Will our newfound freedom last?

By Ignas Kleden

This is the second of two articles on state and democracy.

JAKARTA (JP): The limitation of democratic rights during the New Order was justified on the basis of several related reasons. First, economic development was said to presuppose a stable political situation marked by a double function. On the one hand, it gave the government the time and opportunity to work out serious economic planning and implement it through economic and political policies.

On the other, a stable political situation would attract foreign investors. People still remembered how the struggle for political goals of each party during the Old Order had made political stability all but impossible. Soeharto gradually came of age politically, attaining real power which became increasingly large and concentrated.

Political discussions and debates were treated as something indecent or not timely, whereas political initiatives of the ministers within the Cabinet were extremely limited. Although the heads of their ministries, they were supposed to work only according to instructions of "His Excellency, Mr. President" (menurut petunjuk Bapak Presiden).

In Indonesian politics, the ministers assumed a triple role: heads of department, assistants to the president and public figures. During the Soeharto regime, ministers were only assistants to the president, no more and no less.

The situation could not be stopped and controlled. It proliferated to the extent that nearly all Indonesians were made to believe that any political development was only possible through the approval or disapproval of the president.

Ministers were preoccupied with their own hermeneutics on how to interpret correctly Soeharto's personal gestures: what was the meaning of his smile early in the morning or late in the afternoon, and what was implied in his saying "yes" to a proposal.

Even the president's incorrect use of Indonesian was adopted and followed suit by many within and outside the bureaucracy. The imperfect command of the language became a symbol for their closeness to power and their participation in its realm.

Ultimately, it was not political opposition which succeeded in showing the limits of Soeharto's power, but the market. The exchange rate of the rupiah to the American dollar went down hill at full speed. Imports became impossible. Many projects already underway had to be halted. Prices of consumer goods skyrocketed, and suddenly Indonesia was four times as poor as it was two or three months before. Every measure taken by Soeharto's government could not bridle the plummeting rupiah. Market sentiment became entirely hostile toward Soeharto's political behavior.

After his proposal to set up a Reform Committee was ignored and 16 ministers of his Cabinet decided to withdraw, there was no way-out for Soeharto than to step down as he did on May 21, 1998.

Into his shoes stepped his vice president, B.J. Habibie. Once again democracy seems to have come into full swing. The press and electronic media have regained their freedom of expression. Courageous reports appear on front pages of newspapers or on TV shows about many terrible occurrences during the Soeharto regime: the harassment of the Indonesian Democratic Party; the abduction of young student activists; murders in Aceh, East Timor and Tanjung Priok, Jakarta; the involvement of some military personnel in the shooting deaths of four Trisakti University students; the alleged huge fortunes of Soeharto's family and the possibility of their having bank accounts abroad.

All things and people which are assumed to have any connection with the practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism are boldly divulged.

The press' work is considerably facilitated by the fact that setting up a newspaper or a newsmagazine has suddenly become so easy politically because the license from the Ministry of Information can be attained without too many obstacles. Newsmagazines which were banned during the New Order, when Harmoko was information minister, are now trying to make a return to newsstands. Defunct DeTIK has reappeared as DeTAK. Prestigious Tempo has tentative plans to republish by the end of the year.

Of course, all this is a good reminder for those in power that what they do will not always last forever, and what they destroy will not disappear for good. Also, several books which were banned by the New Order regime are now back in stores.

As for political parties, one can safely say that the present period appears like a political spring, in which so many parties are sprouting up although nobody knows how many of them will be able to blossom.

A recent survey by several journalists found there are currently at least 80 registered political parties of various sizes. In the course of time, this number will surely decrease because many of the parties seem unable to meet the conditions which will be stipulated in the new law on political parties, now being devised by a committee within the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Prospects of political parties during the coming election will also depend very much on the system which is to be applied: a district or proportional system. Despite everything, one can see clearly that the political energy of the people, which was neutered during the Soeharto regime, is erupting in numerous political parties regardless of the prospects they might have. What is revealed by this development is that people are never politically indifferent as far as their political participation is concerned.

The contact and interaction between the president and various social groups is also much more open than ever. Those who protest forcefully against the rape of women during the dark days in mid- May may visit the president and discuss with him their cases in a face-to-face manner. Conversely, those who feel that their rights have been violated can take to the street and organize demonstrations without having to ask for permission and without having to worry about their security.

At face value, one can be so impressed by a revival of a democratic society and democratic politics. The question is can we believe and truly say that Indonesia is now moving forward toward a democratic society with democratic politics?

It is fairly doubtful and debatable. We will have to wait for several years to come before we can give a reliable opinion. The reason is that it is common in Indonesian politics that a government which has yet to find a firm footing displays democratic gestures.

The reasons are several. A fledgling government needs the political support which it cannot as yet mobilize. It needs to attract more sympathy from various layers of society through trying to meet their demands, by giving more freedom of expression or by trying to get close to the people on various occasions. What Habibie is now doing was done even better by Soeharto up to 1974.

Such a government is necessitated to become more democratic because it does not have sufficient power to exercise tight control over democratic initiatives of various social groups. In other words, this is a situation in which the society looks stronger simply because the government is not yet strong enough.

The fact that Habibie's government is still in a weak condition can be discerned in many things. He is supposed to still lack his legitimacy as a president, because he was not elected and installed to the office by the People's Consultative Assembly. As for economic affairs, he has not demonstrated his capacity to take an action to arrest the critical vicious circle of today.

On international relations, he has yet to succeed in winning back the trust of international bodies. His economic team is much criticized because of its "populist" policy of satisfying the people with direct subsidies while sacrificing fiscal disciplinary measures to overcome the monetary crisis. It is akin to a man on a journey through the desert with his son who gives him all the drinking water they have, not thinking of the days to come.

People say a three month-period is too short to evaluate the achievements of a government. However, a long or short duration is all relative. One hour to write a book is, of course, too short. But one hour in a nuclear war is evidently too long. The present economic and political situation in Indonesia is so full of many urgent problems that even two months would be too long for a government if it does not take courageous action to improve stop the problems.

Of course, it is Habibie's bad luck that he came to power in a time full of so many difficult problems, all left behind by Soeharto. But nobody forced him to accept the job. That is why he is also required to do his best to solve urgent problems because otherwise Indonesia will fall into a total economic collapse from which it will be very difficult to recover.

We should not be prematurely optimistic about the prospect of democracy in the country in order that it is not too late for us to be sorry later on. The real test will come only when the present government has become a strong government.

In past experience, the stronger the government, the weaker the upholding of democracy. Whether Indonesian people will repeat once more this lesson depends not only on the willingness of the government, but particularly on the determination of society to defend its democratic rights even if the present government has become three or four times stronger than it is now.

Soeharto had more luck because in his time he could choose between democracy and economy, by giving priority to the latter at the expense of democracy. It was made possible by many reasons resulting from the historical juncture in which the New Order came into existence. Habibie is deprived of this political luxury. He is faced with both an economic crisis and political uncertainty, which he is forced to solve simultaneously.

Habibie has to solve economic problems while pushing for democracy, because otherwise he will lose forever the trust of the Indonesian people and international community, which is extremely important and instrumental to the implementation of his economic policy. He cannot solve the political question while postponing the economic question either because the people are under imminent threat of great scarcity of basic foodstuffs.

It is Habibie's fate that he has to build a strong government and, concurrently, a democratic one. To use more existential parlance, he is condemned to be strong and democratic at the same time. He is thrown into a war on both flanks, with the catch of winning both or losing everything.

The writer is a sociologist based in Jakarta.