A stable Indonesia vital for Southeast Asian security
A stable Indonesia vital for Southeast Asian security
By Paul Dibb
This is the second of two articles based on a paper presented
at an international conference recently held in Bogor, co-hosted
by the Jakarta-based Research Institute for Peace and Democracy.
BOGOR: One way to avoid a dangerous struggle for power among
the major powers is to strengthen the multilateral organizations
that deal with peace and security in the Asia-Pacific.
Historically, Asia has not had a good track record with
multilateralism. The Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO),
which was created in 1954 and dissolved in 1977, was not an
effective organization.
Unlike NATO it never had standing forces that could be
committed in the event of war. ASEAN, which was created in 1967,
has been a successful regional political organization and, until
recently, it has done better than might have been expected.
But the Asian economic crisis has greatly diminished the
relevance of ASEAN. It has been powerless to help with either the
turmoil in Indonesia or the security crisis in East Timor.
Moreover, the expansion of ASEAN to include ten countries,
with membership ranging from communist Vietnam and an oppressive
military regime in Myanmar through to vibrant democracies in the
Philippines and Thailand, has undermined the cohesion and
credibility of the organization.
The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) also seems to be losing its
way. It started off in the early 1990s with much fanfare and with
the aim of progressing steadily from military confidence-building
measures to preventive diplomacy and, eventually, to conflict
resolution.
But despite its early promise it has not progressed beyond
discussing fairly basic confidence-building measures in the seven
years of its existence.
And there are still many countries in the region that do not
produce the most basic information about their military
capabilities and strategic doctrine. The ARF, like ASEAN, proved
totally incapable of making a useful contribution to the
resolution of the situation in East Timor last year.
The problem with the ARF is that it has taken on the ASEAN
style of multilateralism in which difficult issues are swept
under the carpet and process is more important than tangible
security outcomes.
Of course, the ARF is still in its infancy and it took Europe
a long-time before it developed arms-control and disarmament
agreements between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. So, we must be
patient.
But the ARF is dangerously close to becoming an irrelevant
regional security organization, as distinct from a diplomatic
talk shop. Asian Europe Meeting (ASEM) is a useful political and
economic relationship between Southeast Asia and the European
Community but it is difficult to see how it can have any security
importance.
It is hard to be optimistic about the role of regional
security organizations. It will take a long-time, if ever, for
the ASEAN Regional Forum -- which is the most promising of the
regional multilateral organizations -- to be able to handle the
resolution of conflicts.
There is still much deep-seated historical suspicion and many
outstanding territorial disputes in the region and hardly any
tradition of military cooperation. Many of the military forces in
Asia are highly secretive. They are resistant towards arms-
control ideas and the introduction of the kinds of transparency
measures that are common in Europe and between the United States
and Russia.
But in fact the ready availability from commercial sources of
satellite photography, with a resolution of one meter or better,
will force a significant degree of military transparency onto the
region.
It is also important to recognize that the ARF has made some
progress, even if slow and hesitant, in the discussion of
military confidence-building.
The regular discussions that have occurred between the ASEAN
countries and China on the South China Sea are to be welcomed.
But there are question marks surrounding the future of the ARF
and its chairmanship by ASEAN, which is a grouping with little
real clout. The central strategic issues in the region are in
Northeast Asia, not in Southeast Asia.
The newly created East Asian caucus group (which consists of
the ASEAN 10 plus China, Japan and South Korea) is, however,
unlikely to contribute much to regional security given the strong
distrust that exists between China and Japan and between South
Korea and Japan. Its main emphasis will be in the area of trade
and investment and perhaps financial reform.
Indonesia has played a key role in the security of the region,
both through its prominent position in ASEAN and the ARF as well
as through the stability of the Soeharto regime for over 30
years.
Indonesia will not recover its former leading status in
Southeast Asia for at least the next ten years. It faces huge
tasks in economic, social and political restructuring.
The economy will remain in a critical state for the
foreseeable future. Poverty, unemployment and inflation are all
at disastrous levels and showed few signs of early improvement.
Moreover, the ethnic Chinese community, the leading source of
domestic investment, has relocated the bulk of its capital
offshore, where it is likely to stay at least for the medium-
term.
Indonesia's high rate of unemployment, officially at about 17
percent, will remain the country's main problem for the next five
to ten years, according to Manpower Minister Bomer Pasaribu.
There are now 36 million Indonesians out of work as a result of
the prolonged economic crisis. With this year's economic growth
estimated at between three and four percent, only 1.6 million
jobs will be created.
Economic recovery has been slow, largely because the core
problems of the crisis that began in 1997 have not been fixed.
The banking system is not working, most corporate debt is yet to
be restructured, and the courts are unpredictable.
Investment that might fund a recovery remains elusive. Overall
investment shrank by 21 percent in 1999, according to the World
Bank. Foreign investors are wary of investing again because of
the confusing picture Indonesia still presents to the outside
world.
Since the economic crisis of 1997 Indonesia's per capita
annual income has fallen from US$1300 to $600, leading to great
social unrest and an increase in violence.
Indonesia is in the middle of a dangerous political
transition. In the most optimistic scenario it will lead over the
next two to three years to a stable democratically elected
central government. But the transition from an authoritarian
military regime to a democracy is fraught with danger.
The Defense Minister, Juwono Sudarsono, has said that the
transition to democracy will have to come gradually and could
take 10 to 15 years. He has observed that the military has
dominated Indonesia too long for the country to quickly become a
full democracy.
While the fact that Indonesia has held elections is welcome,
effective democratic governance and the creation of a rules-based
civil society will take a very considerable time.
Juwono is cautiously optimistic that Indonesia can establish
viable democratic institutions over the next decade. There are
crucial problems to be resolved and not least the future
political role of the Indonesian armed forces, which is still the
only institution that is holding the country together, according
to the Defense Minister.
In practical terms, there is likely to be a hybrid political
system between openness and control in Indonesia for the next
three to five years to help maintain order during a transition
period to more effective democracy.
The continuing turmoil in Indonesia is a potential threat to
regional security. For over a generation, Indonesia has been
committed to internal stability and a peaceful international
approach. But the greater freedom in Indonesia since the downfall
of president Soeharto has exacerbated internal tensions --
religious, ethnic and geographic.
Encouraged by the success of the East Timorese, there are now
major and increasing separatist pressures -- in Aceh, West Papua
and the Moluccas. If any of these regions get independence, the
reaction from the military will be intense, and may well put an
end to democracy in Indonesia.
The breakup of Indonesia is not in the region's interests. It
would face neighboring countries -- and particularly Singapore,
Malaysia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea and Australia -- with
a highly unstable and potentially violent neighbour.
The reversion of the Soviet Union to a smaller Russia is one
guide to what might happen in this situation, although the
violent and bloody breakup of Yugoslavia may be a better example.
For many years there has been considerable anxiety in
Southeast Asia about the direction of Indonesia after Soeharto.
Now some of the worst fears of Indonesia's neighbors are being
realized.
Malaysia and Singapore in particular fear a wave of refugees
should central authority in Indonesia break down completely.
Already these countries have been a haven for a considerable
number of ethnic Chinese fleeing the steadily increasing violence
across the archipelago.
The cohesion and unity of Indonesia must, therefore, be the
central security concern of the region. It will be important in
this process that an independent East Timor and Indonesia come to
friendly terms with each other and with Australia. Relations
between Australia and Indonesia have been damaged very
significantly over the independence of East Timor.
In terms of its own national interests, Australia would have
strongly preferred that East Timor remained part of Indonesia had
this been the wish of the East Timorese people.
There is no avoiding the fact that an independent East Timor
complicates Australia's security outlook. The potential for
serious friction between Indonesia and Australia is now higher
than it has been for many decades. It is in the interests of
nobody for a military confrontation to occur.
The focus of the region and of the external powers, as well as
major international institutions such as the IMF, must be on
helping Indonesia to recover economically and build a democratic
society. This will be no easy task because of the extreme
nationalist sentiments that have been stirred up in some quarters
in Indonesia.
A combination of religious fervor and strident nationalism in
the Indonesian leadership would be of grave concern to
Indonesia's neighbors. Indonesia has a well-deserved reputation
as a moderate secular nation. A more extreme Islamic stance in
Indonesia, occurring at the same time as similar sentiments in
Malaysia and the southern Philippines, would be deeply disturbing
if aggressive foreign policies were the outcome.
The future direction of Indonesia will be decided by the fate
of President Wahid and his democratically elected government in
the current power struggle. The next several months are critical.
There is a widespread feeling that for Indonesia's sake Wahid
must be allowed to succeed. Most Indonesians recognize that
another political crisis will be national suicide.
But there are deep uncertainties surrounding Indonesia's
future. The stability of this vast nation of more than 200
million people -- the world's fourth largest country -- is
central to any consideration of Southeast Asia's security.
A weak and divided Indonesia could well spread its contagion
to neighboring states, for example Papua New Guinea and the
Philippines.
It would also be vulnerable to external great power
interference. This would raise acute anxieties in the region, not
least in Australia. Those who believe that Australia wants to see
a disintegrating Indonesia do not understand the realities of
Australia's geopolitical position.
Since 1965, Indonesia has provided a strategic shield to
Australia's vulnerable and sparsely populated north. A stable,
unified and democratic Indonesia is in Australia's national
interest. A weak and divided Indonesia, or an Indonesia led by a
nationalist military regime or a xenophobic religious government,
would present Australia, and the region, with a serious security
threat.
Professor Paul Dibb is head of the Strategic and Defense
Studies Center in the Research School of Pacific and Asian
Studies at the Australian National University. He was formerly
Deputy Secretary and Director of the Joint Intelligence
Organization in the Australian Department of Defense.
Source: jawawa.id (https://jawawa.id/newsitem/a-stable-indonesia-vital-for-southeast-asian-security-1447893297-1302517)
Originally published by The Jakarta Post