Achieving Judicial Independence Through the Strengthening of the Judicial Commission
Current conditions indicate that efforts to realise court independence remain suboptimal, hindering the achievement of a free and independent judiciary. This difficulty stems from a conflict of norms in the regulations governing the supervision of judges. The clash between internal oversight by the Supreme Court and external oversight by the Judicial Commission (KY) regarding judicial conduct has resulted in a dualism of supervision.
Previously, Constitutional Court Decision Number 005/PUU-IV/2006 declared that the Judicial Commission is a supporting element or state auxiliary organ. Its supervisory authority cannot be positioned within a checks and balances framework. This reasoning has since crippled the Judicial Commission’s oversight function, creating persistent obstacles to realising judicial independence.
The problem extends beyond mere concern, pointing to non-legal factors that influence the judicial process. It is undeniable that court rulings have become a commodity, with such transactional practices inevitably preceded by compromise and accommodation.
The question arises as to how an integrated judicial system can be implemented when the Judicial Commission’s enforcement of ethics consistently faces barriers. Independence is also linked to the professionalism of judges in carrying out their duties. In practice, technical judicial reasoning has been used to negate the principle of professionalism, even though a professional attitude is a fundamental principle of the Code of Ethics and Judicial Conduct.
Professionalism is an absolute requirement for judges, as mandated by Article 5 paragraph (2) of the Judicial Power Law. The interpretation of technical judicial matters refers to the principle of res judicata pro veritate habetur, meaning a judge’s decision must be considered correct until overturned by a higher court. However, this principle serves legal certainty, not necessarily justice, and is not absolute.
Judges, as the main pillars of law and justice, must provide justice to all who seek it. A transactional ruling that harms others is unjustifiable. Regrettably, in many cases, the application of the law tends to be subjective. Deductive reasoning is manipulated, where an individual’s actions are predetermined as a minor premise to be forcibly matched with a major premise, resulting in a contrived syllogism.
Given the weak judicial independence that impedes the realisation of an independent judiciary, a theological approach is necessary. This should not be mere reflection but a paradigm to be acted upon, where difficulties must be overcome to find ease. The maxim ‘behind every difficulty, there is ease’ serves as a guide. In Surah At-Talaq: 7, Allah SWT says, ‘Allah will bring about ease after hardship.’ Similarly, in Surah Al-Insyirah: 5-6, ‘For indeed, with hardship comes ease. Indeed, with hardship comes ease.’ The repetition of the word ‘with’ provides absolute certainty that every challenge is accompanied by a solution. The definite form of ‘hardship’ refers to a single difficulty, while the indefinite form of ‘ease’ indicates multiple or manifold reliefs, suggesting that one difficulty will be met with two or more forms of ease.
In a hadith, the Prophet Muhammad SAW said: ‘Know that in patience towards what you dislike, there is much goodness. And indeed, victory comes with patience, relief with distress, and with hardship comes ease.’ Scholars conclude that one difficulty cannot overcome two eases, showing that hardship is temporary and will inevitably be followed by relief. No matter how difficult the situation, it will never surpass the grace of Allah SWT, and ease will penetrate even the most challenging circumstances.
The persistent problem of the Judicial Commission’s narrowed authority will render judicial independence mere rhetoric, far removed from reality. Based on the aforementioned texts, this must become a theological foundation for a new framework of thinking. A relevant and significant model of strengthening must be presented.
In this regard, the concretisation of the Judicial Commission’s authority as stipulated in Article 24B paragraph (1) of the 1945 Constitution must be reinforced. The Commission’s posture, including the perfection of its ethical oversight of judges, must be clarified in its implementation. As the oversight body for judges, the functional position of the Judicial Commission cannot be equated with that of the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Board. The Judicial Commission is not intended to be an actor of judicial power, nor is it merely a supporter of the Supreme Court in matters of judicial oversight. Instead, the Judicial Commission should be the ‘controller’ of judicial oversight, exercising inherent, unencumbered, and robust supervision.