Will our newfound freedom last?

Will our newfound freedom last?

By Ignas Kleden

This is the second of two articles on state and democracy.

JAKARTA (JP): The limitation of democratic rights during the
New Order was justified on the basis of several related reasons.
First, economic development was said to presuppose a stable
political situation marked by a double function. On the one hand,
it gave the government the time and opportunity to work out
serious economic planning and implement it through economic and
political policies.

On the other, a stable political situation would attract
foreign investors. People still remembered how the struggle for
political goals of each party during the Old Order had made
political stability all but impossible. Soeharto gradually came
of age politically, attaining real power which became
increasingly large and concentrated.

Political discussions and debates were treated as something
indecent or not timely, whereas political initiatives of the
ministers within the Cabinet were extremely limited. Although the
heads of their ministries, they were supposed to work only
according to instructions of "His Excellency, Mr. President"
(menurut petunjuk Bapak Presiden).

In Indonesian politics, the ministers assumed a triple role:
heads of department, assistants to the president and public
figures. During the Soeharto regime, ministers were only
assistants to the president, no more and no less.

The situation could not be stopped and controlled. It
proliferated to the extent that nearly all Indonesians were made
to believe that any political development was only possible
through the approval or disapproval of the president.

Ministers were preoccupied with their own hermeneutics on how
to interpret correctly Soeharto's personal gestures: what was the
meaning of his smile early in the morning or late in the
afternoon, and what was implied in his saying "yes" to a
proposal.

Even the president's incorrect use of Indonesian was adopted
and followed suit by many within and outside the bureaucracy. The
imperfect command of the language became a symbol for their
closeness to power and their participation in its realm.

Ultimately, it was not political opposition which succeeded in
showing the limits of Soeharto's power, but the market. The
exchange rate of the rupiah to the American dollar went down hill
at full speed. Imports became impossible. Many projects already
underway had to be halted. Prices of consumer goods skyrocketed,
and suddenly Indonesia was four times as poor as it was two or
three months before. Every measure taken by Soeharto's government
could not bridle the plummeting rupiah. Market sentiment became
entirely hostile toward Soeharto's political behavior.

After his proposal to set up a Reform Committee was ignored
and 16 ministers of his Cabinet decided to withdraw, there was no
way-out for Soeharto than to step down as he did on May 21, 1998.

Into his shoes stepped his vice president, B.J. Habibie. Once
again democracy seems to have come into full swing. The press and
electronic media have regained their freedom of expression.
Courageous reports appear on front pages of newspapers or on TV
shows about many terrible occurrences during the Soeharto regime:
the harassment of the Indonesian Democratic Party; the abduction
of young student activists; murders in Aceh, East Timor and
Tanjung Priok, Jakarta; the involvement of some military
personnel in the shooting deaths of four Trisakti University
students; the alleged huge fortunes of Soeharto's family and the
possibility of their having bank accounts abroad.

All things and people which are assumed to have any connection
with the practices of corruption, collusion and nepotism are
boldly divulged.

The press' work is considerably facilitated by the fact that
setting up a newspaper or a newsmagazine has suddenly become so
easy politically because the license from the Ministry of
Information can be attained without too many obstacles.
Newsmagazines which were banned during the New Order, when
Harmoko was information minister, are now trying to make a return
to newsstands. Defunct DeTIK has reappeared as DeTAK.
Prestigious Tempo has tentative plans to republish by the end of
the year.

Of course, all this is a good reminder for those in power that
what they do will not always last forever, and what they destroy
will not disappear for good. Also, several books which were
banned by the New Order regime are now back in stores.

As for political parties, one can safely say that the present
period appears like a political spring, in which so many parties
are sprouting up although nobody knows how many of them will be
able to blossom.

A recent survey by several journalists found there are
currently at least 80 registered political parties of various
sizes. In the course of time, this number will surely decrease
because many of the parties seem unable to meet the conditions
which will be stipulated in the new law on political parties, now
being devised by a committee within the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Prospects of political parties during the coming election will
also depend very much on the system which is to be applied: a
district or proportional system. Despite everything, one can see
clearly that the political energy of the people, which was
neutered during the Soeharto regime, is erupting in numerous
political parties regardless of the prospects they might have.
What is revealed by this development is that people are never
politically indifferent as far as their political participation
is concerned.

The contact and interaction between the president and various
social groups is also much more open than ever. Those who protest
forcefully against the rape of women during the dark days in mid-
May may visit the president and discuss with him their cases in a
face-to-face manner. Conversely, those who feel that their rights
have been violated can take to the street and organize
demonstrations without having to ask for permission and without
having to worry about their security.

At face value, one can be so impressed by a revival of a
democratic society and democratic politics. The question is can
we believe and truly say that Indonesia is now moving forward
toward a democratic society with democratic politics?

It is fairly doubtful and debatable. We will have to wait for
several years to come before we can give a reliable opinion. The
reason is that it is common in Indonesian politics that a
government which has yet to find a firm footing displays
democratic gestures.

The reasons are several. A fledgling government needs the
political support which it cannot as yet mobilize. It needs to
attract more sympathy from various layers of society through
trying to meet their demands, by giving more freedom of
expression or by trying to get close to the people on various
occasions. What Habibie is now doing was done even better by
Soeharto up to 1974.

Such a government is necessitated to become more democratic
because it does not have sufficient power to exercise tight
control over democratic initiatives of various social groups. In
other words, this is a situation in which the society looks
stronger simply because the government is not yet strong enough.

The fact that Habibie's government is still in a weak
condition can be discerned in many things. He is supposed to
still lack his legitimacy as a president, because he was not
elected and installed to the office by the People's Consultative
Assembly. As for economic affairs, he has not demonstrated his
capacity to take an action to arrest the critical vicious circle
of today.

On international relations, he has yet to succeed in winning
back the trust of international bodies. His economic team is much
criticized because of its "populist" policy of satisfying the
people with direct subsidies while sacrificing fiscal
disciplinary measures to overcome the monetary crisis. It is akin
to a man on a journey through the desert with his son who gives
him all the drinking water they have, not thinking of the days to
come.

People say a three month-period is too short to evaluate the
achievements of a government. However, a long or short duration
is all relative. One hour to write a book is, of course, too
short. But one hour in a nuclear war is evidently too long. The
present economic and political situation in Indonesia is so full
of many urgent problems that even two months would be too long
for a government if it does not take courageous action to improve
stop the problems.

Of course, it is Habibie's bad luck that he came to power in a
time full of so many difficult problems, all left behind by
Soeharto. But nobody forced him to accept the job. That is why he
is also required to do his best to solve urgent problems because
otherwise Indonesia will fall into a total economic collapse from
which it will be very difficult to recover.

We should not be prematurely optimistic about the prospect of
democracy in the country in order that it is not too late for us
to be sorry later on. The real test will come only when the
present government has become a strong government.

In past experience, the stronger the government, the weaker
the upholding of democracy. Whether Indonesian people will repeat
once more this lesson depends not only on the willingness of the
government, but particularly on the determination of society to
defend its democratic rights even if the present government has
become three or four times stronger than it is now.

Soeharto had more luck because in his time he could choose
between democracy and economy, by giving priority to the latter
at the expense of democracy. It was made possible by many reasons
resulting from the historical juncture in which the New Order
came into existence. Habibie is deprived of this political
luxury. He is faced with both an economic crisis and political
uncertainty, which he is forced to solve simultaneously.

Habibie has to solve economic problems while pushing for
democracy, because otherwise he will lose forever the trust of
the Indonesian people and international community, which is
extremely important and instrumental to the implementation of his
economic policy. He cannot solve the political question while
postponing the economic question either because the people are
under imminent threat of great scarcity of basic foodstuffs.

It is Habibie's fate that he has to build a strong government
and, concurrently, a democratic one. To use more existential
parlance, he is condemned to be strong and democratic at the same
time. He is thrown into a war on both flanks, with the catch of
winning both or losing everything.

The writer is a sociologist based in Jakarta.