A look at the rise of collective violence in Indonesia

A look at the rise of collective violence in Indonesia

Try not to travel to Jakarta or cities in West and East Java
during the months of January, May and September because those are
the places and times when the probability is greatest for one to
be a victim or perpetrator of violence. This is one of the
conclusions of a study by sociologist M. Iqbal Djajadi of the
University of Indonesia on the rise of collective violence.

Question: How did you come to that conclusion?

Answer: That was a rather a tongue-in-cheek conclusion. But
seriously, I studied 380 cases of collective violence that
occurred over 53 years, spanning the Old Order, New Order and
Reform Order (B.J. Habibie) administrations. One example of
collective violence are riots, which I define as spontaneous,
unorganized and aimless, for the purposes of destruction, looting
of properties or attacking people.

A total of 18 cases of collective violence took place between
1946 and 1955, 44 cases between 1956 and 1965, 12 cases between
1966 and 1975, 32 cases between 1976 and 1985, 37 cases between
1986 and 1995 and a whopping 237 cases between 1996 and 1999.

The data showed that violence peaked between 1960 and 1969 and
between 1990 and 1999. The first peak mostly had to do with anti-
Chinese unrest in 1963 in cities in West and Central Java and the
massacre of suspected communists between 1966 and 1967.

The second peak contributed to 70 percent of the total cases
of collective violence.

The study also showed that 65 cases of violence or 17 percent
occurred during Sukarno's administration, 168 cases or 44 percent
under Soeharto and 148 cases or 39 percent under Habibie.
Considering that Habibie only ruled the country for 10 months,
the number of violent incidents that took place under him was
incredible!

So was Habibie's rule more violent than his predecessors?

As a form of collective violence, riots are different from
vandalism, looting, brawls, sabotage, military operations, coups,
internal wars or murders as these are not spontaneous. They are
relatively organized and have specific intents. During Habibie's
term, the most frequent collective violence were looting,
vandalism, brawls and internal wars.

Perhaps unrest during the earlier two administrations served
as "safety valves." Rather than having people attack the state,
maybe the Old and New Order administrations just allowed people
to express their aggression in different forms -- let people
attack other people, the Chinese for example, or let them destroy
properties rather than killing people.

It's not clear what really happened during Habibie's rule but
the ethnic Chinese were no longer the main target. Those involved
in the unrest were more selective -- they targeted barns or
vehicles carrying rice, regardless of whether they belonged to
the Chinese, Javanese or Padang businessmen.

They seemed to have lost all fear; they attacked, vandalized
and even burned police offices. They killed people from their own
ethnic group or religion. What was most horrible, they murdered
systematically over a period of time.

So it was not the number of riots that had increased but other
forms of collective violence.

Regarding your first conclusion...

The perpetrators certainly did not have "a favorite month" to
launch the violence nor did they consult one another about when
to do it. But I found in my study that May is the month when
unrest, lootings and killings took place most frequently. January
and September are the other two months with the highest incidence
of violence. Jakarta, West Java and East Java are regions with
the highest incidence of violence. The least violent regions are
North Sulawesi, South Kalimantan and Jambi.

Shortly before the general elections in June last year, some
Jakartans moved to regions that they thought were safer, such as
Bali, Manado (capital of North Sulawesi) and Yogyakarta. Manado
was a good choice but Yogyakarta and Bali were not because there
were violence in those two regions as well.

This is why I can say, albeit jokingly, that I do not
recommend traveling to Jakarta, West Java or East Java during the
months of January, May and September.

Some fear that increasing cases of violence like riots
indicate prospects for national disintegration. What do you
think?

Riot is not a good predictor of national disintegration. The
Soviet Union, for instance, did not experience a significant
upsurge in unrest before it disintegrated.

A nation is said vulnerable to disintegration when its people
reject the ruling state and opt for another ruler of their own. A
nation is said to be experiencing a social disintegration when
units within its society reject each other.

If Indonesia was indeed on the path of disintegration, then
the collective violence would reflect a conflict between people
and the state rather than a conflict among different units in the
society. But I found that most of the collective violence, or 56
percent, was between different units of society. Only 16 percent
of the violence was directed against the state.

I have to point out again that 74 percent of the collective
violence between our social units took place during Habibie's
term. Under Soeharto, 35 percent of collective violence was
committed by the people against the state as opposed to the 34
percent of violence committed by the state against the people.

So Indonesia is not really unraveling?

That is another concept that we need to discuss:
"malintegration" -- a collective action to express dislike
publicly. Technically, "malintegration" can take the forms of
riots, looting, vandalism and brawl. These is actually what
Indonesia has been facing all this time.

I found in the study that the main problem under Sukarno was
the breaking-up of the country. Under Soeharto, it was civil
unrest while under Habibie, the primary problem was
"malintegration" -- the breaking down of social unity.

Indonesia cannot be said to be facing national disintegration.
It is facing social "malintegration" and may be, to a certain
extent, social disintegration. (Santi Soekanto)