Winning the peace harder than winning war

Winning the peace harder than winning war

Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, Former Governor, National Resilience Institute
(Lemhanas), Jakarta

The Americans are now facing difficult and complicated
problems in the management of postwar Iraq. Not only are
administrative problems causing them severe headaches, but so are
security problems. According to AFP, about 57 members of the U.S.
military have become victims of postwar skirmishes since May this
year.

Only by winning peace can the U.S. build a new Iraq in
accordance with its national interests. The Americans have
already stated that the new Iraq will be a democratic Iraq.
Although not formally stated, the U.S. is also interested in
making Iraq an important -- if not the most important -- player
in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East, in
accordance with U.S. interests.

This means that the new Iraq should safeguard the continuity
of the state of Israel in an environment of intense Arabic
hostility.

However, winning the peace in Iraq is not an easy nor simple
matter. It looks as if the U.S. has misjudged or underestimated
this problem, and it seems that Americans believe that the U.S.'
success in rebuilding Germany and Japan after World War II can be
repeated easily in Iraq. If so, there is not enough
acknowledgement of the differences between the German and
Japanese conditions of the past with the present Iraqi situation.

America's success in rebuilding Germany after World War II
may, in large part, be attributed to its conflict and competition
with the Communist East.

The majority of Germans did not like communism nor the Soviet
Union, and this sentiment was a strong motivator for them to
rebuild West Germany to become the wealthy Federal Republic of
Germany and a strong ally of the Americans. The Marshall Plan was
a very significant factor in changing the German people's minds
in becoming friendly with the Americans. A no less important
factor was the sense of unity among the German people and their
patriotic character. The wise and effective leadership of Konrad
Adenauer also cannot be underrated.

The success in Japan, on the other hand, stemmed, in
principle, from two factors. The first was General Douglas
MacArthur's great ambition to not only be a successful military
general and war leader, but also an administrator and statesman
who will be renowned throughout history.

The second was the Japanese's recognition that they had lost
the war because they were far behind America in industrial
management and technology, and that Japan must dramatically
change its stance vis-a-vis the Americans, pleasing the Americans
to acquire the necessary knowledge to improve its shortcomings.

Then came the rising danger of communism, when the People's
Republic of China replaced Kuomintang China. MacArthur wanted to
make Japan a strong U.S. ally in Asia and so supported all
Japanese requests to rebuild their country. The unity of the
Japanese people was also very important for this purpose, so
MacArthur did not take any action against the Japanese Emperor,
although many in the West wanted him to be incriminated as
Japan's Number One war criminal. The result was that Japan
recovered within five years, making the dramatic change from an
enemy into an ally.

In Iraq, we have entirely different conditions. The most
important factor is the division of the Iraqi people into the
Shia and the Sunni, the Kurds and the Baath Party. Winning the
peace in Iraq means the reestablishment of Iraq as a national
entity, and this requires a national leadership that can unite
the people and overcome their differences.

It seems that Bremer, the U.S. administrator, is not a
MacArthur, and it is far from easy to unite all the factions and
gaining their confidence. Moreover, the Kurds have their own
agenda of becoming the independent -- or at least separate --
political entity of Kurdistan. Also, nobody among the Iraqi
leaders can exert strong leadership and has the confidence of all
factions. It is therefore understandable that until today, we
have not seen any political progress in the new Iraq, let alone
the emergence of a democratic Iraq.

Facing the lack of national leadership among the Iraqis, the
U.S. appears to have decided to prolong its presence in Iraq and
the dominant role of the U.S. administrator. It is also possible
that the U.S. does not want to leave Iraq so soon, and may want
to use its position for other political and strategic maneuvers
in the Middle East.

Most of the Iraqi people do not like the idea of a long U.S.
presence, and have reminded the Americans that they came to Iraq
to liberate the Iraqi people from Saddam Hussein. They are happy
with the end of Saddam's dictatorial rule, but now the Americans
should leave Iraq to rule itself. This situation will only
sharpen the controversies between the Iraqi people and the U.S.
occupation forces further, and will lead to more violence and
victims among the Iraqi people, as well as the U.S. military.

The Americans' underestimation of the consolidation problem
has also caused many shortcomings in daily managerial problems,
like the shortages in electricity, medical supplies and other
daily necessities. These will definitely create an atmosphere of
discontent and distrust that could exacerbate the political
problems. Further, there seems to be no prospect for a speedy
improvement of these administrative activities.

Meanwhile, the wish to turn Iraq into a nation with a single
religion, like Iran, seems to be developing among the Shia. This
will result in additional problems that did not exist before,
because during Saddam's rule Iraq was a secular state that
recognized all the different faiths among the Iraqi people. If
the Americans are to deny this development, it will definitely be
viewed as a Christian move against Islam. It is all too easy to
imagine the potential dangers of a religious conflict, which will
invite Muslims and Christians from other areas to join the fight.

It will be very interesting to see how the Americans handle
this delicate issue.

With all these problems to be resolved, we must agree that the
U.S. still has a long way to go before it can turn Iraq into a
useful ally for promoting its interests in the Middle East.

Although President Bush has declared that the Iraq war is
over, America still has yet to win the peace.