Wiranto, Golkar Party and fear of militarism

Indra J. Piliang, Jakarta

The general election of 2004 is the first golden gate leading to civilian supremacy as well as sovereignty, after the past dominance of a hybrid regime combining authoritarianism and democracy. Besides, it is also part of the effort to phase out political veterans so far limitedly controlling the top of Indonesia's power pyramid.

Meanwhile, the opportunity is open for the process of political regeneration and at the same time recruitment of new political leaders, with new visions of leadership. In the context of change, the election serves as a driving force of political institutionalization to promote reform principles for public interests.

In terms of leadership, the election is a medium to secure leaders capable of boosting political stability while incorporating cultural affiliations and elements of leadership into the institutional political system. Indonesia requires figures having not only strong personal character but also the ability to convince people of the policy to be pursued.

This ideal, however, is difficult to achieve. The monopoly of power in the hands of Sukarno and Soeharto for over 50 years of Indonesian independence created stagnation in leadership regeneration and competition.

So far, the most important source of leaders has comprised intellectuals, civilian politicians and military figures. Civilian politicians and intellectuals held sway in the first 20 years of the republic.

The next 30 years saw the military's political control over all government levels, leaving only limited areas to civilians in political parties, campuses and ideologically crammed social/religious organizations.

As a consequence, government power only circulated around Soeharto. Sadly, this power kept growing to the extent that Soeharto found it hard to control, covering political, economic and even intellectual spheres. Those whom wished to become professors had to obtain Soeharto's approval and signature. Indonesia finally underwent intellectual, political and economic degradation as a result of the declining skill of Soeharto in maneuvering his big power.

The portrait of political leaders over the last five years has indicated their weak and low-quality leadership performance. The political elite have served merely as a cosmetic of democracy instead of carrying out its true essence.

Indonesia's failure to get rid of the present multi- dimensional crisis is virtually due to the inferior quality of the current leadership. Hardly any effort has won public confidence through detailed explanations about past and future policies, while inter-agency coordination is ineffective.

It is this very dimension that could be noticed in Wiranto's victory over Akbar Tandjung in the Golkar Party's national convention on April 20.

Akbar failed to gain support from Golkar politicians because he belongs to the country's political elite, as speaker of the House of Representatives (DPR) with a poor institutional performance. With this awareness among regental/municipal boards, they cast more votes for Wiranto and Aburizal Bakrie in the first round of the candidate election. Akbar's first-round lead was considerably helped by 18 votes from the central board and over 45 from provincial boards.

Golkar Party politicians, known for their perseverance and even their better performance (in certain cases) in the DPR and regional legislatures than other parties, of course made profound consideration of the consequences of their choice in this convention. They elected a Golkar presidential nominee rather than party leader. In making Akbar the loser, they actually still have high respect for Akbar because under his leadership the Golkar Party will remain consolidated.

The biggest question over the last few days has been: Why Wiranto? The Golkar Party apparently overlooked the subjective factor in Wiranto's track record. This party might not consider his track record a national problem, because when Wiranto was military commander, Golkar was also dominant in legislative and executive institutions.

It means that even if Wiranto was seen as flawed, the mistake was shared collectively in the House and the executive body. Golkar's courage to choose Wiranto was naturally in the spirit of its contention that the various subjective issues affecting Wiranto constituted a collective problem.

The other matter arousing the anxiety of pro-democracy activists is the possible return of militarism through the legal and constitutional path of democracy, i.e. general elections. This fear is certainly reasonable because the past 30 years of militarism brought leadership regeneration, scientific developments and democratization to a standstill.

Press freedom, the transition from military to civilian supremacy and institutionalization of civilian rights will be at stake if militarism becomes widespread. The trauma of lost freedom of speech keeps haunting all those once victimized by militarism.

Wiranto and of course Golkar Party supporting him should therefore present a platform and outlines of their presidential working program for handling such public apprehensions. Moreover, the biggest trauma of militarism is the failure to resolve the issues of Aceh and Papua peacefully.

Martial law in Aceh, which has claimed human victims on both sides and impoverished Aceh people, should be included in the program with a pledge for peaceful settlement. As long as these commitments to humanity remain unfulfilled, Wiranto and the Golkar Party will be seen as a political structure rising from the ashes, but with very slim hope for further transformation.

The writer is political analyst, Center for Strategic and International Studies.