Year 2000 'blows winds of harmony to ASEAN-10'

The following is an interview with Dr. Michael Leifer, professor of international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science about ASEAN-10. The interview was held during the Roundtable Asia Pacific meeting in Kuala Lumpur last week.

Question: By accepting Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia ASEAN is said to have achieved its long cherished dream or vision. What is your opinion?

Answer: I really don't think it makes any difference whether you call it a dream or a vision or whether you say that the beginning of this issue comes from basic pragmatic matters.

There were several reasons why the ASEAN governments thought it made make sense to expand and I think the key factor is not so much a vision.

In 1995 it was possible to include Vietnam and that really was a historic turning point because, if one looks back, there had been division within Southeast Asia... Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were polarized from Myanmar which stood to one side.

And once the problem of reconciling with Vietnam was overcome, it was as if a logjam had been broken and with certainty and a comprehensive policy of engagement in place, it was logical to bring together all the Southeast Asian countries.

And then we could realize the dream because the dream is... well, the millennium is coming up in the year 2000 and there is a certain harmony associated with the dream, plus ASEAN clearly needs to strengthen its identity because it has to deal in a wider regional context with major Asia Pacific powers.

So clearly, if you can have ten countries speaking together with one voice then it is good for the corporate identity and standing of ASEAN.

Q: Is the formation of ASEAN-10 a strategic necessity?

A: I see it as a response to a strategic reality and the strategic reality is the fusion between Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia as a result of a new pattern of power after the end of the Cold War. So I think it is a response on the part of Asia to cope with a new strategic reality.

Q: What are the challenges of ASEAN-10?

A: The challenges are that by promoting the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN has compromised on the Zone of Peace and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) principle because the idea of this zone is to try to exclude the major external powers, or at least not allow them to determine the order within the region.

Now, it is not possible to do that. In political life you can not do that. But to the extent that ASEAN develops a stronger corporate identity, increasing its scale in a coherence sense, then it helps ASEAN try and sustain the spirit of the zone within a wider strategic framework.

In other words, it is intended to give ASEAN a greater ability to engage in regional Southeast Asian self determination.

Q: What do you think of the concept of ZOPFAN?

A: I don't think the concept of ZOPFAN applies in its original sense. Changes have taken place which means that you can not demarcate the balance of the region in any precise linear sense.

While ZOPFAN was a signal to outside powers that they should not intervene, the very nature of the ARF makes them a party to the management of regional security matters not just in Northeast Asia but also in Southeast Asia.

But by expanding to include 10 countries, ASEAN is demonstrating that they are an effective diplomatic community which can at least maintain some kind of proximation to the idea of ZOPFAN. The idea of ZOPFAN can be reconciled with the expanding framework of a multilateral security dialog.

Q: The institutionalization of foreign intervention through ARF was mentioned in the roundtable discussion...

A: I used that phrase because intervention is not just one thing. It can take a variety of forms. When the U.S. established its Radio Free Asia broadcast then you could say that was a form of foreign intervention.

So it does not have to be blatant military intervention. By making a major Asia Pacific power a party to a multilateral security dialog which links Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, it is possible to argue that at the very least in a diplomatic sense, it institutionalizes external intervention and therefore challenges the ZOPFAN concept.

Q: Do you see this foreign intervention as positive or negative?

A: That remains to be seen. For example, if Southeast Asian countries are concerned about sea-lane's freedom of passage security and if this is challenged by active intervention, it could be considered positive.

But you cannot prejudge it or over generalize the issue. It depends on the circumstances and it depends on whose interests are affected. It may well be it could even work in the interest of ASEAN in some sectors. The number of ASEAN countries, including Indonesia, provided limited facilities for the American navy and you could call this active intervention but intervention itself is not necessarily related to who is disadvantaged. So it depends on the circumstances and the interests involved.

Q: Domestic issues were raised at the roundtable as something that could affect ASEAN-10's performance, including those of Indonesia which just ended its most violent general election. What do you think?

A: I don't see domestic issues being a major factor within the ASEAN framework and there is some significant spill over. In the case of Myanmar, the most evident problem is that its problems could spill over into Thailand. Refugees, smuggling, and drugs are the kind of things that attract attention.

The problems that Indonesia has experienced recently should not affect the relationship between Indonesia and other ASEAN countries.

I think what concerns other countries is the future of Indonesia because Indonesia has been the core of ASEAN. Without Indonesia's commitment, ASEAN would have been nothing so what they are concerned about is political change in Indonesia and whether or not Indonesia's commitment continues in the same way.

Economic factors is obviously a sensitive issue to ASEAN. But I think most ASEAN governments are flexible concerning this issue and with political will they are able to strengthen political stability.

Q: If the future of Indonesia is so important to ASEAN, what are the chances of smooth political change?

A: I can't give you a precise answer but I think it depends on who is elected by the People's Consultative Assembly as vice president, on the resilience of the Armed Forces (ABRI) and the future cooperation between the person who is acceptable to President Soeharto, the assembly and ABRI as the vice president. I think this is the key to the future. I think that cooperation is crucial.

Q: In the roundtable discussion, it was suggested that ASEAN set up a new mechanism to facilitate deeper dialog among member countries...

A: There are two issues here. One, it is hard to deepen the commitment of ASEAN among the countries and you can do that by developing other common institutions so that you can involve different generations, different constituencies and parliamentarians.

But I think there is one fundamental principle that can't be violated. Once you have any kind of open discussion on domestic problems then that sets up structural tension.

If you accept a country into ASEAN and there are problems then the only way of dealing with those problems is in the quiet Asian way, not publicly.

If you allow the issue to become public then there is the potential for confrontation. And that's to be avoided. I think that would be institutionally destructive for ASEAN.

Q: But if everything is not done in public then the West would continue criticizing ASEAN...

A: It does depend on the effect. If it is possible to show through private dialog that some progress has been made, then I think Western governments are not that stupid to not know what's going on. If they do that, they are capable of making progress. The bottom line is whether it is possible to suggest change and whether western governments will acknowledge changes have taken place.

If nothing happens and the situation gets worse then obviously they are going to react. Western governments tend to react to events in countries like Myanmar.

Q: How big is the drive of economic advantage in the formation of ASEAN-10?

A: I don't have that information, I only know about it in general terms. Obviously there are business opportunities which businesspeople in several ASEAN countries have taken advantage of. I'm not in a position to know to what extent these business interests are linked to government policies. (hbk)