World Bank's silent collusion

Dennis de Tray's response to Jeffrey Winters' comments on the World Bank's silent collusion with their sponsor's (Soeharto's) corrupt regime, skirts Winters' challenge altogether. Failing to address Mr. Winters' points of argument, de Tray instead answers an argument that Winters never made.

Mr. Winters never said that the World Bank programs did no good at all in Indonesia; but this is the issue Mr. de Tray hastened to debate. The problem is not that the World Bank has done nothing worthwhile. The sad point is, how much more they might have done, not only directly in development projects, but indirectly, in opposing official corruption, had country directors over the years been better stewards of the public's funds.

Why didn't Mr. de Tray answer this criticism and take some responsibility, instead of evading Mr. Winters' underlying argument? If the point of Mr. Winters' article has eluded Mr. de Tray, we may begin to understand how so much else might have escaped his attention over the last years.

De Tray claims that his employer, the World Bank, had taken the leading role among international organizations in warning the Soeharto government of the need for reform. (For starters, this is definitely faint praise). Bank officials "warned", they "raised the issue" and they "advised". Is this leadership? In the current context especially, can soft, polite speech be considered an appropriate exercise of leadership? If this is the World Bank's idea of leadership -- issuing warnings, dispensing advice, raising issues -- then no wonder they find themselves US$10 billion short today.

Mr. Winters is correct: international organizations, and our embassies, too, are in a far better position to challenge corruption and to support those who challenge it, than are local foundations, non-governmental organizations or other local enterprises. Why are they doing so little on this front?

Mr. de Tray now says it is impossible to collect evidence of corruption. At this point it may be, thanks to the failure of those in charge to discover and correct the administrative failures long before now. At the risk of sounding too accusatory, one might say: "How convenient". How convenient for all who benefited; they can relax secure in the knowledge that the World Bank will let this matter rest, and the thieves -- for that is what they are -- will never be found out.

Where were the Bank's officials when millions and billions of project dollars were disappearing? Did no one notice $10 billion sneaking out the back door? Where were the World Bank's directors when money disappeared, hundreds of dollars at a time? Did they see nothing at any level? Surely not all managers were so inattentive to both small-scale and large-scale financial mismanagement. Or was it that officials thought it beneath their dignity to examine details, to ask for a closer accounting of smaller amounts of money. Or were they simply untrained to notice the right things; were they far more concerned with what they thought to be more important: loftier responsibilities such as meeting important people, preparing eloquent public relations material, reviewing grand plans?

Those are important functions. But someone has to "make the donuts" -- to do the leg work at ground level of seeing how much is being spent on what, and asking whether the amounts are justified. Who was ultimately responsible for these things in the World Bank's Indonesia office, and what responsibility will those individuals bear? Mr. de Tray's plaintive recital notwithstanding, Mr. Winters' indictment of the World Bank's Indonesia operations stands.

DONNA K. WOODWARD

Medan, North Sumatra