Will President Yeltsin rejuvenate Russia?

By Harvey Stockwin

JAKARTA (JP): Today, Aug. 9, Russian President Boris Yeltsin has an opportunity to begin the process whereby he both capitalizes upon his recent election victory and rejuvenates Russia as it grapples with the imperative of further economic reform. While his energetic election campaign seemed to be a happy omen, it is too soon to be sure that Yeltsin will grasp this chance to enhance Russian dynamism.

Today Yeltsin becomes the first Russian president to be inaugurated after winning democratic re-election. More than that, today he becomes the first democratically-elected president of Russia. When Yeltsin was sworn in for his first term as Russian president, the Soviet Union still existed, and Yeltsin was still technically subordinate to then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev.

Since Yeltsin's swearing-in today is such an intrinsically unique moment, it seems the perfect time for Yeltsin to deliver some insightful oratory, confronting Russians with the memories, and the lessons, of their recent turbulent history plus their predominantly authoritarian past. It is also a moment for admitting the pain and suffering caused by economic reform during his first term -- and telling the electorate clearly why further reform will be both necessary and potentially rewarding.

The moment may be missed. The Russian news agency Interfax has reported that the inaugural ceremony will probably be a scant half hour, an hour altogether at the most. This scarcely suggests that the second Yeltsin administration intends to make the ceremony into a defining moment which Russians will long remember.

Rather the reported pursuit of brevity in the newly-devised inaugural ceremony (Russia, of course, had no ready-made inauguration formula to fall back upon) reminds everyone that the main motive may have been continued concern with Yeltsin's health. Since the run-off election in early July, Yeltsin has been mainly out of sight at Barvikha Sanatorium outside Moscow ostensibly recuperating from his energetic election campaign.

The announcement, soon after Yeltsin won, that he would be taking a two-month pause at the spa, dismayed those who felt that the election had given Yeltsin renewed political momentum. Yeltsin returned to Moscow on Tuesday to prepare for the inauguration but there are indications that he may return to the sanatorium after it.

If, after a month's secluded "rest", he must still husband his energies, it hardly augurs well for his second term -- or for momentum sustained. Rather it is likely to increase speculation that Yeltsin either is still dogged by his heart complaints, or has something else medically wrong with him.

The only other possible explanation is that Yeltsin still sees political mileage in the habits born of Russia's Czarist and communist past, and favors personal remoteness as a way of getting things done. This is not as strange as it may seem. It might even be make good political sense. Yeltsin, having quickly appointed those who will have to bear the burden of Kremlin intrigue, has placed himself above the fray, perhaps the better to keep ultimate control and a sense of direction.

First, even before the results of the first part of the presidential election had been fully digested, Yeltsin appointed the third-placed former Army Gen. Alexander Lebed as his national security chief with particular orders to wage war on crime and corruption. The speed of the appointment suggested, at the time, that there was an element of desperation in the Yeltsin camp's efforts to defeat second place finisher, the communist party leader Gennady Zyuganov. Zyuganov was after all only three percentage points behind Yeltsin in the initial election.

In retrospect, Lebed's quick appointment additionally suggests that there had been prior understandings between Yeltsin and Lebed. The American political consultants hired to be back room boys assisting in the Yeltsin re-election campaign were, inevitably, assiduous poll-takers. They almost certainly knew in advance that Lebed was likely to be the leading also-ran.

The clearest indication of a prior deal was the increased favorable TV coverage which Lebed received from the effectively- controlled television media in the final week of the campaign. Other candidates were not so lucky. Liberal reformer Grigory Yavlinsky had talked with the Yeltsin forces during the campaign. Conceivably, had Yavlinsky been able to cut a deal, he would have been the one to receive the favorable coverage rather than Lebed.

Immediately before the run-off election, Lebed was built up, not least as a possible successor to Yeltsin. With the election won, Yeltsin lost no time indicating who his immediate successor would be during his second term. So, secondly, Yeltsin again appointed 58-year-old former Soviet bureaucrat Viktor Chernomyrdin as Prime Minister. After the abortive vice- presidency of Alexander Rutskoi ended in rebellion early in Yeltsin's first terms, the constitution was changed and the vice- presidency abolished.

Now, if the 65-year-old Yeltsin were to die in office, the prime minister would become acting president for three months during which time another presidential election must be held. Chernomyrdin is thus a key player in Russia's future, given the uncertainties over Yeltsin's health. But Yeltsin is complicating matters a little by declining to behave like Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui, immediately after his re-election last March.

Taiwan's Lee, it will be recalled, caused a furor in Taiwan's democracy by appointing his elected vice-presidential running mate to continue as prime minister -- and then refusing to seek fresh parliamentary approval of the appointment. President Yeltsin could have argued the same way -- that since Chernomyrdin is already prime minister, there is no need to again seek the Duma's approval. He has declined to do so. So, until the Duma does approve Chernomyrdin's re-appointment during the next few week's, Russia will be lacking a constitutional successor.

(Chernomyrdin's approval will probably be obtained from the communist-dominated Duma in return for a few communist ministerial appointments. If it is not, then Yeltsin might well nominate other leaders whom he could be sure the Duma would reject. Three Duma rejections would entitle Yeltsin to dissolve the Duma, and seek a non-communist majority at a fresh election.)

Yeltsin's third key appointment for his new administration was, like that of Lebed, a surprise. Anatoly Chubais, the economic reformer Yeltsin sacked in January to appease the communist victors in the December 1995 Duma election, was brought back in the key position of the President's chief of staff. In the end Yeltsin did not appease the communists after all. He sacked Chubais because he needed a scapegoat for the very real economic pain felt as Russia's command economy was dissolved and its welfare state was diminished.

Two months later, when Yeltsin needed someone to organize and energize his lackluster election campaign, he brought back Chubais, who was the key figure in the effort to win re-election. Chubais is now appointed in place of another hard-liner. The hard-liners around Yeltsin had tended to favor abandonment of the electoral process as a way of staying in power. Now that Chubais has demonstrated that elections can still work to Yeltsin's advantage, he will be expected to repeat that demonstration in the forthcoming gubernatorial elections later this year.

But the net effect of these three key appointments is to clearly demarcate how the second Yeltsin administration could succeed or fail.

The risk is that Kremlin in-fighting will so intensify that real gains will be minimized. If, as many assume, Lebed sees himself as a successor to Yeltsin, then he will probably seek to expand his powers and influence. But Chernomyrdin probably sees himself as the next president and therefore will be anxious to cut Lebed down to size. As he seeks to secure the election of governors amenable to Yeltsin across the vastness of Russia, Chubais may fall prey to many conflicting interests. He might also be forced to hold the ring between Lebed and Chernomyrdin.

This is but one possible scenario for Kremlin in-fighting. There could be many others. As the brief conflict and purge of top Yeltsin aides immediately after Lebed's appointment clearly showed, devious Machiavellian maneuvers did not end with the passing of politburos. The very real risk emerges that a weakened Yeltsin, prone to long retirements into the background, could preside over an administration notable only for conflicts, not accomplishments.

The more optimistic hope must be that Yeltsin, whether in a health spa or actually at the Kremlin, will be in sufficient control to see that his troika works more for Russia rather than for themselves. If, like so many leaders throughout history, Yeltsin has appointed Lebed, Chernomyrdin and Chubais merely with the intention of playing a canny game of divide and rule, then the threat is obvious: there will be more divide than rule.

But the very fact that Yeltsin played his cards so cannily vis-a-vis Lebed, an initiative for which Chubais may have been partly or wholly responsible, the fact that Chernomyrdin has managed to sustain a stable administration for so long while maintaining a certain degree of reform momentum, the fact that Yeltsin re-appointed the reform minded Chubais as his top aide rather than another middle-of-the-road bureaucrat -- all these trends suggest the possibility of a happier outcome.

The troika has clearly demarcated responsibilities. Lebed will look after the security field. He has already had his choice, Gen. Igor Rodionov, appointed minister of defense. Chernomyrdin will be responsible for the administration and the economy. Chubais' brief will be the further political consolidation of Russia's democracy. Yeltsin will provide the sense of direction and purpose which will override any drift to factional divisiveness.

This is a hopeful but by no means impossible scenario. But it will help if today Boris Yeltsin can make it plainer to the Russian people where they are and where they are headed.

Window: The risk is that Kremlin in-fighting will so intensify that real gains will be minimized.