Will Jiang Zemin step down?

Will Jiang Zemin step down?

Natalia Soebagyo, Board Member, Center for Chinese Studies,
Jakarta

Now that the date for the 16th Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) has been confirmed for Nov. 8, speculation
is high about what will President Jiang Zemin do. Will he or
won't he step down gracefully as the Party secretary-general?
What is important to note is the attempt of CCP leaders to secure
an orderly political succession. How serious are they?

No doubt the changes in China's domestic situation and demands
of the international community require a Chinese leadership that
is not only more savvy about the outside world, but also more
attuned to the dynamics of a fast-changing Chinese society.

Since its accession into the World Trade Organization (WTO),
China is a full-fledged and recognized member of the
international economic community and therefore has to act
accordingly.

Chinese society has also changed; the individual in China has
greater freedom now to pursue his aspirations. There is, to a
certain extent, greater freedom of expression allowed and urban
life especially is very vibrant.

There are surely still many unresolved issues related to the
blind pursuit of economic development while having to
simultaneously build the necessary institutions for supporting
such rapid development. Corruption is rampant, state-owned
enterprises are saddled by debt, the number of private
enterprises continue to grow and the public is increasingly more
critical. Chinese society is therefore now much more complex.

Deng Xiaoping had anticipated this and not long after he
assumed power he began to put in place a system for orderly
political succession, realizing full well that institutionalizing
succession in a Leninist system is no easy task. He started the
process by handpicking his successors early, by encouraging his
peers to retire and by emphasizing the importance of institutions
and clear procedures in the management of the politics of the
elite.

He also began limiting his importance within the system so
that his departure would not be too disruptive. Thus, he gave up
two of the top three positions, namely the premiership and head
of the party.

However, as rivalry among the political elite became more
acute, Deng subsequently purged his handpicked successors, first
Hu Yaobang in 1987 and then Zhao Ziyang after the Tiananmen
incident in 1989. He also kept his position as chairman of the
powerful Military Affairs Commission.

It was clear that there was, and still is, a big difference
between real power and formal position and that the institution-
building process was not going very far. Hence, Deng did not
follow through his succession strategy as he had originally
intended.

Jiang Zemin's appointment was Deng's third and last attempt to
secure the party's leadership. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen
incident, Deng's options were limited. Other members of the
Politburo Standing Committee had either been too lenient or too
harsh towards the Tiananmen demonstrators and Jiang Zemin was
seen as a safe bet, a solid party member who had steadily risen
in the ranks through a series of steady promotions despite
lacking the revolutionary credentials.

Over the years, Jiang has emerged as a leader who began his
term as secretary-general cautiously, but who over the years has
proven capable of weathering the storm, setting the middle ground
between those on the left who espouse upholding socialism and
those on the right who have no qualms over so-called "bourgeois
liberalization." He has come into his own as a political leader.

This confidence is reflected in Jiang Zemin's desire to attain
the same stature as his predecessors by trying to make his "Three
Represents" theory part of party doctrine. By doing so he is
asking the Party to represent the fundamental interests of the
broad masses of the Chinese people, not simply representing the
vanguard of the working class.

The "Three Represents" is a theory which ideologically
justifies the emergence of the new capitalists in China, making
the CCP a more open, almost an "all people's party".

As the 16th CCP Congress draws near, analysts wonder whether
in this coming congress Jiang Zemin will tackle the issue of
political reform and succession from the "third" generation to
the "fourth" generation of China's leadership.

Membership of the Politburo Standing Committee was determined
months ago and many scenarios have been raised about who will be
the next core. One scenario is that Jiang Zemin will relinquish
his position and hand over the baton to Hu Jintao, thus carrying
out a smooth transition. Another scenario has Jiang Zemin
stepping down only if Li Peng, Zhu Rongji and others of his
generation relinquish power too.

If the CCP is serious about establishing a system of orderly
political succession, Jiang Zemin would not be given the
opportunity to retain his power. He currently is president, Party
secretary-general and chairman of the Central Military
Commission. The Constitution limits the Presidency to two terms
and Jiang Zemin is nearing the end of two terms.

He has also been Party secretary-general for longer than two
terms. Besides, he is 76 and if he doesn't step down it would irk
speaker for National People's Congress Qiao Shi who grudgingly
withdrew in 1997 when Jiang asked all those over 70 to step
down.

If he insists on staying on the scene, he could always extend
his term as chairman of the CMC or revive the position of Party
chairman, which Deng abolished in 1982.

But unfortunately for Jiang, he has already promised to
withdraw from the scene by the end of this year.

To induce him to step down, the trade-off could be for the
Party to officially incorporate the "Three Represents" into Party
doctrine.

All this speculation proves that political succession in China
is still an opaque process and that the law of men still prevails
over the rule of law; but hopefully the trend is going in the
right direction.

One can only assume that political reform in China, as with
economic reform, will be slow and incremental, nudged along by
reformist elements both within and without the CCP.