Will the nation's top leaders stick to their pledges?

Will the nation's top leaders stick to their pledges?

The following is an excerpt from an interview with Cornelis Lay,
a political observer in Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, where
President Abdurrahman Wahid, Vice President Megawati
Soekarnoputri, Speaker of the House of Representatives Akbar
Tandjung and Speaker of the People's Consultative Assembly Amien
Rais met last week. The gathering was hosted by Sultan
Hamengkubuwono X:

Question:The meeting of the four leaders led to a joint
agreement. Your comment?

Answer: What is of greater significance is whether the
participants will comply with what they have agreed on. The
problems from the first Ciganjur meeting (at Abdurrahman's
residence in South Jakarta before he became president) and the
subsequent sporadic meetings, have been that one of the parties
betrayed agreements for the individual or group's benefits.

A very obvious example is the first Ciganjur meeting. The
consensus wore out not because the eight points offered were not
remarkable but because Amien took his own group to the House
(DPR) and the Assembly (MPR). This gave the impression that
"Ciganjur I" was the result of his own work ...

Q: Such meetings, including the Yogyakarta Summit, have often been
criticized because they are considered elitist. Do you agree?

A: In a highly fragmented society like Indonesia, democracy can
be sustained only if it is managed in an elitist way by people
considered to represent the fragmented society ... The model of
elitist management of democracy has become our choice for this
transitional period.

Q: But the four figures may not represent the political
groupings. Amien and Akbar may not be able to enjoy the
commitment of all groups in the axis force and Golkar
respectively regarding this agreement...

A: This (elitist) model has its shortcoming, when the elite are
not considered representative of existing groups, or when the
elite fail to force followers or allied groups to comply.

Pak Amien, who has virtually led the axis force bandwagon,
will have to encounter a great variety of groups within the force
who may not fully endorse his steps.

An indication was the strong demand by Hamzah Haz (from the
United Development party) for his inclusion in the Yogya talks.
It means that he did not feel represented by Pak Amien. My guess
is that people like Yusril (Ihza Mahendra) chairman of the
Crescent Star Party (PBB) and a number of other axis force
figures, including even people close to Pak Amien such as Fuad
Bawazier, would have made similar demands.

If the compliance of the members of the various elites and the
variants of the groups cannot be established, it will lead to the
crumbling of the agreement. Akbar faces the same problem although
formally the interests of all the ranks in Golkar seem to be
accommodated. Quite a few groups within Golkar, in fact, have a
latent potential for disintegration.

Only Megawati and Gus Dur (Abdurrahman) would not have much
difficulty to reach their mass base and supporters. Nobody (among
their followers) would question their most important decisions.
In the case of Gus Dur, I believe Nahdlatul Ulama (Muslim
organization) and the National Awakening Party can assure total
compliance.

Q: The above leaders have verbally agreed that the MPR Annual
General Session will not turn into a Special Session to impeach
the President...

A: The question is whether Pak Amien and his axis force can fully
guarantee such a commitment. I'm not so sure about it. Also, I am
not convinced that Golkar's networks would comply with such a
commitment.

The core of the problem will likely shift to this (betrayal of
the agreement). So this is a tough job for the elite, to open
discussions again with the groups they represent. It is important
for Pak Amien to involve the entire elite of the axis force to
discuss what has been agreed on in Yogyakarta.

Second, it is generally agreed among those involved in the
axis force, the Indonesian Democratic Party for Struggle (PDI-P),
the NU and Golkar that social and economic matters must be placed
on top of the priority list.

Q: Do you mean strong pressure to impeach Gus Dur will still color
the Annual Session?

A: I'm not sure. It is very likely that there will be individual
tendencies. In terms of numbers, if PDI-P says "No" (to the
impeachment proposal) and some members of the Golkar faction do
likewise, it is a closed case. The other (factions) cannot impose
their wishes in the face of the mechanism of democracy -- that
the majority rules.

Q: How do you see the risk in unseating Abdurrahman?

A: In a democratic country, replacing a president while he is
still in office is quite natural. However, the reasons for this
dismissal may lead to new problems if they are not politically
legitimate. The impeachment planned for Gus Dur has never had any
strong political justification because impeachment may be slapped
on a president only if a number of things are fulfilled.

First, if Gus Dur disavows his oath of office as a head of
state and a head of government, which he has not done. Second, if
he truly violates the constitution. Until today it has been
difficult to find any such violations by Gus Dur.

Third, if he is incapable of, or fails in, implementing the
stipulations or decisions on the State Policy Guidelines ...
collusion, corruption and nepotism (KKN) are yet to be thoroughly
eliminated, but it can be easily argued that there is a huge pile
of problems in this regard...

The problem with Gus Dur is that his leadership style tends to
spark controversies. Many people dislike his informal style of
leadership. For a good 32 years people were fed with Soeharto's
very formal and cold style of leadership and then suddenly we
have a very informal president. Second, his inconsistency, as
revealed in his arguments regarding his dismissal of Laksamana
Sukardi and Jusuf Kalla from the Cabinet

So, if Gus Dur can show more formality and consistency, there
wouldn't be a single reason which is constitutionally and
politically justifiable -- let alone ideologically -- to unseat
him.

The risk of unseating him in the absence of a strong reason
will be a lack of governmental stability. The second risk is the
image that once Gus Dur is forced to step down, there will be
public fury although in percentage (terms the followers of) the
NU or PKB are small.

They are, however, heavily concentrated in Java, particularly
East Java. Java itself is 80 percent to 90 percent politically
significant in the national political arena.

The third risk is that impeachment may become a new precedent:
if a Muslim cleric like Gus Dur can be impeached, the next
president, who may not be a Muslim cleric or who may even be a
woman, for example, may be subject to the same thing.

Things would be worse if, for example, the president comes
from a party collecting only a small number of votes in the 1999
general election, such as Pak Amien, or if the president is
Akbar, who has his New Order past.

This is actually what we seek to avert. So the reason is not
that we idolize Gus Dur... However, if Gus Dur, for example, has
received a bribe, the people should be told why Gus Dur has to be
impeached.

Q: Of the four points agreed upon in Yogyakarta, which is the most
significant?

A: The public would first be concerned with the fourth point, the
commitment to quickly eradicate KKN, which symbolizes the
seriousness of establishing an entirely new government.

This big task, if done in earnest, will also give considerable
credit -- but also a risk -- to Akbar. Quite a few in his circle,
and part of his network will be affected.

I don't think they'll be happy to see Akbar sign the
agreement. Many others will urge that what is put on paper be
translated into reality. There will be unusually great pressure
on the Attorney General, the police and other law-enforcement
agencies. There will be a bigger push from people about
Soeharto's case because they will not be content just to see
Soeharto tried in his capacity as the chairman of a foundation.

The public will demand that he be tried for crimes against
humanity in his 32 years in power and also for his economic
crimes. People can no longer see, for instance, Tutut
(businesswoman and daughter of Soeharto Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana)
traveling around freely.

And many others should also take responsibility (for their
actions) like former MPR Speaker Harmoko, and the public will
demand that they, too, be taken to court.

Also, Gus Dur, as a consequence of this agreement, must focus
on settling economic problems. He would have to considerably
reduce his political statements although this won't be easy for
him. The key lies in the two options left to Gus Dur.

The first is whether he will fully entrust his economic team
to solve all economic problems and make them settle poor
consolidation and coordination among themselves, because they do
have the capacity to solve problems. The second choice is that
Gus Dur completely overhauls his economic team.

And of course, regarding the third point in the agreement,
people are waiting to see how the government will actually
respond to demands, for example, for a free Papua and a free Aceh
and also to the sectarian conflicts raging in Maluku ...

What's interesting here is the statement that the five of them
(including Hamengkubuwono) made to the effect that these problems
must be common problems.

Therefore, it is important, to Pak Amien and his network, for
example, not only to blame Gus Dur for the continuing sectarian
conflicts in Maluku but also to be symbolically or actually
involved in handling the problems.

Although this may be beyond the job description of an MPR
Speaker, as the representative of members of the political elite
Pak Amien may find these steps important to take.

Q: Will this agreement mean that the conflicts involving the elite,
generally considered as having triggered the conflicts in Maluku,
will end and will lead to peace in this region?

A: At the very least, more attention will be paid to Maluku.
Whether a settlement is possible is another problem. There is a
strong indication that some members of the political elite of the
past (of the Soeharto regime) have become an important part of
the Maluku conflicts and they are not included in the Yogyakarta
Summit.

The five who signed the agreement have no interest in seeing a
conflict break out in Maluku. However, there is another force, in
possession of a strong network and in control of the military,
that is not included in this agreement.

Besides, if it is effective, this agreement will be able to
narrow down the loopholes usually used to trigger a riot. When a
conflict breaks out, there is a greater opportunity to start a
new conflict. (Asip A. Hasani)