YLBHI: An asset or a national threat?
YLBHI: An asset or a national threat?
The Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), one of the best
known non-government organizations in Indonesia, celebrated its
24th anniversary last week. Sociologist Kastorius Sinaga argues
that whoever sees it as a threat is actually the destabilizing
factor.
JAKARTA (JP): Unlike previous anniversaries, the celebration
of the YLBHI anniversary appeared to be overshadowed by
unfavorable conditions. An increase of political pressure,
ranging from prohibition of its members to speak at seminars,
intimidation of some of its vocal staff, to the imposition of
unduly complicated procedures for obtaining the necessary permits
to organize meetings, have frustrated its activists.
This leads to critical questions. Is the foundation actually a
threat to national political stability? Or does it contribute to
the interest of political development in this country? I think
such questions are relevant now in line with our efforts to solve
misunderstandings which have probably emerged between the
government and the foundation in particular, and human rights
activists in general.
The foundation was founded in 1971 when ten lawyers joined
outstanding intellects and journalists to launch a pilot project
on legal aid for poor people in Jakarta. They proved to be an
unusually effective blend: the lawyers provided professional
legal skills, the intellects a "think tank" for social problems
and the journalists were responsible for the function of public
exposition.
Since the beginning, the foundation has operated under very
challenging circumstances. Particularly in Jakarta, which was
rapidly developing into a modern metropolis, conflicts in various
fields increased between the government and society, particularly
with those living around developed areas. In the 1980s the
foundation expanded to other regions due to a strong belief that
legal cases outside Java would increase constantly. Now the
foundation has 13 branch offices in the provinces which provide
legal assistance free of charge to thousands of poor and
powerless people, like farmers, laborers, petty traders, becak
drivers and uneducated people. Since many individual cases, like
arbitrary labor disputes, land conflicts and subversive cases,
emerged due to a particular government policy and regulation, the
foundation shifted its emphasis of legal aid from "individual" to
"collective structural" legal aid. This shift has led the
foundation to directly confront government policies.
In handling collective cases, the foundation adopts two
strategies simultaneously. The first is litigation, leading to a
range of formal juridical activities to defend the rights of
clients in court. Juridical accusation and plea on behalf of
clients are normally postulated on the bases of positive
juridical principles. Misuse of authority, authoritarian behavior
of the state apparatus, intimidation supported by the military
(particularly in land eviction cases) are also prosecuted in the
name of the law. Such litigation activities in turn draw
attention to the problems related to the execution of power. In
other words, juridical cases were broadened to represent general
political issues or problems.
The second strategy is composed of non-litigation activities
ranging from independent fact finding which enables the
foundation's lawyers to include in their plea a clear public
statement concerning any politically repressive methods used by
the state, assisting and mobilizing the clients to the House of
Representatives or respective ministry in order to gain political
recognition of their problem, to building networks with student
groups and other NGOs both domestic and international. In short,
the non-litigation activities function to promote sweeping
changes in fundamental social conditions by initiating widespread
public concern for the plea of the clients.
With such activities, we should consider that the foundation
has actually helped to maintain political stability in this
country. Firstly, through juridical processes (litigation
activities), the government has actually been indirectly assisted
by the foundation to cope with the conflicting situation between
the people and the government. The reason is that the protracted
social and political conflicts have been "narrowed" to a mere
juridical conflict where the government is automatically in the
dominant position. Secondly, by allowing the presence of the
foundation and its non-litigation activities, Indonesia will be
seen by the world community as a more open and democratic state.
Thirdly and more interestingly is that the oppositionist
character of the foundation will gradually empower the status-quo
position of the state, since the latter will be indirectly helped
to better understand the course of conflicts emerging from the
"grassroots" and subsequently can choose a more suitable solution
to the conflicts. With these three arguments, I think, whoever
sees the foundation as a potential threat to national political
stability is actually the party itself which jeopardizes this
stability.
The writer is a lecturer at the Postgraduate Program of Social
Sciences in the University of Indonesia, Jakarta.