A slim chance for peace in Aceh

A slim chance for peace in Aceh

International Crisis Group, Jakarta/Brussels

Indonesia's efforts to end the separatist rebellion in Aceh
entered a new phase in April 2001 with the launching of a
military offensive against the guerrillas of the Free Aceh
Movement (GAM). Three months later, the government passed a law
conferring "special autonomy", or limited self-government, on the
province. This briefing paper charts recent events in Aceh,
updating two ICG reports in 2001 which analyzed these two strands
of Indonesian policy: Military force and the offer of autonomy.

The military offensive has done some damage to GAM but the
guerrillas do not seem close to defeat. The majority of the war's
victims are civilians and both sides are thought to have
committed atrocities in the last year, including mass murder. One
of the worst periods of violence was in the district of Central
Aceh in mid-2001, during which hundreds of people were killed by
GAM, the military or local militias.

The military has had some success in improving its battered
public image in Aceh, though soldiers still seem largely
unaccountable to the law, and reports continue of civilians being
killed. This lack of accountability is also true of the police,
who have an even worse reputation. As for GAM, parts of the
movement have degenerated into banditry, costing it some support
in Aceh. Although civilian views are hard to assess in the midst
of the conflict, disillusionment and despair appear widespread.

Against this gloomy background, the meeting between
representatives of the Indonesian government and GAM in Geneva on
Feb. 2 and 3, 2002 was a welcome development. They agreed to turn
the armed conflict into a political dispute and involve other
Acehnese groups than GAM in the discussions. However, previous
agreements along these lines were violated by both sides, and
there is a risk the current round of talks will meet the same
fate. There is a need for concerted international pressure on
both sides to continue talking and to uphold any future
agreements that are reached, or the war is likely to drag on for
some time at great human cost.

Indonesian policy aims to balance military action with
political and economic measures to win back the loyalty of
Acehnese who favor independence. In practice, military action is
still the dominant factor. The implementation of special
autonomy, intended to reduce Acehnese grievances against the
government, is still in its early stages, and progress on
fleshing out the law with local regulations has been slow.

The implementation of autonomy is likely to take some time,
and its final shape is far from clear. Given that GAM cannot
force Indonesia to leave Aceh and the lack of international
support for self-determination in the province, some form of
autonomy still offers the only realistic chance of an eventual
compromise peace. Such a plan is unlikely to work, however,
without further reform of the Indonesian military and
bureaucracy, which are still largely unaccountable for their
actions to the Indonesian public and to the law.