Will the EU keep faith with Turkey?

Martti Ahtisaari and Albert Rohan, Project Syndicate

More than forty years ago, Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community. With the Association agreement of 1963, a special relationship was established, culminating in the customs union of 1996. During all these years, European governments consistently confirmed Turkey's eligibility for full membership, making accession dependent on compliance with membership criteria.

Turkey's formal recognition as a candidate state in 1999 led Turkey to undertake unprecedented reform efforts in the area of human and minority rights, including abolition of the death penalty, safeguards against torture, promotion of religious freedoms, gender equality, and restriction of the military's role in political life. Should the EU consider the accession criteria as having been fulfilled, it must decide to open negotiations in early 2005. Not to do so would mean to renege on political commitments and to severely damage the EU's credibility in the world.

In many parts of Europe, however, Turkey's admission to the EU is viewed with skepticism owing to its size, relatively poor economy, fears of massive immigration, and, above all, cultural and societal differences -- a euphemism for Islam. It would be foolish to deny that some of these factors represent serious challenges. However, they are often exaggerated and certainly not insurmountable. Negotiations with Turkey would be lengthy and accession may not occur before 2015. This period of time would offer both Turkey and the Union an opportunity to come to terms.

With 80 million people, Turkey would be one of the largest EU states. But the size of a country plays only a limited role in the EU's decision-making process, because political influence within the Union depends more on economic power. Moreover, for decades Turkey has been a responsible member of many European institutions, and there is no reason to believe that it would act differently in the EU.

Because of its weak economy, Turkey would be eligible for substantial EU assistance. The size of these transfers, however, would depend on the EU's financial policies at the time of admission, the outcome of accession negotiations, and economic developments in Turkey. In any case, the EU's practice of "capping" its budget would prevent an explosion in the financial costs entailed by Turkey's accession.

Immigration should not be a cause for undue concern, either. Human mobility is limited, and Turkey workers' would probably be allowed to move freely within the EU only after a long transition period, possibly not before 2025. Given the expected upswing of Turkey's economy and its declining birthrate, experts predict a figure of around 2.7 million immigrants by that point. Meanwhile, diminishing and aging populations in most of Europe will have made immigration a necessity. Among the countries from where immigration to the EU is probable, Turkey has the best prospects for successful adaptation.

It is Turkey's Muslim population that creates the strongest emotions. Many feel that Turkey simply does not fit into a European society based on Christian traditions and culture. It is also feared that Islamists may one day turn Turkey into a fundamentalist state. Unlikely as it may be in view of Turkey's deeply rooted secularism, such a risk cannot be totally excluded. But the same is true for any other democracy, where radical groups could well misuse the democratic process for their purposes.

Surely, the best protection against such a calamity is to strengthen Turkey's democratic system, which can best be achieved by anchoring it firmly in a bloc of similarly democratic countries. As for the EU, it must decide whether it wants to be a closed "Christian club" or an open and inclusive society, drawing strength from cultural and religious diversity. Turkey's accession to the Union would give a powerful answer, one that would be heard with particular clarity in the Islamic world.

The need to refute arguments against Turkey's admission to the EU leaves the advantages rarely mentioned: Its unique geopolitical position at the crossroads of the Balkans, Southern Caucasus, Central Asia, and the Middle East -- vitally important regions for Europe's security; its role as mayor transit country for energy supplies; its military capabilities at a time when the EU is developing its new European Defense Policy; and the great potential of the Turkish economy, with its young and dynamic labor force.

At the same time, the risks of rejecting Turkey must also be taken into account: The likelihood that the reform process would collapse, bringing radical currents to the fore and leading to instability and political unrest at the EU's doorsteps.

Turkish EU membership presents both opportunities and challenges. On balance, however, the advantages far outweigh the risks.

Martti Ahtisaari, Finland's former president, is chairman of the Independent Commission on Turkey. Albert Rohan is rapporteur of the Independent Commission on Turkey.