A winning coalition only Susilo could beat

Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, Jakarta

Everything is proceeding as planned for Megawati Soekarnoputri. After the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P)'s disastrous showing in the legislative election, the incumbent President has defied the odds and come out in the best possible position ahead of the presidential runoff.

Last week she consolidated support as the United Development Party (PPP), Prosperity and Peace Party (PDS) and, most importantly, the mighty Golkar Party formalized their endorsement for her reelection. Her challenger, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, faces the daunting reality of going against the strongest and most experienced political organizations in the country.

While this so-called "Nationhood Coalition" pledged long-term alliances, it is naive to view the alliance as anything more than a transitory coalition of expedience with the intention of dividing the spoils upon electoral success.

Kudos to the President's campaign strategists for turning a seemingly hopeless situation into one of great hope.

There were three key factors behind Megawati's recent political rejuvenation. The first was installing a pragmatic target after the legislative election. The immediate goal became not to win the first round of the presidential election, but to ensure her survival for the second round. Survival in the first round meant buying time -- over five months to be exact from the April 5 legislative election.

In May and June, Susilo was riding a wave of popularity and he was a shoo-in to win the first round. The only way to contest such momentum was not to break it, but to let it subside. Five months is ample time to debit this momentum, especially with Susilo himself unable to capitalize on it.

One way to ensure Megawati's survival in the first round was to segregate the anti-Megawati vote. The more contenders in the running the better. This was certainly achieved as five candidates contested the presidency.

That is not to say that Hamzah Haz's "hopeless" presidential bid was one of the ploys to that affect. But his move to now jump on the Megawati bandwagon again does raise questions.

Abdurrahman Wahid's decision not to endorse any candidates dispersed the crucial Nahdlatul Ulama vote. This again worked to Megawati's advantage. One can only speculate what would have happened if Wiranto and Golkar had attained Abdurrahman's endorsement in the first round of the election.

The second factor was the ability to increase Megawati's profile by using her facilities as the sitting President. For a person with a reputation for aloofness and a disinclination for public speaking, she is certainly active now "shaking hands and kissing babies".

The third factors has been the temporary extraction of impediments within Megawati's inside circle. Certain personalities who may have "turned off" voters or discouraged other political players from negotiating a coalition with Megawati have tactically stepped into the background. Is it mere coincidence that the likes of Taufik Kiemas and Theo Syafei, who have been so prominent in her administration, have been keeping a conspicuously low profile?

And what is in it for Golkar? Party leader Akbar Tandjung, the sly politician he is, has the best of both worlds.

If Megawati is reelected Golkar is assured a slice of the spoils. Many of the party's initiatives in the legislature will also likely gain the support of the PDI-P, the second largest faction in the House of Representatives.

Even if Megawati does not win, Golkar is still in an enviable position given that it is simply too large for Susilo to ignore. If he wins the election, Susilo will need Golkar at almost every turn over the next five years if he wishes to get any sort of support from the House.

Given that it is Megawati who is facing Susilo in the runoff, the PDI-P would be the natural opposition party if Susilo won. Golkar would be the more pleasant alternative in Susilo's own need to form issues-based coalitions.

In the immediate months after a Susilo victory, Golkar would faithfully act its role as part of the losing "Nationhood Coalition", but eventually it would play both sides -- Susilo and PDI-P -- acting as a counterweight against any entrenched power among the two.

For Susilo, the election is really his to lose. Despite topping the first round, his popularity has stagnated. His success continues to be a carryover from the momentum of the April 5th legislative election. It may be a case of peaking too early. Unfortunately the negatives do not stop there: He does not have a strong political network, he failed to solicit alliances with stronger and more embedded political forces, and more importantly the public has hardly seen or heard from him since early August.

His rhetoric of building "a coalition with the people" is sadly a case of wide-eyed optimism, and if he loses will be one of daft naivete.

That, however, is not to say that Susilo will lose. If anyone can beat Megawati it is Susilo. With less than 30 days to go, he might just have enough momentum left to snatch victory.

We have also learned that traditional party alliances are not what they used to be. Voters have shown that they are not easily manipulated by simplistic symbols. They are aware of the decisions affecting their lives and are capable of rendering rational judgments on political leaders. But that judgment is still predisposed to the rationality of a political campaign.

Indonesia's first presidential election could, in the end, be a case where a candidate wins despite his or her tactics rather than because of them.

The author is a staff writer with The Jakarta Post.