A. Dahana

A. Dahana
Jakarta

Sinologist I. Wibowo has recently published a book titled
Belajar dari Cina: Bagaimana Cina Merebut Peluang dalam Era
Globalisasi (Learning from China: How China seizes opportunities
in the globalization era, Kompas Publishing, 2004).

In his book, Wibowo presents a number of interesting aspects
about China following Deng Xiaoping's reform drive and its
opening up to the world.

The book introduces the Chinese "model of development", under
which its socialist system co-exists with and allows
opportunities for a liberalized market, a system that hitherto
prevailed only in a capitalist society. As a result, China
emerged as an economic giant, sending a chill even to the United
States, the world's only superpower.

More interestingly, however, is that the book dwells as to why
China has enjoyed such a high level of development. Wibowo
attributes the drive behind China's economic development to
"historical vengeance", particularly as regards the insult it
received from colonialists and imperialists.

Chinese history shows the painful experience it endured
through Western and Japanese imperialism and colonialism.

After the defeat of the Qing, or Manchu, Dynasty in the 19th
century over a series of wars fought against Western aggression,
China was colonized by several countries. The historical
terminology guafen was derived from this experience, and means
dividing Chinese territory like cutting up a watermelon, or gua,
among Western and Japanese aggressors.

In the territories controlled by Western and Japanese
colonialists, an extra-territoriality system was enforced. One of
the stipulations of this system was that only the law of the
colonizing power applied in these concessions. If a foreigner
committed a violation against the Chinese government or people,
the perpetrator was tried in a foreign court.

This is why Sun Yat-sen, known as the Father of the Chinese
Revolution and the Father of the Republic of China, said the
Chinese had experienced a far worse fate than colonized nations,
because China was controlled by several colonial powers at the
same time. In other words, the Chinese were subservient to a
number of colonial masters concurrently.

This colonial system, say historians of Chinese Marxism, was
able to last long because feudalism still held sway in China from
the 19th century to the mid-20th century. The colonial masters
maintained this feudal system by allowing the Qing Dynasty to
continue ruling the country. This is why Chinese Marxist
historians refer to China during that era as "a semi-feudal and
semi-colonized country".

The greatest insult that foreign powers subjected to the
Chinese can perhaps be inferred from a warning put up in a
foreign concession in Shanghai: "No entry for dogs and Chinese".
Evidence of exploitation, repression and abuse that the Chinese
were subjected to can be viewed in the Museum of the History of
the Chinese Revolution, which is located close to Tiananmen
Square in downtown Beijing.

Following the expulsion of foreign imperialist and colonialist
powers from China and the establishment of the People's Republic
of China (PRC) in 1949, the vengeance against foreign
colonialists was channeled through a revolution. Mao said the
establishment of the PRC did not necessarily mean the end of the
Chinese revolution -- the next stage of the revolution would be
to fight against imperialism in the world arena.

To this end, China felt called upon to export its revolution:
Colonized nations, particularly in Asia, Africa and Latin
America, then still in the process of liberating themselves from
the shackles of foreign imperialists, needed assistance. They
were advised to take "the path of the Chinese revolution" in
liberating themselves from the yoke of Western colonialism and
their foreign henchmen.

The attempt to change the world by exporting revolution
reached its height in the early 1960s following the ideological
conflict between the PRC and the Soviet Union. The PRC openly
supported the armed struggle waged by "communist rebels" in
Indochina, Thailand, Burma and Malaysia.

It also lent support to the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI),
which was the comrade-in-arms of the Sukarno administration's
leftist offensive of mobilizing the New Emerging Forces (Nefos)
to crush the Old Established Forces (Oldefos).

At home, Mao organized a number of mass campaigns to stoke the
flames of the revolutionary spirit -- as such, Mao's rule could
also be characterized as a campaign period.

All of this activity was based on Mao's assumption that the
Chinese Revolution was an integral part of the world revolution.

After Mao died in 1976, Deng Xiaoping, following exhausting
political intrigue and internal conflicts among the elite, came
to power in the early 1980s.

When he took hold of power, Deng basically continued Mao's
vengeance but through a different channel: He introduced the
reform drive and popularized the principles "To get rich is
noble" and "To enrich a small number of people and then
distribute the wealth to others is ideologically correct".

The masses, by then very exhausted because of Mao's political
campaigns, welcomed Deng's call warmly: They happily went into
business and took up economic activities. Under Deng's command,
China opened itself up to foreign capital by offering wide-
ranging incentives and facilities to foreign investors. The
result is that China is now an economic giant that other major
economic powers both admire and fear.

Viewed from an historical perspective, to make China rich (fu)
and strong (qiang) has been the obsession of the Chinese elite
since the mid-19th century, when China was looted by foreign
powers -- and Deng Xiaoping was able to transform this dream of
fuqiang, being rich and strong, into reality.

How does this Chinese vengeance phenomenon compare with a
similar phenomenon in Indonesia?

Colonial and imperialist powers dominated China for about 110
years, from 1838 to 1949, while Indonesia was under Dutch
colonial rule for 350 years. Mathematically, therefore,
Indonesia's vengeance against colonialism and imperialism should
be more or less 3.5 times bigger than China's.

Unfortunately, Indonesia's vengeance is yet to find an outlet
like Deng Xiaoping's reform plan. In Indonesia, channeling this
vengeance is still confined to rallies and protests, demanding
this or that.

Otherwise, this vengeance is channeled through the persistent
fight for the principles of those political parties that won or
lost in the elections. Or, in the most extreme cases, it will
take on the form of sectarian conflicts between ethnic, religions
or social groups, which would give rise to mutual killing and
bomb blasts.

Some mass media reported recently that Indo-Chinese
cooperation with China would be strengthened. One of the articles
in this cooperation scheme should be how to manage our historical
vengeance.

It seems we have much to learn from China as to how to channel
this vengeance.

The writer is a professor of Chinese history at the School of
Cultural Sciences, University of Indonesia.