`World on Fire': Does globalization inflame ethnic hatred?
`World on Fire': Does globalization inflame ethnic hatred?
Robert Wyrod, Contributor, Jakarta
Five years have passed since waves of anti-Chinese riots swept
through Jakarta, and Indonesia is still grappling with the
meaning of these events.
Were the riots a momentary orgy of violence in an emerging
power vacuum, or were they symptomatic of much deeper tensions
that continue to fester within Indonesian society?
In World on Fire, Amy Chua claims to have the answers to these
questions. She examines how economic and political change created
a particularly volatile situation in Indonesia, one that has not
diminished significantly in the last five years.
But for Chua, the dynamics animating the riots of 1998 are
hardly unique to Indonesia. They are tied up with globalization
and are at the root of many other recent ethnic conflicts, from
anti-Semitism in Russia, to the war in the former Yugoslavia, to
one of the 20th century's great horrors, the Rwandan genocide.
Chua argues that globalization is at the heart of these
contemporary ethnic conflicts. She claims that the simultaneous
implementation of free market economic policies and mass
democratic elections in the developing world has produced an
explosive situation where class differences and ethnic conflict
converge.
The crux of the issue is how globalization affects
economically successful ethnic groups in developing countries.
Like many others before her, Chua notes that many developing
countries have minority ethnic groups that control large
parts of national economies. Her examples include the Chinese in
Southeast Asia, Jews in Russia, Lebanese in West Africa, South
Asians in East Africa and whites throughout Latin America.
Chua observes that "market dominant minorities" have their
economic power greatly increased by neo-liberal economic
policies. However, these same economic policies often produce
severe economic hardship for the majority of people. The result
is greater resentment of these economically empowered
groups, and heightened ethnic tensions.
What makes World on Fire unique, however, is that Chua
examines more than just the financial fallout of free market
policies. For Chua, the economic impact of globalization is so
troubling in these countries because it often comes bundled with
expanded democracy. Free and fair mass elections are as much a
part of current Western development dogma as neo-liberal economic
policies.
The result is greater political empowerment for the masses,
and the emergence of politicians who aim to capitalize on these
newly enfranchised voters.
Rallying the masses in these situations often involves
demonizing the economic elite, and when the economic elite
include minority groups, political campaigning can easily become
race baiting.
Chua's argument is a powerful and provocative one that
challenges the rosy optimism voiced by proponents of neo-liberal
globalization. It is a welcome rebuke to Thomas Friedman and his
ilk, who champion free market economics with a preacher's
fanaticism.
Indonesia figures prominently in World on Fire and for good
reason, because it is one of the best examples of Chua's theory
at work. With over 1,200 people dead and nearly 100 women
reportedly raped in two days, the riots in Jakarta in 1998 were a
horrific example of ethnic violence. Chua argues that the depth
of the anti-Chinese sentiment is related to the rising prosperity
of this market dominant minority.
As the Indonesian economy flourished during the early 1990s,
driven in part by globalization, some Indonesians of Chinese
decent prospered greatly. For a few, like Mohamad "Bob" Hasan and
Sudono Salim, this was due to their long-standing, cozy
relationship with Soeharto. The majority, however, were simply
riding a wave of economic growth in Southeast Asia.
But while the economic aspects of globalization were working
in the favor of this market dominant minority, other factors were
working against them. Growing dissatisfaction with the Soeharto
dictatorship, and international pressure to expand democracy in
the country, fueled mass resentment. Price hikes and subsidy cuts
mandated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were a final
blow, leading to the demonstrations that forced Soeharto's
resignation.
However, it was not only Soeharto who was the focus of popular
ire. Indonesians of Chinese descent were also seen by some as
beneficiaries of a corrupt and unfair system. The result:
Chinese-Indonesians became the scapegoats for the country's
economic corruption, and blood flowed in the street of Jakarta
for days.
What is new in World on Fire is an understanding of how neo-
liberal, free market ideology and democracy can work together in
disastrous ways. But a central problem with Chua's analysis is
that she glosses over thorny questions of ethnicity.
While Chua states Chinese-Indonesians represent only 3 percent
of the population, and rarely marry outside of their own ethnic
group, the sources she cites to back up such claims are limited
and unconvincing.
For Chua, it is convenient to treat Chinese-Indonesians as a
distinct and separate ethnic group, even if she cannot marshal
the evidence to prove it.
She fails to acknowledge ways in which ethnic Chinese were
forced to assimilate into Indonesian society, having to take non-
Chinese names, stop using Chinese languages and curtail Chinese
cultural practices. Also, she does not address the issue of
successive Chinese migrations over a period of centuries from
several different regions of China.
All this begs the question of what exactly does it mean to be
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia today, a question which Chua
assiduously avoids.
Chua would brush aside such criticism, saying what matters is
that there is a perception that Indonesians of Chinese descent
are an insular, disproportionately wealthy group, and that in
certain circumstances these perceptions lead to violence.
Yet if "Chinese-Indonesian" is understood as a rather nebulous
category, there certainly must be much more than simple economics
behind anti-Chinese sentiment. Indonesian history is filled with
examples of how the ethnic Chinese have been manipulated by those
in power to provide a buffer between the elite and the masses,
whether it was the Dutch colonial elite, Japanese colonialists or
the Soeharto dictatorship.
The recent report on the May riots from the National
Commission on Human Rights is another case in point. The report
states that provocateurs helped instigate the riots while the
police and military conveniently looked the other way. Such
reports have led many to conclude that pro-Soeharto forces were
stirring up anti-Chinese sentiment in order to derail
the movement to overthrow the dictator.
Clearly, politics are as much a part of the story of the May
riots as economics, making the question of ethnic identity more
complex than Chua would care to admit.
While the Indonesian case itself is complicated, Indonesia is
just one of many examples Chua presents to buttress her argument.
Jumping from Southeast Asia, to Latin America, to Russia and
Africa, Chua argues that market dominant minorities are the key
to understanding conflicts in over a dozen countries. At first
such comparisons are intriguing, but the superficiality of her
analysis starts to make such globe-trotting tiresome.
There is also very little firsthand research, or reporting, in
any section, which makes Chua's authoritative tone tedious. And
in each of these cases, the same troublesome questions about
ethnicity recur.
By stretching her argument, Chua diminishes what is a very
persuasive and important examination of how globalization can be
tied to ethnic conflict. The book might have been stronger, and
her analysis deeper, if she would have stayed focused on
countries where her case is most convincing.
These are countries, like Indonesia, where an ethnic minority
has increasing economic power, but little formal political power,
and democracy in the form of mass elections is on the rise. Her
chapter on Russia, for example, reveals intriguing, but
unfortunately unexplored, similarities between the position of
Jews in that country to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.
World on Fire closes with Chua's suggestions for dealing with
the problems wrought by globalization. She is rightfully
suspicious of proposals that would prioritize free markets over
democratization. Instead she sees the need for proactive
government policies that could ameliorate glaring economic
inequalities.
On a more symbolic level, she also thinks market-dominant
minorities themselves need to be proactive in contributing to the
local economy through philanthropic activities. Yet the extent of
the anti-Chinese violence of 1998, and the current lack of
political will to bring any perpetrators to justice, make such
suggestions seem naive at best.
World on Fire has much to say about the current state of
affairs in Indonesia, and gives one much to think about as
Indonesia heads into what will be a decisive year in the
country's history.
While Indonesia has decided to move away from the IMF's
tutelage, its macroeconomic decisions will still be greatly
influenced by free market policies. This while it will be holding
its first direct presidential elections. While ethnicity could
easily become a political issue, one hopes Indonesians have
learned enough from 1998 to reject such political demagoguery and
manipulation.
World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic
Hatred and Global Instability; By Amy Chua, 2003, Doubleday;
340 pp