Wiranto's presidential bid unlikely to face international opposition

Muladi, Senior Lecturer, Diponegoro University, Jakarta

The opinion aired by Jusuf Wanandi in his article entitled Poll Results Boost Golkar's Chance for the Presidency in The Jakarta Post on April 12 is truly appreciated. Specifically, the possibility that the Golkar Party's triumph in the April 5 legislative election would make it the largest faction of the House of Representatives (DPR) -- now a tremendously powerful institution under the new Constitution.

The chance for a Golkar candidate to win the presidency is wide open and realistic. Therefore, the upcoming Golkar convention -- slated for April 20 -- at which the party's presidential candidate will be chosen, is not only imperative to Golkar, but will also influence the future of this country.

For the country, which currently experiences a "leadership crisis", a strong and democratically elected president would be strategic in light of the complexity of challenges that must be faced in the future.

But with all due respect toward Jusuf's freedom of expression, his article was also extremely disturbing, specifically the part -- which could be perceived as a "character assassination" -- in which he spoke of Wiranto, one of the candidates to contest the Golkar convention. This "character assassination" could even be termed "hideous" by readers of his article.

Jusuf presented a subjective and superficial perspective, using political analysis heedlessly by substituting presumption of innocence with presumption of guilt.

Each member of Golkar will sincerely accept the winner of the Golkar convention (including Akbar Tandjung), if the convention is carried out in a free and fair manner. Although, fears have mounted that the brilliant idea of the convention could have a boomerang effect on Golkar, if the convention were to be executed through manipulative and deceitful actions.

Jusuf states that Wiranto's presidential bid would be a disaster for Indonesia and claims that the West and Japan are against his candidacy. It is also the well-established policy of foreign governments (and in particular those of the West) not to give, or even to suggest, support or non-support for the presidential candidates of another country.

During a series of meetings, which Wiranto held with foreign dignitaries, including the ambassadors of "friendly" countries, such an impression never surfaced. The only concern raised was over democratic procedures, which the diplomats hoped would be undertaken during the presidential election -- and that they would accept whoever became president.

It is logical, however, for elements of society and the international community to state their personal attitudes toward Wiranto, or any other candidate. It would be illogical if a statement of the pros and cons of a candidate's election disclosed a one-sided judgment, and bypassed ethical norms, as well as the prevailing law.

Stating Wiranto would face opposition from students, civilians and the mass media, should he become Golkar's presidential candidate, does not fully reflect upon reality. True, there would be some negative reaction, but that should be seen as the dynamics of democracy.

Jusuf is thought to acknowledge that, even though the United Nations Security Council has the authority to form an international criminal tribunal specifically for the East Timor case, the "complementary" principles of international law underline that in bringing to justice gross violations of human rights -- which implement "concurrent jurisdiction" between international and national courts -- the domestic mechanism through the national court is the "Primary Forum" option. The East Timor case is similar to cases in Rwanda (ICTR) and Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), as well as the "hybrid model" in Sierra Leone and the Serious Crime Unit of Timor Leste.

Thus, exceptions may only occur if national court proceedings (similar to the Indonesian human rights court based on Law No.26/2000) are not conducted independently or impartiality and are merely aimed at protecting the perpetrators -- a reflection that it is unwilling and unable to bring the perpetrators to justice.

The "complementary" principles also comprise the need of the international community to respect the process of investigation of the state which has jurisdiction. Unless, however, that particular state has decided not to prosecute -- when these actions are a reflection of an unwilling attitude.

In terms of the East Timor case, several officers and generals of the military and police had been investigated, and were brought before the human rights court. Others, including Wiranto, were acquitted due to inadequate evidence.

Furthermore, the question remains, is it really true that Wiranto and military members committed war crimes and crimes against humanity ?

In East Timor, during the referendum, there was no sign of war. Internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots and isolated and sporadic acts of violence between pro-independence and pro-integration groups, were not related to war crimes. These events were triggered by mounting tension over the referendum process faced by the two sides.

If the involvement of the military and the police in the field was discovered, these were perceived as sporadic or isolated crimes -- which ought to have been dealt with through a civil or martial court based on ordinary criminal law.

Also, regarding the 1998 May Riots, Wiranto in his memoir entitled Witness in the Storm (Bersaksi di Tengah Badai) explained in detail from pages 51 onward, the possibility that the mass movement striving for political interests was "used" by instigators, looters and muggers. Therefore, it was a formidable task to neutralize the situation.

As for the Trisakti and Semanggi cases, according to procedures under Law No. 26/2000, each individual suspected of involvement in those incidents underwent a transparent and open hearing process of the DPR's special committee, which later stated that there was no evidence of gross human rights violations.

The writer was formerly minister of justice under Soeharto's administration and minister of justice and state secretary under BJ Habibie's administration.