Will Sino-U.S. ties help solve Korea's problems?

By Landry Haryo Subianto

JAKARTA (JP): Many analysts maintain that one solution to Korea can be found in stable Sino-United States relations. However, Sino-U.S. relations have always been marked by periods of ups and downs. At present, when the question of North Korea nuclear power has resurfaced, Beijing-Washington relations are not conducive to a more promising solution. Washington has accused Beijing of sponsoring the "illegal transfer" of nuclear technology from New Mexico. China's leaders are undoubtedly annoyed by the accusation. In this context, therefore, it has become unclear how the leaders of the two countries can mitigate the escalation of conflict on the Korean peninsula at a time when Sino-U.S. relations are not in the best shape.

It will be difficult to solve nuclear problems in East Asia as long as Washington views China and North Korea as potential and/or actual threats to America's regional interests. More constructive engagement is needed to avert a bigger and more dangerous conflict. Washington could strategically position China in a more symmetric role when dealing with North Korea's presumed nuclear development. However, Washington's announcement on Chinese espionage activities last week brings uncertainty to this idea. This article looks at the issue and examines how domestic political factors affect Sino-U.S. relations, especially in relation to the North Korean issue.

Recently, Americans were deeply shocked when the White House formally responded to allegations of Chinese espionage activities on U.S. nuclear development programs in the 1980s. It was a response to a New York Times report, which highlighted China's attempt to produce small nuclear warheads that could be deployed from a single missile at multiple targets. The plan was based on secrets stolen from Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory in New Mexico. This was not only a political blow to domestic politics (Congress) as Sarah-Jackson Han indicated (The Jakarta Post, March 15, 1999), but also has threatened Sino-U.S. bilateral relations in general. In fact, it has become a saleable political commodity inside and outside Capitol Hill.

President Clinton is without any doubt facing a serious challenge at home despite the upcoming U.S. elections. Some legislators have strongly urged the government to reexamine the U.S. grand strategy over China and called for the resignation of National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. However, the White House has eloquently denied all the allegations, especially the allegation of hiding this security breach from Congress. Indeed, as Vice President Al Gore vindicated, the breach took place under "the previous government". This outraged congressional Republicans. Nonetheless, it has become an onus for top-brass officers in the White House and the Pentagon to satisfactorily accommodate all sentiments on Sino-U.S. relations, especially in saving a pillar of President Clinton's foreign policy on constructive engagement with China.

From the Chinese point of view, this alleged espionage in one way or another could harm its relations with the U.S.. However, Beijing is more concerned with U.S. missile defense with its allies in East Asia. More importantly, China's leaders seem to be overwhelmed by the Taiwan issue. For Beijing, the Theater Missile Defense program has a dual effect, namely underscoring China's military threat over Taiwan and fostering greater cooperation between Taipei and Washington, following the last controversial visit of Taiwan's top leader to Washington.

Many experts and China watchers relate this reaction to Beijing's medium-term strategic ambition to unseat current principal actor (the U.S.) in the region and thus reaffirming China's supremacy over the region. Patterns of Chinese military deployment strongly support this speculation. China's military concentration is centered on Taiwan and in the South China Sea. China's negative reaction to North Korea's missile tests last August really reflects this individual ambition. Despite the fact that North Korea is its closest ally, Beijing obliged in "sacrificing" its relationship with Pyong Yang in pursuing its national objectives. Aside from changing leaderships in the two countries, this is probably the main argument to explain why North Korea has become less close to China.

It is clear that managed Sino-U.S. relations will be sustained due to a number of factors. Among influencing factors are: first, on one hand, Chinese domestic political and economic reforms will affect the attitude of China toward the U.S.. Beijing fully realizes that regional stability could contribute to its advancing economic programs. This can only happen if China firmly exercises its influence over North Korea, whereas the U.S. performs a similar role with Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, Chinese massive and rapid military build-up is also perceived as seriously provocative. This can also affect U.S. perception of China's regional ambitions and cause the U.S. to retaliate promptly. Once China is able to moderate its military performance, the greater the chance for better relations.

Second, the Korean peninsula issue will be a continuous cementing-factor for both China and the U.S.. Both countries put great interest on how things should be settled on the Korean peninsula. The U.S. perceives China as holding influence over Pyong Yang. As long as this perception is held by U.S. leaders and is followed by China's serious attempt to retain close relations with North Korea, the more likely the U.S. would be willing to maintain its constructive engagement policy with China.

Third, the policy's continuing existence will also depend on how the Clinton, or his successor's, administration copes with U.S. domestic politics. The White House should be able to assure Congress and the Senate that China is essential in supporting U.S. interests in East Asia. The last espionage scandal will be a tough test for President Clinton. In this regard, it is important that Washington does not allow domestic politics to intrude on its strategic interests in maintaining good relations with Beijing.

Fourth, the current saddening crisis in North Korea calls for more humanitarian attention from both sides, rather than mere political and military considerations. In this case, "tactical alliance" between the U.S. and China over the alleged North Korean nuclear development program could also include nongovernmental bodies e.g. humanitarian NGOs. Thus, aside from active collaboration under international institutions such as the International Atomic Energy Agency, both governments should also establish and support a "people-to-people connection" in subduing the increasing tension on the peninsula.

Last, recent financial and economic crises in Asia would also lend new nuances to how relations should be managed. A warning bell has rung, announcing the necessity for closer economic cooperation to overcome Asia's crises. In this sense, along with China's great effort to build its economy, the U.S. should bolster more attentive sympathy and real actions rather than begrudging China's past attitude. This will hopefully build the impression that the U.S. is a real friend of Asia's rather than just a fair-weather friend.

The writer is with the Department of International Affairs, Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta.