Will Bush be less interventionist?

By Siswo Pramono

CANBERRA (JP): The fact that George W. Bush compromises between internationalist and isolationist does not mean that under his leadership the United States will become less interventionist.

The U.S. is the world's hegemonic power and a hegemonic power is an interventionist.

Many Americans believe that the benevolent hegemony exercised by the U.S. is good for the global community. However, with Bush in power, U.S. foreign policy is likely to shift toward liberal rather than realist traditions. This is particularly true when the U.S. deals with the daunting issue of human rights abroad.

The U.S. has a strong tradition of humanitarian intervention in its foreign policy. The realists, in the tradition of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, focus on the security aspects of humanitarian interventions.

Since in the realists' view the abuse of human rights is mostly organized and committed by the state, the most effective way to deal with it is to remove the abusive regime by force. So, in March 1996, National Security Advisory Anthony Lake proposed the use of military force for humanitarian purposes.

The liberals, in the tradition of Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, focus on the introduction of liberal democracy, the enforcement of international law, free trade, and intensified supervision by international organizations in attempts to promote human rights abroad.

Thus, in the case of gross violations of human rights, the liberals would prefer to address the issue at the United Nations, pressing the Security Council to issue resolutions for the establishment of international tribunals. Bush would prefer this liberal way.

In Bosnia and Kosovo combined efforts were initiated based on these two schools of thought. Multilateral forces, led by the U.S., were sent in under the United Nations' mandate (but not under the UN command) to maintain order and capture elements of the abusive regimes; whereas a separate international tribunal was set up to try the perpetrators of human rights abuse on a case by case basis. Embargoes, economic sanctions or economic threats of all kinds accompanied the military actions.

Bush supports the U.S. humanitarian intervention in Bosnia and in the Balkans (Presidential Debate at Wake Forest University, 11 Oct. 2000). However, Bush also said that military intervention is not always the best solution for humanitarian issues.

It is argued that abusive regimes might respond defiantly in facing mounting military pressure. Serbian deviance during the bombing of Kosovo is one such example. Massive ethnic cleansing campaigns by Serb forces were launched after, not before, the start of NATO's bombardments.

Out of one million Albanians escaping the atrocity, about 800,000 were expelled from Kosovo following the outburst of NATO aggression (New York Times, May 29, 1999).

Even when military victory is achieved, it easily slips into an ironically uncertain mission or a stalemate with an unclear exit strategy. The early days of the NATO military operations in Kosovo were marked by the West's efforts to protect Albanians from the Serbs, and about a year later, to protect the Serbs from the Albanians (Washingtonpost.com Sept. 20, 2000).

It is wrong to assume that U.S. foreign policy always leans toward an arch-realist military approach. On many occasions the U.S. has avoided direct intervention in the wake of gross violations of human rights, an attitude partly to do with the severe budget constraints called for since 1995 by the Republican-controlled Congress (New York Times, March 3, 1995).

Another reason for the U.S. to avoid military intervention is "the ghost of Somalia". Thirty American soldiers were killed in Somalia, a tragedy that compelled the Clinton administration to reconsider its policy in UN operations.

The result was a new policy that triggered a vicious circle: first, the U.S. will not join any UN operation unless the UN fulfills necessary conditions such as deployment of troops, logistics, and financial arrangements. One can easily see, however, that such conditions could only be met with the full support of the U.S. itself.

And, second, the U.S. will only commit itself to support and become involved in such operations if its vital interests are at stake.

Under the new policy, Clinton refrained from intervening in the gross violation of human right in Rwanda in 1994 that claimed about 800,000 lives. On Rwanda, the U.S. gave the leadership to France.

The U.S., too, did not directly intervene to stop human rights violations in East Timor. Following the East Timor balloting, the U.S. left the matter to be handled by Australia.

Bush's internationalism cannot escape this Clinton legacy. With "the ghost of Somalia" in his mind, Bush would never allow U.S. troops under UN command.

U.S. troops would only be deployed abroad when the vital interests of the U.S. or its allies are threatened (Presidential Debate, Boston, 3 Oct. 2000). If the troops are to be sent, the mission must be clear and the exit strategy obvious.

Thus, U.S. troops are more likely to be deployed to protect the U.S. vital interest in the Middle East (e.g. to secure the supply of energy) than to intervene in human rights crises in South East Asia or elsewhere.

Bush would withdraw U.S. troops from the Balkans but he would keep U.S. troops in the Korean Peninsula to promote stability in the region.

All in all, one can expect less U.S. military interventions abroad (under a Bush administration).

Conversely, under Bush leadership, the U.S. would intensify its preventive diplomacy to deal with humanitarian crises. In line with the liberal school of thought, Bush believes that trade is better for human rights than sanctions. Human rights would be promoted through democratization that should go hand in hand with free trade.

Trade and foreign aid would be the main tools to promote human rights, and to encourage political reform and implementing common markets in the developing world.

In other words, the "linkage" policy, namely the use of human rights and democratization as conditions for trade and economic aid, is becoming more apparent. This is, of course, humanitarian intervention by other means.

Last but not least, Bush would not completely abandon the long tradition of U.S. military intervention.

As Bush stated, "I will have a foreign policy with a touch of iron driven by American interests and American values". U.S. diplomacy would represent a foreign policy with a touch of iron and a sharpened sword. This means, when its vital interests are at stake, the U.S. would resort to gun boat diplomacy.

The author is a doctoral student at the Department of Political Science, Australian National University, Canberra.