Yugoslavia bombings 'result of NATO frustration'

William L. Nash , a retired U.S. army major general who is director of global civil-military programs for the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), visited the country last week. The following article is based on excerpts from an interview.

JAKARTA (JP): Gen. Nash cherishes childhood memories of the city. He lived in Jakarta from 1955 to 1957 when his father, who bears the same name, was the U.S. military attache.

"I used to play kites with my Indonesian friends," he said, his eyes glistening at the memory. He said one of the friends grew up to be a high-ranking military official.

Asked where he once played, he replied: "Right here," pointing to the floor of the Mandarin Oriental Hotel where he stayed during his visit. "Before, this was an open field and I lived on Jalan Agus Salim."

He joined NDI in January 1999 from Harvard University, where he was a fellow and visiting lecturer at the John F. Kennedy School of Government.

He was the commanding general of the U.S. army's first armored division from June 1995 to May 1997. He also served as commander of Task Force Eagle, a multinational division with more than 25,000 soldiers from 12 nations. It was charged with implementing the Dayton Peace Accords in northeastern Bosnia-Herzegovina from December 1995 to November 1996.

He discussed the ongoing North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombings of Yugoslavia and about his work with NDI.

Question: U.S.-led NATO air strikes on Yugoslavia have been going on for a week now. Do you think they will achieve NATO's goal?

Nash: It's a difficult question to answer in an objective way, the key issue is to ensure NATO's political objectives. What you desire in political objectives you then try to match with military objectives, which will help you achieve your political objective.

Air power alone in history has not shown itself to be decisive. The political objective in this case is more limited than the total victory to bring Serbians to the negotiating table. A combination of air power and continued diplomatic efforts have a reasonable chance of success.

Q: You were saying something about matching political and military objectives, but there are some who think that the bombing has come too late.

N: There has been a great difficulty in doing that and there has been a lack of consensus within the NATO community until recently about the use of force. So it was not possible to use force earlier because many of the NATO nations wanted to keep using political or diplomatic actions as a solution. But what happened, I believe, is that finally they reached the threshold of frustration.

Q: And as this threshold is reached the Albanians are leaving Kosovo in great numbers, what some describe as the greatest humanitarian catastrophe since World War II...

N: What must be understood is that when you use force you set off a dynamic of human interaction that is not easily predicted. What happens next and what we see is that the use of force, instead of bringing a quick resolution to the problem, has caused the defiance of Serbia's Milosevic and an increase in very cruel behavior within Kosovo.

And that's one of the reasons I am most concerned about this whole operation because I don't think the implications of our actions have been completely thought out, and now we are facing a very difficult situation.

Q: How could the possibility of such a catastrophe be overlooked?

N: I join you in your mystification, but one thing I want to say though is that we must be cautious in this information age to be too quick with judgment. In today's world we get so much information so fast that we have a tendency at the end of every day to try to make a final judgment, and then tomorrow we make another final judgment and the day after.

Q: This sounds like a comment from a keen media observer...

N: No, it's not just the media. It's also with policymakers because I have all this information. And I would say this case is not just a five-day situation or a six-day situation. So it's going to take a while for the whole strategy to come together.

Q: If I may come back to the air strikes, what would happen if, for example, Milosevic resorted to a cease-fire in Kosovo?

N: I think a unilateral cease-fire in the killing of the Kosovars would be a very positive step. But I think at this point the NATO alliance would also want a commitment from Milosevic to fulfill the Rambouillet agreement to include the presence of an international peace-keeping force to ensure compliance by all parties.

Q: Why do you think NATO doesn't want to introduce ground forces?

N: I have reservations about the wisdom of the introduction of ground forces because I'm not sure there will be unity in such forces. I'm not sure the cost that would result in such an operation would be willingly paid by the nations of NATO and that's why they are trying to find an intermediate solution rather than a complete solution.

There is a great risk that it will not be successful, but it is too soon to tell. Let's not fall into the trap of instant analysis.

Q: Do you see a parallel between these bombings and the recent Western bombings of Iraq?

N: The greatest similarities that I see are that in both cases it has been very difficult to match military objectives with the political objectives that we seek. And that has caused great frustration to the Western world in dealing with both these situations... that, short of a massive invasion, limited military means and limited military objectives have made the achievement of a specific political objective very difficult. And that's the parallel I see with the Iraqi situation.

The importance of political objectives has not been sufficient to introduce ground forces.

Q: It seems that in both cases it is the common people that endure the deepest suffering...

N: I think there are arguments to be made for that in both cases, but in the Yugoslav case the suffering is by the Kosovar Albanians, the people we are trying to help. I think there has been a great deal of effort by NATO to minimize civilian casualties within Yugoslavia, and the Yugoslavs were very quick to point out any casualties, but given all the bombs and all the missions that have been flown, civilian casualties have been kept to the absolute minimum. But (the incidence of) Kosovar Albanians being attacked by the Serbs has increased during these days and that is, at the very least, very unfortunate.

Q: After the fall of communism, the United States has increasingly been seen as the world's policeman. What is your comment?

N: I guess the use of the word "policeman" bothers me. With the power the United States has, I think it is incumbent upon it, in cooperation with many other countries, to remain engaged in this world to try to condition the respect of human rights, for self- determination of people, respect for the growth of democracy around the world.

But I also think that we should not act unilaterally except when our vital interests are threatened. And when the interests are less than vital we should attempt in every way possible to operate this part of a coalition, whether it be NATO or a coalition of the willing. While we might be the sheriff, there are a lot of other countries which should be the posse.

Q: Has the U.S. been acting commensurate with its power?

N: I think the U.S. is trying to act commensurate with its responsibility in the world. I personally have some reservations about how we got to this point, where force became the least bad of actions, and I truly wish those who have criticized would have been more forceful in the pursuit of a diplomatic solution so force could have been avoided. I think it is somewhat hypocritical of some other nations to criticize the NATO use of force when they haven't exerted the maximum influence to try to help resolve the situation.

Q: However, the U.S. has supported certain regimes in the past due to reasons often undigestible to other countries...

N: I understand that concern, which was certainly commented upon here in the last week, that after four years of cooperating with President Milosevic with respect to the Bosnian peace agreement, now he has become a vile enemy. What is he doing now that is different from what he did before? I guess the administration would answer it is the killing of a lot of people in Kosovo. This is a very tough problem, there are so many factors and issues involved, that I think to draw clean lines in the absoluteness of judgment is very difficult.

Q: Some observers like to compare Milosevic with Saddam Hussein...

N: I think the personality trait that is most common between the two men is their thirst for the retention of power. And I personally believe that important to both Saddam Hussein and Milosevic is that they are both concerned with keeping themselves in power at any cost and will allow their people to bear any burden as long as they retain power, the very antitheses of democracy.

Q: Allow me to change the subject to the civil-military programs you are running at the NDI...

N: The NDI is in the business of promoting and strengthening and expanding democracy around the world. As part of that effort we try to help the development of political parties, governance issues primarily with the parliaments around the world. We like to work with civil organizations, with academic institutions and with the media.

The civil-military program is just part of the normal business because in many emerging democracies, there is difficulty in establishing democratic civilian control with the military. We try to improve the capacity of civilians in their ability to provide the necessary leadership, direction and management and oversight of military forces.

Q: The notion of civilians directing the military sounds so strange in a country ruled by the military for three decades...

N: One of the things NDI does not want to do is to try to impose any solution anywhere or to interfere in the internal politics and procedures of a nation. Our purpose is to try to provide a wide range of alternatives for the leaders of the country, for the concerned citizens of the country to consider as they go about their pursuit of democracy.

A very important part of NDI's works is that we don't try to give anybody a single solution. In fact we bring international experts from many countries around the world that have experienced similar issues to bear.

As I tell people we are not here to feed you a meal, we are here to provide a menu for you to select your meal from.

Q: The fact that you have this civil-military program, isn't it because you see something wrong in the relationship between the two constituencies?

N: I think the first thing I see that is common to a lot of countries is a lack of understanding of civilians of the military in its role, and by the military as to the issues that the civilians seek. One of the things that could be helpful in this kind of situation is to establish programs that will allow increased dialog, so the views are heard and hopefully understood by the military and the civilians.

In all mature democratic nations there is a legitimate role for the military, at least for issues of security. So it is important in democracies, as well as any other forms of government, that there is a requirement for sound professional military forces. Civilian leaders need to understand this.

The issue at hand is who provides the leadership, direction, management and oversight of those military forces.

In a democratic system, it is civilian leadership, the political leadership that should provide that. Basic issues are that military forces of the nation are servants of the people and servants of the government. They are designed to protect the territorial integrity of a nation, and to carry out those duties that are assigned by the legitimate leaders.

In all countries in the world today there has been generally a reduction of forces because external threats are reduced in many parts of the world.

Q: What are the most common misunderstandings in the military and the civilian relationship?

N: In a lot of places in the world the military fails to understand that the elected governments are the representatives of the people, and are charged with the responsibility of providing the leadership to the nation as the nation progresses for what we call the common good of the people.

Much in the 20th century have been internal and external threats to the integrity of the countries and that caused the military to properly focus on those threats, but maybe at the cost of disregarding some of the other interests of the nation.

So, the military needs to understand that there is a civilian capacity to provide that leadership lesson. Civilians who are anxious to pursue social and economic goals may not fully understand the requirements for the security environment that allows those social and economic goals to be pursued. So there can be a misunderstanding and because this emerging democracy is in transition from some sort of authoritarian regime, change in the paradigm between authoritarian and democracy requires all elements of the society to rebalance their thinking, to rebalance their priorities and refocus the method by which they integrate all the needs of the society.

Q: Does this civil-military problem exist only in developing countries?

N: Two hundred years of civil-military relations in the United States, you can see examples ... the Constitution of the United States went to great lengths to ensure civilian control and establish both within the executive and the legislative branches, checks and balances to ensure that civilian control would dominate our government.

Even with that, as you look at the variety of issues through the years there has been tension between the civilian and the military and we had to deal with those issues. We have had presidents fire generals because they are not compliant with national policies. The Truman-MacArthur conflict in the Korean war is the most famous example. Abraham Lincoln faced issues in the Civil War of generals not obeying the commander in chief.

In more recent days, we had major disagreements over policies of the military. There are tensions over funding levels and there are disagreements, but we have a system of government that allows the military to speak its mind. The elected leaders both in the executive branch and the legislative branch make the final judgment, but they balance the concerns of the military along with other considerations to make the decision.

Q: As an expert on media-military relations, what is your view of this specific topic in developing countries?

N: On the broader scale, in developing countries, they have reasonably established freedom of the press. The institution of journalism is not mature and that is understandable. It has not had a chance to mature so there is a wide explosion of freedom and additional newspapers.

At the same time, in mature and immature democracies, there is a natural tension between the military and the media. The media is looking for great openness and wants to get the story out to all that it concerns.

In the military, there is a natural propensity for operational security; as we have seen in the Kosovo example, the NATO military is very restrictive on the amount of information (released). At the same time, they fully understand that the provision of that information is also the basis for developing public support. And the natural tension is not necessarily bad.

As a lecturer in media and military relations, I advocate maximum possible openness by the military to the public. The military should understand that they are the servant of the people and the government and that the media, the journalists of the world, provide information on the military to the public and to the government.

At the same time, there is a responsibility of the media to be truthful, fair and comprehensive and to be knowledgeable about the issues they are reporting. A harmonious and respectful relationship between the two benefits the nation. (hbk)