Young, old Palestinians need unity

Khalil Shikaki, Director, Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, Ramallah, Project Syndicate

Israel's reoccupation of Palestinian cities and towns culminates a predictable pattern. American willingness to accept Ariel Sharon's portrayal of that reoccupation as an acceptable part of its global "war against terror" was not only surprising, but misguided and dangerous. By helping to de-legitimize Yasser Arafat and by accepting Prime Minister Sharon's characterization of Israel's reoccupation as "self-defense," American policy threatens to weaken the moral clarity and credibility of the U.S. in the eyes of the world. The consequences for the Middle East and beyond could be deadly.

Eighteen months of violent Israeli-Palestinian confrontations have set new dynamics in motion. These follow a predictable pattern, locking the two sides into an escalation that will push toward a total and final confrontation. It now seems doubtful that these dynamics can be contained. Secretary of State Colin Powell's April mission was doomed to failure because American policy failed to reverse, or even address, the causes of deterioration.

On the Palestinian side, the current intifada created a Young Guard that despises the Old Guard, represented by Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. Unlike the members of the Old Guard who spent much of their lives outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Young Guard is a product of domestic Palestinian society.

Not just younger, they are more educated than the old leaders, and are convinced that they know better how to deal with Israel. While the two groups share the vision of a two-state solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Young Guard tends to rule out any return to previous channels of negotiation. These, they argue, served to consolidate the Old Guard's domination of Palestinian politics.

Fueled by the failure of the peace process to deliver an end to Israel's occupation, and by the Old Guard's failure to deliver good governance, the Young Guard allied themselves with radical Islamists. Despite important ideological and political disagreements with the Islamists, the young nationalists hoped that alliance would strengthen their hand against the Old Guard and increase pressure on the Israelis.

Supported by an enraged and desperate public, this new alliance set out to achieve two goals: 1) to displace the Old Guard of the PLO, and 2) to use violence to end Israel's 35-year- old occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, using Israel's unilateral withdrawal from South Lebanon as a model.

Most Palestinians support violent attacks because they believe that only violence will end the occupation, not negotiation. This extends to suicide bombing, an immoral and cruel act of terror. In a widespread Palestinian view, suicide bombing creates a "balance of terror" that may, over time, neutralize Israel's superior firepower. Suicide bombings make Israelis feel vulnerable, and comprise, Palestinians hope, a powerful incentive to end the occupation.

So the intifada produced the first big change in the balance of Palestinian political power since the peace process began a decade ago, with more and more people shifting loyalty from the nationalists to the Islamists. Support for the Islamists, which stood in 1995 at about 15 percent, doubled to 30 percent by 2001. Support for the nationalists decreased from 55 percent to 30 percent over the same period. With some 40 percent of the population uncommitted to either camp, the competition between the two forces is far from resolution.

By destroying the Palestinian Authority (PA)'s civil and security infrastructure, Israel dealt a severe blow to the PA's ability to deliver services to this "up-for-grabs" population. The Islamists will likely see further gains. The nationalist Young Guard, which suffered a serious setback during the April reoccupation, will likely remain a powerful force in Palestinian politics -- for now. In the long run, the ability of the national movement to continue to lead will be put to the test.

On the Israeli side, the new dynamics include loss of public confidence in the peaceful intentions of the Palestinians. So Israelis turned to a hard-line leadership. So long as they feel threatened, Israelis are likely to choose leaders committed to a military solution to Israel's security problems. This could lead to a long-term reoccupation of Palestinian areas.

But a long-term reoccupation of the West Bank could destroy whatever moderate elements remain in the Palestinian leadership, closing the door on further peacemaking for years to come. That would threaten Israel's peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan, as popular anger at Israel turns against pro-American regimes in the region.

Unlike President Bush and Prime Minister Sharon, most of the world sees a clear difference between the American-led war against al-Qaeda and Israel's war against the Palestinians. The U.S. never occupied Afghanistan, but Israel occupies Palestinian land. It is not just Osama bin Laden's means that are condemned everywhere, but also his cause. Unlike bin Laden, the Palestinian cause enjoys nearly universal support among Arabs and Muslims.

While America found many Arab and Muslim countries willing to support the U.S. campaign against al-Qaeda, none endorses a war that equates Palestinian violence against Israeli occupation with the terror of al-Qaeda. A successful Israeli effort to make that equation plausible would abruptly turn a legitimate global war against terror into a war against Arabs and Muslims, indeed a war against Islam, which is precisely what the Bush administration seeks to avoid. If that happens, Sharon will have succeeded where bin Laden failed.