World Bank's silent collusion
World Bank's silent collusion
Dennis de Tray's response to Jeffrey Winters' comments on the
World Bank's silent collusion with their sponsor's (Soeharto's)
corrupt regime, skirts Winters' challenge altogether. Failing to
address Mr. Winters' points of argument, de Tray instead answers
an argument that Winters never made.
Mr. Winters never said that the World Bank programs did no
good at all in Indonesia; but this is the issue Mr. de Tray
hastened to debate. The problem is not that the World Bank has
done nothing worthwhile. The sad point is, how much more they
might have done, not only directly in development projects, but
indirectly, in opposing official corruption, had country
directors over the years been better stewards of the public's
funds.
Why didn't Mr. de Tray answer this criticism and take some
responsibility, instead of evading Mr. Winters' underlying
argument? If the point of Mr. Winters' article has eluded Mr. de
Tray, we may begin to understand how so much else might have
escaped his attention over the last years.
De Tray claims that his employer, the World Bank, had taken
the leading role among international organizations in warning the
Soeharto government of the need for reform. (For starters, this
is definitely faint praise). Bank officials "warned", they
"raised the issue" and they "advised". Is this leadership? In the
current context especially, can soft, polite speech be considered
an appropriate exercise of leadership? If this is the World
Bank's idea of leadership -- issuing warnings, dispensing advice,
raising issues -- then no wonder they find themselves US$10
billion short today.
Mr. Winters is correct: international organizations, and our
embassies, too, are in a far better position to challenge
corruption and to support those who challenge it, than are local
foundations, non-governmental organizations or other local
enterprises. Why are they doing so little on this front?
Mr. de Tray now says it is impossible to collect evidence of
corruption. At this point it may be, thanks to the failure of
those in charge to discover and correct the administrative
failures long before now. At the risk of sounding too accusatory,
one might say: "How convenient". How convenient for all who
benefited; they can relax secure in the knowledge that the World
Bank will let this matter rest, and the thieves -- for that is
what they are -- will never be found out.
Where were the Bank's officials when millions and billions of
project dollars were disappearing? Did no one notice $10 billion
sneaking out the back door? Where were the World Bank's directors
when money disappeared, hundreds of dollars at a time? Did they
see nothing at any level? Surely not all managers were so
inattentive to both small-scale and large-scale financial
mismanagement. Or was it that officials thought it beneath their
dignity to examine details, to ask for a closer accounting of
smaller amounts of money. Or were they simply untrained to notice
the right things; were they far more concerned with what they
thought to be more important: loftier responsibilities such as
meeting important people, preparing eloquent public relations
material, reviewing grand plans?
Those are important functions. But someone has to "make the
donuts" -- to do the leg work at ground level of seeing how much
is being spent on what, and asking whether the amounts are
justified. Who was ultimately responsible for these things in the
World Bank's Indonesia office, and what responsibility will those
individuals bear? Mr. de Tray's plaintive recital
notwithstanding, Mr. Winters' indictment of the World Bank's
Indonesia operations stands.
DONNA K. WOODWARD
Medan, North Sumatra