Will Sino-U.S. ties help solve Korea's problems?

Will Sino-U.S. ties help solve Korea's problems?

By Landry Haryo Subianto

JAKARTA (JP): Many analysts maintain that one solution to
Korea can be found in stable Sino-United States relations.
However, Sino-U.S. relations have always been marked by periods
of ups and downs. At present, when the question of North Korea
nuclear power has resurfaced, Beijing-Washington relations are
not conducive to a more promising solution. Washington has
accused Beijing of sponsoring the "illegal transfer" of nuclear
technology from New Mexico. China's leaders are undoubtedly
annoyed by the accusation. In this context, therefore, it has
become unclear how the leaders of the two countries can mitigate
the escalation of conflict on the Korean peninsula at a time when
Sino-U.S. relations are not in the best shape.

It will be difficult to solve nuclear problems in East Asia as
long as Washington views China and North Korea as potential
and/or actual threats to America's regional interests. More
constructive engagement is needed to avert a bigger and more
dangerous conflict. Washington could strategically position China
in a more symmetric role when dealing with North Korea's presumed
nuclear development. However, Washington's announcement on
Chinese espionage activities last week brings uncertainty to this
idea. This article looks at the issue and examines how domestic
political factors affect Sino-U.S. relations, especially in
relation to the North Korean issue.

Recently, Americans were deeply shocked when the White House
formally responded to allegations of Chinese espionage activities
on U.S. nuclear development programs in the 1980s. It was a
response to a New York Times report, which highlighted China's
attempt to produce small nuclear warheads that could be deployed
from a single missile at multiple targets. The plan was based on
secrets stolen from Los Alamos Nuclear Laboratory in New Mexico.
This was not only a political blow to domestic politics
(Congress) as Sarah-Jackson Han indicated (The Jakarta Post,
March 15, 1999), but also has threatened Sino-U.S. bilateral
relations in general. In fact, it has become a saleable political
commodity inside and outside Capitol Hill.

President Clinton is without any doubt facing a serious
challenge at home despite the upcoming U.S. elections. Some
legislators have strongly urged the government to reexamine the
U.S. grand strategy over China and called for the resignation of
National Security Adviser Sandy Berger. However, the White House
has eloquently denied all the allegations, especially the
allegation of hiding this security breach from Congress. Indeed,
as Vice President Al Gore vindicated, the breach took place under
"the previous government". This outraged congressional
Republicans. Nonetheless, it has become an onus for top-brass
officers in the White House and the Pentagon to satisfactorily
accommodate all sentiments on Sino-U.S. relations, especially in
saving a pillar of President Clinton's foreign policy on
constructive engagement with China.

From the Chinese point of view, this alleged espionage in one
way or another could harm its relations with the U.S.. However,
Beijing is more concerned with U.S. missile defense with its
allies in East Asia. More importantly, China's leaders seem to be
overwhelmed by the Taiwan issue. For Beijing, the Theater Missile
Defense program has a dual effect, namely underscoring China's
military threat over Taiwan and fostering greater cooperation
between Taipei and Washington, following the last controversial
visit of Taiwan's top leader to Washington.

Many experts and China watchers relate this reaction to
Beijing's medium-term strategic ambition to unseat current
principal actor (the U.S.) in the region and thus reaffirming
China's supremacy over the region. Patterns of Chinese military
deployment strongly support this speculation. China's military
concentration is centered on Taiwan and in the South China Sea.
China's negative reaction to North Korea's missile tests last
August really reflects this individual ambition. Despite the fact
that North Korea is its closest ally, Beijing obliged in
"sacrificing" its relationship with Pyong Yang in pursuing its
national objectives. Aside from changing leaderships in the two
countries, this is probably the main argument to explain why
North Korea has become less close to China.

It is clear that managed Sino-U.S. relations will be sustained
due to a number of factors. Among influencing factors are: first,
on one hand, Chinese domestic political and economic reforms will
affect the attitude of China toward the U.S.. Beijing fully
realizes that regional stability could contribute to its
advancing economic programs. This can only happen if China firmly
exercises its influence over North Korea, whereas the U.S.
performs a similar role with Japan and South Korea. On the other
hand, Chinese massive and rapid military build-up is also
perceived as seriously provocative. This can also affect U.S.
perception of China's regional ambitions and cause the U.S. to
retaliate promptly. Once China is able to moderate its military
performance, the greater the chance for better relations.

Second, the Korean peninsula issue will be a continuous
cementing-factor for both China and the U.S.. Both countries put
great interest on how things should be settled on the Korean
peninsula. The U.S. perceives China as holding influence over
Pyong Yang. As long as this perception is held by U.S. leaders
and is followed by China's serious attempt to retain close
relations with North Korea, the more likely the U.S. would be
willing to maintain its constructive engagement policy with
China.

Third, the policy's continuing existence will also depend on
how the Clinton, or his successor's, administration copes with
U.S. domestic politics. The White House should be able to assure
Congress and the Senate that China is essential in supporting
U.S. interests in East Asia. The last espionage scandal will be a
tough test for President Clinton. In this regard, it is important
that Washington does not allow domestic politics to intrude on
its strategic interests in maintaining good relations with
Beijing.

Fourth, the current saddening crisis in North Korea calls for
more humanitarian attention from both sides, rather than mere
political and military considerations. In this case, "tactical
alliance" between the U.S. and China over the alleged North
Korean nuclear development program could also include
nongovernmental bodies e.g. humanitarian NGOs. Thus, aside from
active collaboration under international institutions such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency, both governments should also
establish and support a "people-to-people connection" in subduing
the increasing tension on the peninsula.

Last, recent financial and economic crises in Asia would also
lend new nuances to how relations should be managed. A warning
bell has rung, announcing the necessity for closer economic
cooperation to overcome Asia's crises. In this sense, along with
China's great effort to build its economy, the U.S. should
bolster more attentive sympathy and real actions rather than
begrudging China's past attitude. This will hopefully build the
impression that the U.S. is a real friend of Asia's rather than
just a fair-weather friend.

The writer is with the Department of International Affairs,
Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Jakarta.