A Theoretical Analysis of the Judicial Commission as the Controller of Judicial Oversight
As an independent institution, the Judicial Commission has constitutional authority to oversee judges. Its independence should, in essence, be understood as giving it control over the oversight of judges’ conduct. There should therefore no longer be a division between internal oversight by the Supreme Court and external oversight by the Judicial Commission.
Regrettably, the current system involves dual oversight, leading to overlapping responsibilities. Supreme Court Chief Justice Sunarto has said that conducting oversight separately has fostered arrogance, sectoral egotism, esprit de corps and mutual distrust. This dualism has also caused disharmony and a loss of direction.
The dual oversight system is reflected in Articles 39(3) and 40(2) of Law No. 48 of 2009 on Judicial Power. Article 39(3) states that the Supreme Court oversees judges’ “conduct”. Article 40(2) says that the Judicial Commission oversees judges’ “behaviour”. Yet there is no significant difference between “conduct” and “behaviour”; the distinction lies in which institution carries out the oversight. Article 41(4) further states that “provisions on oversight as referred to in Articles 39 and 40 shall be regulated by law”.
The question is: which law governs this? This differentiation in oversight functions should not be maintained. The problem of dual oversight must be prioritised for remedying the conflict between legal provisions (antinomy).
Disharmony and disorientation must be addressed through unified oversight to ensure coordination. This could be achieved by establishing a joint body bringing together the Judicial Commission and the Supreme Court to collaborate on overseeing judges. It could be called the Integrated Judicial Oversight Body (BPHT). It would be led by the head of the Supreme Court’s Oversight Chamber, or at least the head of its Supervisory Agency (Bawas), and the head of the Judicial Commission’s Judicial Monitoring Bureau (Waskim), supported by suitably qualified experts.
The two institutions would act as quality guarantors for integrated oversight. Decisions would be made after first determining whether a matter involves a breach of the Code of Ethics and Conduct for Judges (KEPPH), or is purely a question of procedural law. If it is purely procedural, the complaint should not be pursued. However, where a procedural irregularity indicates a criminal offence, such as a transactional practice, it should be referred to law enforcement authorities. This would help tackle transactional practices, which are now widespread in the courts. By contrast, if a procedural irregularity also amounts to a breach of the KEPPH, it must be investigated and adjudicated.
The Judicial Commission’s commissioners would serve as the “controllers of oversight” within the BPHT. This control by the Commission would neither diminish the Supreme Court’s role in judicial development nor interfere with its technical oversight of adjudication, as set out in the Draft Law on Judges.
This would instead accord with the principle of “shared responsibility” in the administration of the judiciary. By way of comparison, Article 63 of Law No. 32 of 2014 on Maritime Affairs makes the Maritime Security Agency—which is not a law-enforcement institution—the coordinator of maritime law enforcement. Its authority is exercised in an integrated and coordinated manner, under a single command and control structure.
The Judicial Commission’s authority to control oversight of judges would be a justified “exception” (exceptie). This accords with the maxim “no law without an escape clause”. In principle, exceptions are legitimate if they produce benefits, and may even be advisable. In this regard, Jalaluddin Abdurrahman bin Abi Bakar As-Suyuthi argued that all legal products should be assessed according to whether they deliver benefits and avert harm.
Accordingly, if a legal product loses its benefits and instead causes harm, it should be reviewed. This is consistent with the Islamic legal maxim “dar’u al-mafasid muqaddam ’ala jalbi al-mashalih”, meaning that preventing or avoiding harm must take precedence over securing benefit.
Securing benefit is consistent with Satjipto Rahardjo’s view that justice is the constant and perpetual will to give each person what is due to them (iustitia est constants et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi). Aristotle likewise held that justice—in legal interpretation—must embody epikeia, or “a sense of what is fitting”. Propriety is synonymous with “truth” and “justice”. Making the Judicial Commission responsible for controlling oversight is fitting and would help avert harm.
Since the Judicial Commission plays the leading role in overseeing judges’ ethics, it is appropriate for it to control that oversight. This special authority would support judicial independence.
The purpose of this oversight control is to prevent dualism and overlapping responsibilities. Making the Judicial Commission the controller of judicial oversight would be appropriate to the purpose for which the authority is exercised. This special power accords with the Constitution’s aim of safeguarding and upholding the honour, dignity and conduct of judges. The exception would not undermine legal certainty, truth or justice.
Aristotle held that justice entails proportion. He described conventional justice as justice based on needs that are not fixed or natural. The difference between conventional and natural justice lies in their scope. As its name suggests, natural justice is static and applies to all sections of society. Conventional justice, by contrast, is established by a particular community.
Its application is dynamic and can change depending on the form of government. Bahder Johan Nasution says that while justice does mean equality of rights, it must also be understood to mean unequal rights. In the modern version of Aristotle’s theory, founded on the principle of equality, justice is achieved when like cases are treated alike and unlike cases are treated differently.
Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas also discussed distributive justice. It allocates proportionately according to a person’s position in the public legal sphere. Under Aristotle’s theory, proportionality means that equal rights must be granted to people who are equal. Prajudi Atmosudirjo writes that injustice arises when those who are equal are not treated equally.
He adds that treating unequal people equally, or as though they were equal, also causes injustice. The internal and external oversight exercised by the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission is not equal in status. The two should therefore not be treated identically; doing so would create injustice.
In this regard, Laica Marzuki says injustice is not only treating two equal things differently, but also treating two different things alike. Bagir Manan has made the widely known observation: “Treating unequal things as equal is just as unjust as treating equal things differently.”
The above analysis shows that assigning oversight of judges’ “conduct” to the Supreme Court and of their “behaviour” to the Judicial Commission amounts to “treating two equal things differently”. Justice is not achieved merely by determining an actual value; it also depends on equality between one thing and another (aequalitas rei ad rem). Hernoko’s statement makes clear that the Supreme Court and the Judicial Commission do not have identical functions.
The Supreme Court exercises judicial power by administering justice to uphold the law and justice. The Judicial Commission, meanwhile, is responsible for safeguarding and upholding the honour, dignity and conduct of judges.
Judges’ behaviour should not be interpreted as their conduct and thereby brought within the Supreme Court’s internal oversight. Article 24B of the 1945 Constitution is clear and unequivocal; it therefore requires no further interpretation (Interpretatio cessat in claris). To interpret words that are perfectly clear is to distort them (interpretation est perversion).
Darji Darmodiharjo and Shidarta say that the principle of inequality is a combination of two principles: the difference principle and the principle of fair equality of opportunity. Justice does not mean absolute equality or the standardisation of rights. In other words, justice also recognises unequal rights.
Justice is realised when some people are treated equally and others differently. In all cases, this means treating like things alike and unlike things differently.
It is therefore clear that equality applies to parties who are alike, in this case the Judicial Commission’s commissioners. Bawas personnel are not the same as the commissioners and should not be treated as though they were. This is proportionate. Hans Kelsen says that justice is legality.
A rule is just if it is applied consistently to all cases that fall within its terms. It is unjust if it is applied in one case but not another similar case. Al-Thabathaba’i says justice means maintaining a moderate position and avoiding the two extremes of excess (ifrath) and deficiency (tafrith). The exception that would allow the Judicial Commission to control oversight takes a moderate position and serves the public interest.
In Islam, justice means “putting things in their proper place”. This involves assigning responsibilities according to a person’s ability and giving them what they are entitled to in proportionate measure. Equal shares should go to equal people; those who are not equal should receive different shares, so that everyone is treated equally in like cases and differently in unlike cases. Proportionality is therefore the measure of justice.
In this regard, the Islamic legal maxim “maa laa yudroku kulluhu laa yutroku kulluhu” means: “If something cannot be achieved in full, it should not be abandoned in full.” The Judicial Commission’s oversight should therefore not be negated. Despite its shortcomings, it also has benefits; even if it cannot be implemented in full, it should not be abandoned altogether.
Equal rights for people who are alike are also linked to legal certainty. Van Apeldoorn says legal certainty means that a person can obtain what they expect in a given situation. It also means that rules are clear enough to guide the public, and that the law’s application in society is clear and unequivocal. On this basis, oversight by the Supreme Court’s Bawas conflicts with legal certainty. How can judicial power be upheld if legal certainty itself is violated?
John Rawls says justice is the foremost virtue of social institutions, just as truth is the foremost virtue of systems of thought. A theory, however elegant and economical, must be rejected or revised if it is untrue. Likewise, laws and institutions, however efficient and orderly, must be revised or abolished if they are unjust.
Aquinas argued that a law is invalid if it is not true. Its truth can be tested by its purpose, its drafting or its form. Such a law conflicts with natural and divine law. Kelsen, meanwhile, said that the validity of a norm creates what is known as a hierarchy of norms (the Stufenbau theory).
For a norm to be valid, it must not conflict with a higher-ranking norm. The highest norm is the grundnorm. Kelsen described a legal system as a set of interconnected norms (interlock norms), moving from the most general “ought” to the most particular or concrete. The validity of all these norms ultimately derives from the grundnorm, norms and sub-norms. In his account, a hierarchy of norms recognises only superordination and subordination, not coordination.
Truth and justice are inseparable. A just act is grounded in truth. Al-Kindi likewise said that justice is an inherent quality in a person that impels them to do what is right. The provision for dual oversight in Article 39(3) of the Law on Judicial Power has deprived that article of legitimacy, the author argues, because truth and justice no longer correspond.
Integrated oversight offers a middle way to address dual oversight and its negative consequences. Unified oversight represents coordination within separation—“unity in diversity”.
As part of a revision of the Judicial Commission Law, exceptions are commonplace in legislation and are needed to address special circumstances. Allowing the Judicial Commission to control oversight of judges is intended to serve the public interest by securing judicial independence. Ultimately, this would make judicial independence achievable and uphold the ideals of law.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/a-theoretical-analysis-of-the-judicial-commission-as-the-controller-of-judicial-oversight-1791687100)
Originally published by detikcom (https://news.detik.com/kolom/d-8701655/analisis-teoretis-komisi-yudisial-sebagai-pengendali-pengawasan-hakim), translated from Indonesian