A flicker of threat to region in the Spratly Islands?

A flicker of threat to region in the Spratly Islands?

By Rizal Sukma

JAKARTA (JP): It was reported that China had quietly enforced
its claim again in the Spratly Islands. This time, it was the
Philippines which felt intimidated by the most recent Chinese
move.

The Philippines President Fidel Ramos accused China of sending
its navy to one of the groups of tiny islands, the Mischief Reef
(Panganiban Reef), which is claimed by Manila. Ramos also accused
China of having built a naval base in the area.

Ramos's accusation came after various reports on the presence
of four Chinese warships and ten other smaller ships were
confirmed by the Philippines' Department of National Defense. In
response to Ramos' accusation, the spokesman of Chinese Embassy
in Manila, Deng Xijun, confirmed that there was a "building" in
the area, but denied that the building was a naval base. Instead,
according to the spokesman, the building was a "shelter" for
Chinese fishermen (Kompas, Feb. 9, 1995).

Even though it is still difficult to determine the real
situation at this stage, such an exchange of words between China
and the Philippines seems to strengthen regional concerns that
the Spratly Islands indeed have the potential to be a new hot
spot that could jeopardize the stability of the Southeast Asia
region.

It also shows how the issue could easily come to surface at
any time. And to prevent the escalation of the conflict Indonesia
and its counterparts in the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) took the initiative to issue a South China Sea
Declaration at the ASEAN Summit in January 1992, which stipulates
the avoidance of the use of force among the conflicting parties
in efforts to solve the disputes.

Therefore, if Manila's accusations are right, then China's
position with regard to the South China Sea disputes could have
some repercussions on the hard-won Chinese new image in Southeast
Asia.

Since the end of the Mao Zedong era, it took almost two
decades for China to restore its negative image in the region due
to an adventurist foreign policy posture pursued by previous
Beijing leadership. It can be said that only since the end of
1980s has China finally succeeded in convincing Southeast Asian
Countries (albeit they are still cautious) that it has now
adopted a new, more peaceful foreign policy towards the region.

As a consequence, post-Cold War Southeast Asia now witnesses
the growing interactions between China and ASEAN countries. It
was never before that China had been accepted as a legitimate
actor in the region as it is now. Even Indonesia and Malaysia
which in the past perceived China with strong suspicion are now
adopting a more flexible and cooperative attitude towards
Beijing.

There is a strong feeling among Southeast Asian countries at
present that China should be incorporated into the regional
security framework for the sake of regional stability. They now
accept the fact that without the Chinese involvement, it would be
difficult to maintain a peaceful environment in the region. Such
an acknowledgement on the part of ASEAN countries suggests the
acceptance of China as a significant player in regional affairs.

Therefore, there have been efforts to encourage Beijing to
participate in various regional security forums as an observer,
such as in the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting and participant to
the ASEAN Regional Forum.

All these efforts are intentionally designed to contribute
positively to the process of Confidence Building Measures which
is seen by many as imperative for building better and
constructive security relationship in Southeast Asia. And, as far
as this process is concerned, it can be said that China has
played a relatively positive role.

In this regard, one of the major obstacles to develop a closer
cooperation between China and Southeast Asian countries is the
Chinese policy in the case of South China Sea dispute. Now, if
the alleged presence of China's warships in the South China Sea
is true, then the strain in Sino-Southeast Asia relations would
likely be more complicated. The fact is that China's move to
strengthen its claim to the area has caused some concerns in the
ASEAN capitals.

It is feared that China's policy towards this issue might
become a major source for instability in the future. Coupled with
China's military build-up since the last few years, such concerns
are likely to strengthen.

Therefore, if China continues use military force to back up
and strengthen its claim in the South China Sea with military
forces, three possible implications can be identified. First, it
could strengthen the view already held by regional countries that
China is indeed eager to assert its hegemonic ambition in the
region.

China's policy and intention towards the South China Sea has
long been considered a test for measuring such a hegemonic
ambitions. China's willingness to be a party to the ASEAN
Declaration on the South China Sea mentioned above can be seen at
the time as a positive sign for China's commitment to the
stability in the region. Now, such a test still holds, and
therefore, if China failed to pass it, then it would be difficult
to expect the Sino-Southeast Asian relations would be improved in
the future.

Second, if China still shows inflexibility in approaching the
South China Sea disputes, for example by forcing unilateral
claims, then it would destabilize the already improved Sino-ASEAN
relations. Such a unilateral action by China in forcing its claim
would enforce the hard-liners' view in some ASEAN countries, that
China is a power that cannot be trusted.

As a consequence, Beijing's efforts to restore its image the
last two decades would be in vain. The whole issue would be put
back to the question of mutual suspicion on both sides, and this
would mean a setback to the whole process of regional confidence
building measures.

Third, it might force some countries, which feel intimidated
by China's moves in the Spratly Islands, to consider the
establishment of some sort of de facto alignment against China.
This possibility may seem remote at present, but it might become
a possible option in the future due to the increasing threat from
China. In turn, it might provoke other parties to improve their
military capability, and the region would be characterized by an
arms race between China and other claimants.

No one would expect these possibilities to prevail. The ball
is now in China's hands. China is expected to show a more
transparent attitude towards the South China Sea conflict. The
principle of consultation and the habit of dialog should be
observed by China, and also by other claimants, in order to
prevent a diplomatic incident. For example, China should consult
with and inform other parties if it wants to build a "shelter"
for its fishermen.

Moreover, it would be better if no countries take unilateral
action before any substantial agreement on how the idea of joint-
cooperation should be materialized is reached. For the time
being, perhaps it would be helpful if conflicting parties refrain
themselves from taking controversial and provocative measures and
adhere to the status quo.

Apart from what has been said above, it is time now for all
claimants to move forwards from their present position in the
dialog process. It is time now to discuss the problem in a more
formal atmosphere. The Indonesian-initiated informal Workshop on
South China Sea should be given more serious attention from all
parties.

If China and Southeast Asian countries are indeed committed to
the stability and security of the region, such a call should not
be responded to with suspicion. Of course no one denies that the
question of sovereignty is indeed a very delicate problem in
inter-state relations.

However, it should also be acknowledged that the question of
peace is more substantial than any other questions. In other
words, the rhetoric of "joint-cooperation by putting aside the
question of sovereignty" should be soon transformed into reality.

This is perhaps the best way to eliminate suspicion and to
develop more constructive relations among the conflicting
parties. It is hoped that such efforts would, in the future,
prevent the rise of new troubles in the Spratlys.

Rizal Sukma, is a researcher at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Jakarta and a Ph.D. Candidate at the
London School of Economics and Political Science, Britain.