YLBHI: An asset or a national threat?

The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), one of the best known non-government organizations in Indonesia, celebrated its 24th anniversary last week. Sociologist Kastorius Sinaga argues that whoever sees it as a threat is actually the destabilizing factor.

JAKARTA (JP): Unlike previous anniversaries, the celebration of the YLBHI anniversary appeared to be overshadowed by unfavorable conditions. An increase of political pressure, ranging from prohibition of its members to speak at seminars, intimidation of some of its vocal staff, to the imposition of unduly complicated procedures for obtaining the necessary permits to organize meetings, have frustrated its activists.

This leads to critical questions. Is the foundation actually a threat to national political stability? Or does it contribute to the interest of political development in this country? I think such questions are relevant now in line with our efforts to solve misunderstandings which have probably emerged between the government and the foundation in particular, and human rights activists in general.

The foundation was founded in 1971 when ten lawyers joined outstanding intellects and journalists to launch a pilot project on legal aid for poor people in Jakarta. They proved to be an unusually effective blend: the lawyers provided professional legal skills, the intellects a "think tank" for social problems and the journalists were responsible for the function of public exposition.

Since the beginning, the foundation has operated under very challenging circumstances. Particularly in Jakarta, which was rapidly developing into a modern metropolis, conflicts in various fields increased between the government and society, particularly with those living around developed areas. In the 1980s the foundation expanded to other regions due to a strong belief that legal cases outside Java would increase constantly. Now the foundation has 13 branch offices in the provinces which provide legal assistance free of charge to thousands of poor and powerless people, like farmers, laborers, petty traders, becak drivers and uneducated people. Since many individual cases, like arbitrary labor disputes, land conflicts and subversive cases, emerged due to a particular government policy and regulation, the foundation shifted its emphasis of legal aid from "individual" to "collective structural" legal aid. This shift has led the foundation to directly confront government policies.

In handling collective cases, the foundation adopts two strategies simultaneously. The first is litigation, leading to a range of formal juridical activities to defend the rights of clients in court. Juridical accusation and plea on behalf of clients are normally postulated on the bases of positive juridical principles. Misuse of authority, authoritarian behavior of the state apparatus, intimidation supported by the military (particularly in land eviction cases) are also prosecuted in the name of the law. Such litigation activities in turn draw attention to the problems related to the execution of power. In other words, juridical cases were broadened to represent general political issues or problems.

The second strategy is composed of non-litigation activities ranging from independent fact finding which enables the foundation's lawyers to include in their plea a clear public statement concerning any politically repressive methods used by the state, assisting and mobilizing the clients to the House of Representatives or respective ministry in order to gain political recognition of their problem, to building networks with student groups and other NGOs both domestic and international. In short, the non-litigation activities function to promote sweeping changes in fundamental social conditions by initiating widespread public concern for the plea of the clients.

With such activities, we should consider that the foundation has actually helped to maintain political stability in this country. Firstly, through juridical processes (litigation activities), the government has actually been indirectly assisted by the foundation to cope with the conflicting situation between the people and the government. The reason is that the protracted social and political conflicts have been "narrowed" to a mere juridical conflict where the government is automatically in the dominant position. Secondly, by allowing the presence of the foundation and its non-litigation activities, Indonesia will be seen by the world community as a more open and democratic state. Thirdly and more interestingly is that the oppositionist character of the foundation will gradually empower the status-quo position of the state, since the latter will be indirectly helped to better understand the course of conflicts emerging from the "grassroots" and subsequently can choose a more suitable solution to the conflicts. With these three arguments, I think, whoever sees the foundation as a potential threat to national political stability is actually the party itself which jeopardizes this stability.

The writer is a lecturer at the Postgraduate Program of Social Sciences in the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.