A new U.S. communications paradigm: 'It's the oil, stupid'

Piers Gillespie

Jakarta

One intriguing aspect of the inevitable build up to what could be the biggest military catastrophe in this young century is the way in which the two opposing leaders, George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein have attempted to shape global public perception. In 2003, the issues of perception and credibility are proving central to the way in which both the U.S. and Iraq are being positioned by the world.

Although hundreds of years have passed since Napoleon Bonaparte wrote that "... four bad news articles are a more fearsome weapon than a sword", his words emanate with as much resonance today as they did in his time. And what is even more fascinating is that despite the lessons that should have been learned in the Vietnam and Gulf wars, despite its slick political campaigns and sophisticated communication programs, and despite its media know-how and expertise in cognitive dissonance, it is the United States administration that seems to be coming off second best.

The shadow boxing diplomacy, "spin", and consensus building for America's seemingly imminent invasion of Iraq has demonstrated that success in the modern world of conflict still depends as much on perceptions of innocence and of who is perceived as being in the right, as it depends on smart bombs and missiles.

Both Iraq and the United States have attempted to position themselves as the innocent in the military build-up, at times focusing as much on their media plan as their war plan. In a crisis, no matter its nature, the media will attempt to identify the champion and the villain. Indeed, in this crisis, the methods adopted by both the U.S. and Iraq to utilize the media to build support has proven to be a fascinating study for political, communication, and military strategists alike.

Of surprise, however, is just how well Iraq is doing. Across the globe, leading publications have increasingly raised questions and critiqued the world's last hegemonic power and its seemingly unstoppable quest towards Usiing the military option. Even nationalistic U.S. publications are beginning to report that it is the stars and stripes that is the labeled aggressor.

At its most fundamental level, the communications dilemma for the U.S. appears to be one of honesty and credibility; of making key messages and statements that are not backed up with succinct and credible facts that justify the use of the message in the first place.

Saddam Hussein and his long-standing international spokesperson, Foreign Minister Taruiq Aziz, seem to have learned this lesson well. The Iraqi administration has generally released measured, balanced and common sense statements over the past few months, and has backed these up with open action that lends a logical legitimacy to their case.

Opening up their borders to weapons inspectors -- and allowing the international media to follow them all over the country virtually uninhibited -- has been a masterfully executed communications plan. Although individual comments made by Saddam recently about making September 11, 2001 look "like a picnic" do not help his cause,they have been the exception rather than the rule. Comments such as "they (the Americans) can get much more from Iraq without resorting to the logic of force and war" have been more the order of the day.

Such action-backed communication has proven very effective in the international arena. Measured public statements made by Iraqi officials throw the focus squarely back onto the U.S. and their motivations. And under the glare of the spotlight, the U.S. administration has suffered in terms of credibility and accusations of double standards. Past and present issues have eroded the U.S.'s position and the legitimacy of their strident moves towards a military option. Thomas Friedman, a renowned American political analyst, points out the most recent double standard:

"North Korea breaks all its nuclear agreements with the United States, throws out UN inspectors and sets off to make a bomb a year, and President Bush says it's 'a diplomatic issue'. Iraq hands over a 12,000-page account of its weapons production and allows UN inspectors to roam all over the country, and - after they've found not a jam-jar of dangerous chemicals in 230 raids - President Bush announces that Iraq is a threat to America, has not disarmed and may have to be invaded."

Many publications are realizing the duplicity of an approach that leaves Iraq with seemingly no options and with the UN with seemingly no say in the matter of U.S. strikes in Iraq. A recent editorial in the Washington Post reflected a feeling in the U.S. and sheds light on why America is finding it so hard to convince both its allies and its own citizens about the legitimacy of a first strike.

"Our government seems to be telling U.S. that if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein denies having weapons of mass destruction, while we know he does have them, that falsehood becomes a material breach of Iraq's agreement and reason to take Saddam Hussein out militarily. But if Saddam Hussein admits to having such weapons, he stands convicted out of his own mouth and therefore we have no choice but to take him out."

So what's the Iraqi president supposed to do?

As a typical human response, humor comes to the fore as a way to deal with this situation. "We know he's got those weapons of mass destruction," satirist Mark Russell explains. "We've got the receipts." Behind the humor however is another sorry tale of U.S. foreign policy gone wrong; of the U.S. backing an ally, only to see him them turn, leaving the current American administration with the unenviable task of trying to demonize an individual who once was a key collaborator. In this respect, it must be particularly galling for Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who was telling Congress right up to the 1991 Gulf War that Saddam was an ally.

(The writer has a Masters Degree in International Politics and is a senior technical adviser at Indo Pacific, a strategic communications consultancy.)