World's third largest democracy

World's third largest democracy

This is the first of two articles on the prospect of
democratization in Indonesia by Olle Tornquist, a professor of
politics and development at the University of Oslo.

OSLO (JP): It was a boring election, for parachuted
journalists. Too little violence and cheating to report, and too
little knowledge to explain why. Comparatively, democratic rules
of the game forced much of the Indonesian elite to temporarily
compete by mobilizing votes rather than manipulating in closed
circles and provoking religious and ethnic groups only. That was
a victory of sorts.

Except in East Timor, Aceh, Irian Jaya and a few other places,
some 100 million people finally felt that their vote did matter.
In a way, we witnessed the birth of the second rather than the
third largest democracy in the world, since so many Americans do
not even bother to cast their vote.

But while the very elections were rather free and fair, the
context was not so just and the substance was shallow. There was
a lack of reasonably equal opportunities to make use of political
liberties and many fundamental problems were swept under the
carpet. This will hit back, and this is, therefore, what we
should focus on, if we are interested in the prospects for
stability and democracy.

First, the unjust electoral system. One result was not
delayed: The Indonesian Military would receive 7.6 percent of the
seats in the legislature (more than major reformasi [political
reform] leader Amien Rais' party now seems to get in the open
elections).

Also, 36 percent of the delegates who will later on select the
new president are not elected but will be appointed by the
military and by the political elite in closed smoky provincial
and metropolitan rooms. And, beforehand, former communist as well
as local parties were prohibited, and, remarkably, many seats
were allotted to provinces where the machinery of the current
ruling party, Golkar, remained intact.

Second, the unjust preconditions. While Golkar made good use
of the state apparatuses and control of foreign-funded credits
for cooperatives and social safety net programs, especially on
the outer islands, self-asserted Western democrats gave priority
to stable government through instant elections of "legitimate"
rulers rather than democracy in terms of people's rule and
stability through acceptable chances for everyone to influence
politics and keeping track of elected politicians.

Foreign support for democratization was limited to electoral
arrangements, technical information and some promotion of civic
virtues through non-governmental organizations, while critical
voter education of the actual political forces involved was
scarce, and promotion of democratic organizations among laborers,
farmers, civil servants and employees was almost absent -- not to
talk of parties on the basis of ideas about how societies work
and may be changed.

Such priorities may be in line with a vulgarized version of
democracy, where parties are just machines for the election of
elite politicians and people can only make some difference
through a myriad of single issues and special interest groups.

But it is a bit removed from a more informed understanding of
the dynamics involved, and definitely, for instance, from
European, Indian or South African experiences, where broad
popular organizations and parties were essential for the birth
and growth of democracy.

Predictably, on the one hand, the Indonesian outcome was,
thus, top-down mobilization of votes on the basis of populism and
patron-clientism through the established political machines
(Golkar, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle [PDI
Perjuangan] and the United Development Party), and the
established socioreligious organizations (like the Nahdlatul
Ulama with its major party Nation Awakening Party [PKB], and
Muhammadiyah).

On the other hand, the exciting attempt to form a new liberal
middle-class party, the National Mandate Party (PAN) -- with
secular center-left politics, Muslim values and reform leader
Amien Rais as a locomotive -- proved much more difficult. The
students, moreover -- who forced the elite to do away with former
president Soeharto, who were in the forefront for the reform
process and who put pressure on the traditional politicians --
lost momentum and were marginalized.

And, since way back, genuine development, human rights and
democracy activists often say that their attempts to help people
themselves to organize are now distorted by the neotraditional
political competition.

Third, then, is the shallowness of the elections. This is not
to agree with the many observers who talk of excited masses in
support of a weak woman and a blind man without real programs.

The largest and second largest democracies in the world, India
and the United States, have elected and survived equally odd
leaders.

And even aside from PAN's educated middle-class program,
certain issues did play an important role in terms of people's
expectations and trust in Megawati Soekarnoputri of PDI
Perjuangan and Abdurrahman "Gus Dur" Wahid of PKB as symbols of
dignified resistance against Soeharto and peaceful improvement
without religious and ethnic conflicts, along with old ideals
from the struggle for independence.

No, the major problem is, rather, that it will be very
difficult for the essentially traditional and conservative
politicians now elected to live up to the expectations of
ordinary people, especially of the broad and essentially
unorganized social movement around PDI Perjuangan and Megawati.

There might be a rather long honeymoon, especially if the
economy picks up a bit, but the fact is that voters in the new
instant democracy have been mobilized through old machines and
traditional loyalties which do not correspond with and may not be
able to handle the new major conflicts and ideas in society. Let
me point to some tendencies:

* The grievances and aspirations in East Timor, Aceh, Irian Jaya
and certain other areas were virtually removed from the
established political agenda as local parties were not even
allowed in local elections. So, now the problems will pop up
outside the new democratic framework, where they may be even more
difficult to solve. Fortunately, East Timor may be an exception
-- if proindependent leader Alexandre "Xanana" Gusmao proves
right in "trusting the alternative institutions of the
international community".

* Even the International Monetary Fund's fundamental structural
adjustment program was kept outside the election campaign, and
even the Asian Wall Street Journal (June 21, 1999) questioned the
fact that the Indonesian people were not allowed to take an
independent stand on such a vital issue in its democratic
elections.

But there seems to be a basic consensus between Washington and
the Indonesian elite. So, neither can the new instant democracy
offer an institutional framework for the handling of people's
socioeconomic hardships and protests.

Meanwhile, genuine labor activists find established politics
irrelevant, "as it does not matter much in workers' daily lives".
And employers make up for the loss of outright military
intervention in labor disputes by drawing on their market
bargaining power in times of crisis, establishing fake "unions"
and setting up their own security forces with police and military
personnel as part-time "consultants".

* In view of the irony that Western craftsmen of middle-class
democracy did not manage to make life easier even for the new
liberal PAN, the party's own performance, abandoned as it was by
Muslim stalwarts as well, is a clear indication of the increasing
importance of urban and semiurban intellectuals, professionals
and educated businesspeople.

Some of the democratic potential of the new middle class may
now be lost, however, because of the problems of making a
difference within the neotraditional political framework.
"Alternative" cynicism and preference for extra legislative
lobbying and pressure group activities do not automatically
promote democracy.