A winning coalition only Susilo could beat

A winning coalition only Susilo could beat

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta

Everything is proceeding as planned for Megawati Soekarnoputri.
After the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)'s
disastrous showing in the legislative election, the incumbent
President has defied the odds and come out in the best possible
position ahead of the presidential runoff.

Last week she consolidated support as the United Development
Party (PPP), Prosperity and Peace Party (PDS) and, most
importantly, the mighty Golkar Party formalized their endorsement
for her reelection. Her challenger, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono,
faces the daunting reality of going against the strongest and
most experienced political organizations in the country.

While this so-called "Nationhood Coalition" pledged long-term
alliances, it is naive to view the alliance as anything more than
a transitory coalition of expedience with the intention of
dividing the spoils upon electoral success.

Kudos to the President's campaign strategists for turning a
seemingly hopeless situation into one of great hope.

There were three key factors behind Megawati's recent
political rejuvenation. The first was installing a pragmatic
target after the legislative election. The immediate goal became
not to win the first round of the presidential election, but to
ensure her survival for the second round. Survival in the first
round meant buying time -- over five months to be exact from the
April 5 legislative election.

In May and June, Susilo was riding a wave of popularity and he
was a shoo-in to win the first round. The only way to contest
such momentum was not to break it, but to let it subside. Five
months is ample time to debit this momentum, especially with
Susilo himself unable to capitalize on it.

One way to ensure Megawati's survival in the first round was
to segregate the anti-Megawati vote. The more contenders in the
running the better. This was certainly achieved as five
candidates contested the presidency.

That is not to say that Hamzah Haz's "hopeless" presidential
bid was one of the ploys to that affect. But his move to now jump
on the Megawati bandwagon again does raise questions.

Abdurrahman Wahid's decision not to endorse any candidates
dispersed the crucial Nahdlatul Ulama vote. This again worked to
Megawati's advantage. One can only speculate what would have
happened if Wiranto and Golkar had attained Abdurrahman's
endorsement in the first round of the election.

The second factor was the ability to increase Megawati's
profile by using her facilities as the sitting President. For a
person with a reputation for aloofness and a disinclination for
public speaking, she is certainly active now "shaking hands and
kissing babies".

The third factors has been the temporary extraction of
impediments within Megawati's inside circle. Certain
personalities who may have "turned off" voters or discouraged
other political players from negotiating a coalition with
Megawati have tactically stepped into the background. Is it mere
coincidence that the likes of Taufik Kiemas and Theo Syafei, who
have been so prominent in her administration, have been keeping a
conspicuously low profile?

And what is in it for Golkar? Party leader Akbar Tandjung, the
sly politician he is, has the best of both worlds.

If Megawati is reelected Golkar is assured a slice of the
spoils. Many of the party's initiatives in the legislature will
also likely gain the support of the PDI-P, the second largest
faction in the House of Representatives.

Even if Megawati does not win, Golkar is still in an enviable
position given that it is simply too large for Susilo to ignore.
If he wins the election, Susilo will need Golkar at almost every
turn over the next five years if he wishes to get any sort of
support from the House.

Given that it is Megawati who is facing Susilo in the runoff,
the PDI-P would be the natural opposition party if Susilo won.
Golkar would be the more pleasant alternative in Susilo's own
need to form issues-based coalitions.

In the immediate months after a Susilo victory, Golkar would
faithfully act its role as part of the losing "Nationhood
Coalition", but eventually it would play both sides -- Susilo and
PDI-P -- acting as a counterweight against any entrenched power
among the two.

For Susilo, the election is really his to lose. Despite
topping the first round, his popularity has stagnated. His
success continues to be a carryover from the momentum of the
April 5th legislative election. It may be a case of peaking too
early. Unfortunately the negatives do not stop there: He does not
have a strong political network, he failed to solicit alliances
with stronger and more embedded political forces, and more
importantly the public has hardly seen or heard from him since
early August.

His rhetoric of building "a coalition with the people" is
sadly a case of wide-eyed optimism, and if he loses will be one
of daft naivete.

That, however, is not to say that Susilo will lose. If anyone
can beat Megawati it is Susilo. With less than 30 days to go, he
might just have enough momentum left to snatch victory.

We have also learned that traditional party alliances are not
what they used to be. Voters have shown that they are not easily
manipulated by simplistic symbols. They are aware of the
decisions affecting their lives and are capable of rendering
rational judgments on political leaders. But that judgment is
still predisposed to the rationality of a political campaign.

Indonesia's first presidential election could, in the end, be
a case where a candidate wins despite his or her tactics rather
than because of them.

The author is a staff writer with The Jakarta Post.