Wrong turn on the 'Road to Mandalay'

By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat

JAKARTA (JP): For many one of the first compelling recollections of Myanmar (Burma) would be as a young adult reading Rudyard Kipling's Road to Mandalay.

Kipling paints a tender image of the old Moulmein Pagoda, the Burmese girl and a place where the tinkling temple bells call the British soldier to be shipped somewhere east of the Suez.

Sadly that romantic image has now evaporated.

The international outcry against alleged human rights abuses and suppression of democracy by the ruling regime in Yangon has reached a fever pitch.

The State Peace and Development Council's (SPDC) strict control of socio-political aspects of life in Myanmar, along with the 1988 crackdown against opposition forces have become a rallying cry among activists and NGOs.

The international recriminations resonating in the "West" (particularly the European Union, the United States and Canada), have become more deafening than even possibly those over East Timor.

Like it or not, Myanmar has become the South Africa of the 1990s.

Initially, there were suggestions that the social and political upheaval in Indonesia, which saw off one of the longest serving autocrats in the world, would ripple through to Yangon.

Such assumptions were made since there do exist many parallels between the Soeharto New Order era and the regime in Yangon.

First, it is well known that Myanmar's paramount military chief, Gen. Ne Win and Soeharto were good friends.

The two recently met when Soeharto visited Yangon in February 1997. Ne Win, 76, six months later arrived here on a three-day family visit.

Second, both countries are under constant threat of ethnic conflicts which may bring about the disintegration of the state, thus promoting the declared need for a strong military.

Third, the SPDC has patterned itself after the Indonesian Armed Forces' concept of dwifungsi (dual function), where the military has the task of not only maintaining security but also playing a socio-political role in state affairs.

Fourth, the SPDC now has a quasi-political wing called the Union Solidarity Development Association which could evolve to parallel Indonesia's Golkar political organization.

Fifth, Myanmar is experiencing the same economic woes which preceded Soeharto's downfall.

Severe floods and fertilizer shortages have caused a sharp fall in agricultural production, Myanmar's staple economy.

The situation is aggravated by the Asian economic crisis which has cut off non-oil investment from neighboring countries.

However, the distinct character of the leadership makes it unlikely that the kind of sudden political change that happened in Indonesia will occur in Myanmar.

Ne Win relinquished his leadership a long time ago and the Indonesian system under Soeharto was based on a cult of the personality. Myanmar has survived leadership changes making the ruling regime more entrenched.

The point of bringing the Indonesia-Myanmar comparison to the fore is that events here should serve as a warning for Yangon.

It should recognize that political developments must not falter behind economic progress.

Harvard Institute for International Development researcher Thomas J. Vallely went further during a hearing with the U.S. House Committee on International Relations.

Vallely suggested in September that a more democratic Indonesia could prompt progressive change from within the SPDC itself.

"Many in the Burmese military have looked upon Indonesia's army as a model for their own role. If Indonesia moved towards democracy...it might be easier to urge other models on the army in Burma," he said.

There is little doubt the SPDC aspires to hold power, and pragmatically speaking there is nothing wrong with that. That is politics, that is the nature of the beast.

Since its independence, absolute power has always been the aim of the status quo in Myanmar.

Ironically, it was current opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's father, Gen. Aung San, who in 1941 summed up Myanmar's aspirations: "There shall be only one nation, one state, one party, one leader. There shall be no parliamentary opposition, no nonsense of individualism."

In Myanmar language, politics is Nainganyei (the affairs of the state).

But history warns us of the hazards of discretionary unchecked power which breeds, according to Thomas Hobbes, a hunger for power that ceases only in death.

In the pluralistic era of globalization, no country can escape the trend towards human rights and democracy.

Maybe this trend, the need for economic support, a more "politically correct" business community and the failure of others will prompt small changes.

Earlier this year, the SPDC formed a political committee headed by Lt. Gen. Khin Nyunt.

Many see this development as a non-militaristic approach to counterbalance the National League of Democracy (NLD).

But more importantly it could be signs of the regime possibly manipulating some semblance of democracy by creating in the near future a narrowly controlled pluralistic political process once the new constitution has been revised.

Here again the Indonesian example comes to mind where, under Soeharto, there was an official opposition party and an electoral process which was all designed to perpetuate the regime.

If this assessment is correct, it is a step which paves the way for something new on the political front. At the very least it signifies a shift from the despotic structure currently in place.

The question concerning most of us outside Myanmar is what can we do?

Neither the Association of Southeast Asian Nations's (ASEAN) "constructive engagement" nor the West's isolationist policy has produced real improvements.

There continues to be a "Cold War" between Myanmar and the West, whilst constructive engagement has only been a mute slogan to help facilitate Myanmar's entry into ASEAN.

ASEAN officials loved quoting tariff lines and how economically prepared Myanmar was to join the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) as justification for its admission to ASEAN.

Nevertheless, without some sort of change, Myanmar will become an increasing liability to ASEAN governments both in terms of its ties with the West and accountability to their own people.

So what is the solution?

Buddhism, the predominant faith in Myanmar, teaches the "middle path", of avoiding extremes, avoiding a zero-sum game.

This ideal should be the route the SPDC takes for its own survival and the path which could resolve the conundrum in tackling the Myanmar issue for outsiders.

Even if Aung San Suu Kyi's NLD is able to attain power, it would not be an effective government without the cooperation of the military.

The EU and the United States should realize that while sanctions and other tough measures have taken a toll, they have made little political headway and only serve to push Myanmar into greater xenophobia and resistance.

The West should end its perception of Myanmar as a case of SPDC dictatorship versus the NLD's democracy.

On the other hand, the SPDC should show the political will to foster a more pluralistic environment. In all likelihood, it will remain authoritarian, but at least a kinder, gentler authoritarian regime. In other words benevolent authoritarianism.

ASEAN, with the participation of Japan and China, should then help broker a deal, whereby the SPDC can make "down payments".

These down payments should follow a timetable which would signify progress and allow Western governments to ease restrictions, while still being able to demonstrate to their constituents that some progress is being made.

Among the down payments could be greater freedom of the press.

There may be already attempts in this direction as it was reported last month that the United Nations (UN) was secretly offering an aid package worth some US$1 billion to Myanmar.

While the UN may still succeed in its attempts, it is probably ASEAN states, Japan and China which are best positioned and whom Yangon will be more receptive to if negotiations commence.

Compromise must be the key spirit otherwise bloodshed, as in the Indonesian experience, may transpire.

There is no clear alternative if all sides stand arrogantly in their respective positions.

The situation now is a stalemate, and it is the very people all sides claim to help who will suffer more if compromise cannot be achieved.

Sanctions and other tough measures may in the end marshal in a new political specter in Myanmar, but at what price? The people of Myanmar will be the first and last victims before sweeping change occurs.

Sanctions, isolationism and dogmatic principles of totalitarianism will only fester if we refuse to interact. The most important question now is who has the political will to start?