A flicker of threat to region in the Spratly Islands?

A flicker of threat to region in the Spratly Islands?

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): It was reported that China had quietly enforced its claim again in the Spratly Islands. This time, it was the Philippines which felt intimidated by the most recent Chinese move.

The Philippines President Fidel Ramos accused China of sending its navy to one of the groups of tiny islands, the Mischief Reef (Panganiban Reef), which is claimed by Manila. Ramos also accused China of having built a naval base in the area.

Ramos's accusation came after various reports on the presence of four Chinese warships and ten other smaller ships were confirmed by the Philippines' Department of National Defense. In response to Ramos' accusation, the spokesman of Chinese Embassy in Manila, Deng Xijun, confirmed that there was a "building" in the area, but denied that the building was a naval base. Instead, according to the spokesman, the building was a "shelter" for Chinese fishermen (Kompas, Feb. 9, 1995).

Even though it is still difficult to determine the real situation at this stage, such an exchange of words between China and the Philippines seems to strengthen regional concerns that the Spratly Islands indeed have the potential to be a new hot spot that could jeopardize the stability of the Southeast Asia region.

It also shows how the issue could easily come to surface at any time. And to prevent the escalation of the conflict Indonesia and its counterparts in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) took the initiative to issue a South China Sea Declaration at the ASEAN Summit in January 1992, which stipulates the avoidance of the use of force among the conflicting parties in efforts to solve the disputes.

Therefore, if Manila's accusations are right, then China's position with regard to the South China Sea disputes could have some repercussions on the hard-won Chinese new image in Southeast Asia.

Since the end of the Mao Zedong era, it took almost two decades for China to restore its negative image in the region due to an adventurist foreign policy posture pursued by previous Beijing leadership. It can be said that only since the end of 1980s has China finally succeeded in convincing Southeast Asian Countries (albeit they are still cautious) that it has now adopted a new, more peaceful foreign policy towards the region.

As a consequence, post-Cold War Southeast Asia now witnesses the growing interactions between China and ASEAN countries. It was never before that China had been accepted as a legitimate actor in the region as it is now. Even Indonesia and Malaysia which in the past perceived China with strong suspicion are now adopting a more flexible and cooperative attitude towards Beijing.

There is a strong feeling among Southeast Asian countries at present that China should be incorporated into the regional security framework for the sake of regional stability. They now accept the fact that without the Chinese involvement, it would be difficult to maintain a peaceful environment in the region. Such an acknowledgement on the part of ASEAN countries suggests the acceptance of China as a significant player in regional affairs.

Therefore, there have been efforts to encourage Beijing to participate in various regional security forums as an observer, such as in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting and participant to the ASEAN Regional Forum.

All these efforts are intentionally designed to contribute positively to the process of Confidence Building Measures which is seen by many as imperative for building better and constructive security relationship in Southeast Asia. And, as far as this process is concerned, it can be said that China has played a relatively positive role.

In this regard, one of the major obstacles to develop a closer cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries is the Chinese policy in the case of South China Sea dispute. Now, if the alleged presence of China's warships in the South China Sea is true, then the strain in Sino-Southeast Asia relations would likely be more complicated. The fact is that China's move to strengthen its claim to the area has caused some concerns in the ASEAN capitals.

It is feared that China's policy towards this issue might become a major source for instability in the future. Coupled with China's military build-up since the last few years, such concerns are likely to strengthen.

Therefore, if China continues use military force to back up and strengthen its claim in the South China Sea with military forces, three possible implications can be identified. First, it could strengthen the view already held by regional countries that China is indeed eager to assert its hegemonic ambition in the region.

China's policy and intention towards the South China Sea has long been considered a test for measuring such a hegemonic ambitions. China's willingness to be a party to the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea mentioned above can be seen at the time as a positive sign for China's commitment to the stability in the region. Now, such a test still holds, and therefore, if China failed to pass it, then it would be difficult to expect the Sino-Southeast Asian relations would be improved in the future.

Second, if China still shows inflexibility in approaching the South China Sea disputes, for example by forcing unilateral claims, then it would destabilize the already improved Sino-ASEAN relations. Such a unilateral action by China in forcing its claim would enforce the hard-liners' view in some ASEAN countries, that China is a power that cannot be trusted.

As a consequence, Beijing's efforts to restore its image the last two decades would be in vain. The whole issue would be put back to the question of mutual suspicion on both sides, and this would mean a setback to the whole process of regional confidence building measures.

Third, it might force some countries, which feel intimidated by China's moves in the Spratly Islands, to consider the establishment of some sort of de facto alignment against China. This possibility may seem remote at present, but it might become a possible option in the future due to the increasing threat from China. In turn, it might provoke other parties to improve their military capability, and the region would be characterized by an arms race between China and other claimants.

No one would expect these possibilities to prevail. The ball is now in China's hands. China is expected to show a more transparent attitude towards the South China Sea conflict. The principle of consultation and the habit of dialog should be observed by China, and also by other claimants, in order to prevent a diplomatic incident. For example, China should consult with and inform other parties if it wants to build a "shelter" for its fishermen.

Moreover, it would be better if no countries take unilateral action before any substantial agreement on how the idea of joint- cooperation should be materialized is reached. For the time being, perhaps it would be helpful if conflicting parties refrain themselves from taking controversial and provocative measures and adhere to the status quo.

Apart from what has been said above, it is time now for all claimants to move forwards from their present position in the dialog process. It is time now to discuss the problem in a more formal atmosphere. The Indonesian-initiated informal Workshop on South China Sea should be given more serious attention from all parties.

If China and Southeast Asian countries are indeed committed to the stability and security of the region, such a call should not be responded to with suspicion. Of course no one denies that the question of sovereignty is indeed a very delicate problem in inter-state relations.

However, it should also be acknowledged that the question of peace is more substantial than any other questions. In other words, the rhetoric of "joint-cooperation by putting aside the question of sovereignty" should be soon transformed into reality.

This is perhaps the best way to eliminate suspicion and to develop more constructive relations among the conflicting parties. It is hoped that such efforts would, in the future, prevent the rise of new troubles in the Spratlys.

Rizal Sukma, is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta and a Ph.D. Candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Britain.