Will the student movement succeed?

Will the student movement succeed?

By Olle Tornquist

OSLO (JP): Almost every day, I am asked two questions. The
first is terribly hard to answer in a manner both brief and
academically considered: what's happening to democratization in
Indonesia?

Soeharto's authoritarian state development project is
disintegrating. It is difficult to make prognoses about the
future on the basis of the situation that prevailed before the
crisis began.

Moreover, we can no longer content ourselves with analyzing
the struggle within the elite at the central level. And having
said that, we know too little about the elements which are now
becoming most important: developments on the local level, both in
the Jakarta area and out in the provinces; the dynamic in the new
mass-based forms of politics; and the various actors' politics of
democratization. We will have to return to these matters at a
later time.

The second question is tricky as well, but more restricted.
And since I was not able to take on the first, I'll try my hand
at supplying a quick answer to the second: will the students
succeed?

The answer depends, of course, on what it is they really want.
Many claim that they do not know themselves. Yet the students
have three fundamental demands. First, they want to put Soeharto
and his henchmen on trial, and to hold them politically,
economically and morally responsible.

Second, they want to put an end to the military's dwi-fungsi
(dual function), its right to political and economic (as well as
military) power, and to hold it accountable for the assaults,
torture and murders committed by its members (among whose victims
students also figured).

Third, the students are calling for truly free and fair
elections, as well as the democratization of a great many state
institutions. On these questions they have met with considerable
success, not least in their criticism of the military. But they
have only made it halfway.

For this reason, in the view of most of the students,
achieving real results on all of these fronts requires that the
present regime, consisting as it does for the most part of
Soeharto's old associates, be replaced by a transitional
government. Otherwise, the entire process of "reformasi" will be
botched.

So will they succeed in this? Hardly. During the great
demonstrations of November, some students actually made it all
the way to the parliament building, and they could have gone
inside. But they lacked broad support -- including from the
moderate opposition leaders, one of whom was not to be disturbed
while taking a rest. So the students went home instead. Putting
the point simply, they are confronted with three great obstacles,
and I believe they will only be able to surmount one of them.

The first challenge is presented by the campaign against them
which portrays them as immature muddleheads who mainly cause
traffic problems with all their demonstrations, and who want to
bring down the old order but have no program for what to put in
its place. There is, to be sure, something to this.

In Jakarta I am often reminded of the student movement of 30
years ago in Europe. The latter too was not just pronouncedly
political; it was cultural and anti-authoritarian as well. Yet
that was nothing to despise; indeed, it was probably that which
had the greatest significance in the long run.

In addition, there is among today's Indonesian students a
still greater and more hopeful and dynamic power which issues
from the fact that they are not just breaking with authoritarian
structures: they are also rediscovering history, which was
forbidden, and opening up their society, which was closed.

The students are the weeds that break suddenly through the
asphalt and burst into full bloom: beautiful but disordered. And
they are not, most assuredly, naive or muddleheaded.

Great numbers of them read, discuss, analyze, and come to
democratic decisions. Never, I dare say, have I encountered
students with such questioning minds and such a thirst for
knowledge as those who, December last, took me off in an old
borrowed taxi to meet with a larger group of young leaders from
various campuses, and who then insisted on a six-hour marathon
lecture on the political situation and the historical background.

The hour grew late, yet it seemed to me that the gathering
burned like a beacon in the Jakarta night. In the long run, the
students have history on their side. When the dawn broke,
however, it was still over the Jakarta of today, and that makes
things harder.

The second problem faced by the students is the fact that as
good as all established forces are trying to tame and use them.
For one thing, President Habibie, Gen. Wiranto, the Armed Forces
commander and their cohorts in the regime are doing their best to
keep control and to acquire new legitimacy by directing the
reform process from above, and by marginalizing radicals like the
students.

In addition, the leaders of the moderate opposition (such as
Abdurrahman Wahid, Megawati Soekarnoputri, Amien Rais and the
Sultan of Yogyakarta) are taking advantage of the fact that the
students are putting pressure on the regime.

This enables the moderate leaders to compromise with the
weakened establishment, and to carry out cautious changes at a
tranquil pace. The moderates are also trying to tame the
students, so as to be able to contest the upcoming elections with
a minimum of disturbance.

The students are at a loss as to how to deal with this. They
tried to build a broad and radical movement behind the moderate
leaders, just as the students of the 1940s prevailed upon
nationalist leaders like Sukarno to proclaim the country's
independence, and to refuse any compromise with the colonial
overlords. This time, however, their overtures were rebuffed.

The students are now faced, consequently, with a third
problem: that of formulating a political program of their own,
and building an independent political base. This is the hardest
challenge of all.

Today the students function as a substitute for the broad
organizations among the middle and lower classes which are
missing. They lack a politics of their own, however, for linking
their demonstrations both with the concerns of ordinary people
and with the established political institutions, where
negotiations are conducted and decisions made.

Changing this will be difficult, for the weakness of the
students is also their strength. Their strength lies in
independence, integrity, and a lack of self-interest at a time
when most everything is dominated by new and old bosses within
politics, the economy, and the armed forces.

Largely gone now is the approach of the earlier students,
which was to ally themselves with critics in the military, the
political system, and the intellectual upper crust. Even the pro-
democratic elite of yesterday now complains that the students do
not always listen to them and do not follow their advice.

Yet if this is a strength it is also a weakness, for what will
serve as the base for the students' demands? What are the social
moorings for their politics?

In order to protect their independence, as well as to avoid
provocateurs and undisciplined masses of people, they even
hesitate to allow "ordinary people" to take part in the
demonstrations and to demand their rights and defend their
interests.

In the same way, it is both a strength and a weakness that the
students lack a cohesive organization with a distinct and
encompassing leadership structure. It is networks that rule the
roost here. This means there is no top figure to seize or co-opt.
It also means it is possible to adjust to local conditions and to
make use of the new vitality.

At the same time, however, this loose organizational pattern
makes it hard for the students to reach out beyond their own
group, to mobilize people on a broad basis, or to reach common
decisions over long-term questions.

At present, the students are only able to unite behind
resounding demands which are simple enough to be proclaimed on
the streets and in the squares. One result of this is that the
actual negotiations and decisions are anyway left to the elite
and its allies.

Another is that the questions and demands raised by the
students are not always so relevant for ordinary people, whose
first concern is whether or not democracy will lead to more jobs
and food. Not even those questions on which the students are most
knowledgeable, and which others find difficult to master,
complicated things such as the election laws and their
implementation, make it on to the agenda. These are not suitable
for the parliament of the street either.

Worst of all, the students do not know how to relate to the
coming elections. If we form a party, they say, we will be
divided, and our independence and moral force will be lost. And
if we concentrate our resources on political education and
electoral oversight, many add, we will risk legitimizing not just
a few good new forces, but also all those old villains who will
assuredly be elected too.

So even if the students have nothing against elections, their
efforts are likely to prove irrelevant when election fever
spreads, and people realize that "villains or not -- the only
ones we have to vote for are the politicians of today and their
parties."

So if the regime succeeds in keeping control over the reform
process, and the moderate politicians place their bets on a
compromise with the establishment, which is the most likely
outcome, notwithstanding all the turbulence, the students will be
thrown upon their own resources. And these resources are, to be
sure, substantial and promising in many ways.

But the students' strength is also their weakness, as seen in
the lack of a connection between the concerns of ordinary people,
the actions of the students, and the established political
institutions.

Hence, the admonitory conclusion here is that if the student
movement does not succeed in creating such a connection, for
instance in the form of a second liberation movement rooted in
the interests of ordinary people, and devoted to the achievement
of successive and deepened democratization both before and after
the elections, it will most likely end up as a collection of
fragmented pressure groups. While elected bosses attend to the
making of policy and the exercise of power.

This, of course, is much better than yesterday's authoritarian
exploitation and the present unrest on the verge of breakdown,
but it is hardly the best breeding ground for stable and deepened
democracy.

The writer is professor of politics and development at
University of Oslo, Norway.