Wiranto must face the storm

Pitan Daslani, Contributor, Jakarta
pitand@singapore.com

When Gen. (ret) Wiranto defeated Akbar Tandjung in the vote to become the Golkar Party's presidential candidate on April 21, I recalled the days when he could have taken over the national leadership without too much difficulty.

Wiranto intentionally let pass opportinity to grab power during the reigns of Soeharto and Habibie even though he had all the means and power to do so.

When the nation's stability was in question prior to Soeharto's downfall, the strongman gave him unlimited power to restore order --- the same scope of power that Soeharto received from Megawati's late father Sukarno, which paved the way for the birth of Soeharto's iron-handed control of the New Order.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was among the generals who asked Wiranto whether he would grab power having received Soeharto's mandate to restore stability and order.

After letting the opportunity to seize power pass, which to many observers demonstrated his sincere desire to promote democracy, Wiranto's attention was focused on efforts to counter foreign media reports on his role in the violence in East Timor.

Since then the general's reputation has been tainted by mass media stories that portray him as being responsible for "gross violations of human rights" in the former Indonesian province.

The term "gross violations of human rights" itself has been widely misunderstood, even by many human rights campaigners in the foreign media, more so by those in the local media. Everybody put the blame on Wiranto, as well as on the Indonesian Military (TNI) and the police, despite their self-sacrificing dedication to the conception of the Republic of Timor Leste.

Not surprisingly, Wiranto deemed it necessary to emphasize during Golkar's recent convention the need for his countrymen not to be blindly influenced by mass media verdicts, especially those based on unfounded rumors, at the expense of Indonesia's own dignity and national interests.

Wiranto has anyhow countered all such allegations in his book Bersaksi di Tengah Badai (Witness to the Storm). If Golkar really wishes to put Wiranto in Indonesia's No. 1 position, perhaps one way to rehabilitate Wiranto's international reputation would be to distribute this book everywhere, not as a defense but as clarification.

Wiranto's former subordinate, Susilo, may pose a serious challenge in the presidential race. But of no less significance is the challenge that foreign media opinion could pose to Wiranto given the fact that Golkar is still somewhat split over its leader Akbar's humiliating defeat, so it may not fully back Wiranto in restoring his image on the international front.

Given this, it would not be surprising to see a substantial number of Golkar voters shifting their support to the Democratic Party's Susilo or to presidential candidates from other parties. This will be the biggest test of Golkar's solidarity and concern for national interests.

If Indonesia wishes to have a strong government, its next president must be backed by a strong legislative bastion. In other words, if Golkar's legislative election victory is to mean anything, like it or not, it must remain solid in escorting Wiranto to the presidency. If this is not the case, Wiranto's victory in Golkar's presidential convention could be counterproductive to Golkar's own image.

This leads us to a very important question: are the regional chapters of Golkar and the party's central executive board, especially those who did not support Wiranto at the convention, sincere about wanting to see Wiranto climb the ladder of power? More critically, can we expect the same degree of sincerity from Akbar, who may be worried that he is witnessing the end of his own political career?

The first challenge Wiranto needs to overcome is to bring unity back to Golkar, especially given the fact that he does not have direct command over the party lines. The degree of sincerity in the relationship between the Golkar Party's structure and its presidential nominee will determine the extent to which Wiranto can maneuver to establish a solid legislative platform for himself.

Another challenge Wiranto faces is finding the right candidate for the position of vice president. Susilo has already picked Jusuf Kalla and the pair seems to have gained substantial popularity among the political elite. To match this pair, Wiranto may have to pick a candidate from Abdurrahman Wahid's Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), if the former president is willing to give others a chance and does not insist on pressing on against all odds to try and regain the palace.

Wahid would perhaps feel a bit satisfied if Wiranto embraced the NU's top man to be his vice presidential candidate. That would perhaps compensate for Wahid's possible failure in his drive to regain the presidency.

Such a pair could perhaps reduce the significance of picking a vice presidential candidate from eastern Indonesia (which comprises more than 66 percent of the total Indonesian territory) in the way Susilo did with Kalla, because quantitatively Wahid's NU claims a 40 million strong membership, a majority of which will take part in the direct presidential election on July 5.

But given the fact that NU members are spread all over so many political parties, this direction would be but one of many Wiranto would need to take in garnering support for the final showdown against candidates from other parties.

In practice, however, it is not easy to put Golkar and the NU's political wing, the National Awakening Party (PKB), together in the same basket. The same is true of Hamzah Haz' United Development Party (PPP) due to reasons of prestige and different orientations.

A comprehensive pie-sharing arrangement may have to be considered should Wiranto win the upcoming presidential election. This would be ever more true if the election was won by Susilo, whose party is relatively new and relies on his personal charm instead of any other party strengths. For despite his sudden rise in popularity, Susilo's possible victory could lead to the formation of a weak government due to legislative domination by bigger and more experienced parties.

The next crucial scene to watch is the formation of political coalitions prior to the July 5 presidential election. Whether Indonesia will have a strong or a weak government depends on the level of harmony the next president will have with the ruling forces in the House of Representatives.

If one puts aside the aggressive maneuvers Amien Rais is making to match his dreams with the painful reality his party faces, it is tempting to assume that if the big parties fail to take this direction, even if Susilo, Amien or Megawati won the presidential election, the next government would not be as strong and solid as expected because of the numerous concessions the new president would need to make to satisfy the interests of everybody on the stage.

Do we have to assume now that if Wiranto and Susilo should emerge as the main contenders in the July 5 election, it would be the story of two Army generals stealing the show, the story of a military victory in a civilian democracy? Some say Indonesia's democracy has entered a stage where the dichotomy of military versus civilian is perhaps no longer relevant.

But, like it or not, what is happening is that at the peak of Indonesian reform that started with the comprehensive dismantling of military power, now stand two former Army generals stealing the show in the race for Indonesia's top position.