesia achieved independence through a "revolution". The notions of glory and grandeur, dedication and sacrifice associated with this "revolution" led to an overemphasis of its violent dimensions, while the less romantic and spectacular, but equally decisive, dimensions became obscured.

These overlooked dimensions were "diplomacy". The armed struggle was often violent and bitter. However, as the late Gen. TB Simatupang put it, it was a combination of diplomacy ("first line") and force of arms ("second line") that ultimately won Indonesian independence.

The role and function of the U.S., as a "third party" under the banner of the UN, in our diplomacy with the Dutch, played a vital part in helping Indonesia achieve independence. The American shift from somewhat ambivalent to positive toward our struggle was due to Indonesia's success in crushing a communist revolt of 1948 without external aid. This was important in the early post-World War II years, with the "Communist threat" at the onset of the Cold War.

The "Bandung spirit" of anticolonialism and imperialism is another myth. The Bandung African-Asian conference of 1955 was used by Sukarno to gain international support for our struggle against the Dutch in West Irian.

In the end, however, failing in that effort, Sukarno again applied the experience of the struggle for independence. Foreign minister Subandrio said before the UN Assembly in 1961: "The United Nations, unable, or more correctly not wanting, to lend its assistance in the solution of this problem, left my government with no other alternative than to find our own way ... My Government thus embarked on a policy of confrontation vis-a- vis the Netherlands, not only politically but also economically and militarily."

On another occasion he said, "We have always pursued a confrontational policy against colonialism and imperialism in all its manifestations ...."

More important was, as before, Sukarno's use of a "third party", the U.S. This time he created what appeared to be a possible situation containing the danger of a confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, at a time when the Cold War was marked by a "balance of terror", in consequence of the development of nuclear weapons. Sukarno used the tactic effectively to "brandish the Soviet saber" to induce the role of the U.S. as a mediator, again under the banner of the UN, resulting in a solution in favor of Indonesia.

What the U.S. probably did not realize was that the Soviets did not really provide Indonesia with adequate arms to win a war against the Dutch, which would have meant U.S. military intervention. Khrushchev repeatedly warned Sukarno of the danger of escalation.

Nor did the U.S. seem to be ready to take advantage of the worsening Sino-Soviet dispute, which had broken open at the start of the 1960s. Hence the success of Sukarno's maneuver, which failed later in his confrontation against Malaysia, when China was not in a position to be a power Sukarno thought he could use to induce another mediation by U.S. to his advantage.

The third myth, though created by other countries rather than Indonesia itself, is one in which Indonesia is regarded as a pioneer of the Non-Aligned Movement. Either Indonesian leaders have short memories, not properly learning from history, or they simply ignore historical facts.

The fact is that Sukarno was the most insistent on having a second Bandung conference despite developing tensions among a number of Asian and African countries. Yet, despite failing to set up a second Bandung conference, he wanted to see the African- Asian gathering expand to include Latin American countries.

Worse, Sukarno developed the bizarre idea of a new bipolarization of the world into the so-called Old Established Forces and the New Emerging Forces. The former were to consist of the capitalist Western countries, and the latter of African, Asian and Latin American countries -- all of them developing nations -- plus socialist countries.

Sukarno first introduced that dream before the UN General Assembly in September 1960, in his speech To Build the World Anew. The main thrust of this speech was repeated at the first summit of the Non-Aligned Movement in Belgrade in October 1961. In fact, the idea of the Non-Aligned Movement was introduced by Josep Tito of Yugoslavia. As a socialist state, Yugoslavia was expelled from Cominform in 1947. She could not join the Western Bloc. As a European country, she could not be a member of the African-Asian group. Therefore, Tito proposed the idea of a political principle rather than geographical boundaries as a basis of cooperation. This explained his idea of non-alignment. Sukarno, however, disagreed with Tito and Nehru on the role to be played by the non-aligned group.

The myth of the Bandung spirit is dead. So to convene another grandiose African-Asian summit, to be attended by about 50 heads of state and government, their foreign ministers, senior officials and other members of their delegations, with doubtful aims and purposes, is just a waste of resources in the midst of appalling poverty in Indonesia, besides other urgent and serious problems faced by the nation.

In foreign policy, even within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Indonesia has serious problems with Malaysia over territorial disputes and illegal immigrants, and with Singapore just agreeing belatedly on an extradition treaty.

ASEAN as a whole has yet to prove its will and ability to bring pressure to bear on Myanmar to prove its worthiness to remain a member of the association by taking serious steps toward democracy, starting with the release of Aung San Suu Kyi. Otherwise, the Americans would be right in their reluctance to attend the next meeting with ASEAN, when Myanmar is due to chair the group.

Given the circumstances, it is unrealistic and pretentious to envisage a wider and more complex African-Asian framework of cooperation. Such thoughts are no more than an expression of either megalomaniac nostalgia or nostalgic megalomania.

The writer is a political analyst.