Will ASEAN reverse its decision on Myanmar?

Will ASEAN reverse its decision on Myanmar?

J. Soedjati Djiwandono, Political Analyst, Jakarta

Prime Minister Mahatir's suggestion of the possibility of
expelling Myanmar from ASEAN to bring pressure to bear on the
military junta of Myanmar to have the opposition leader Aung San
Suu Kyi released from detention should be seriously considered by
the rest of the ASEAN states. Mahatir did say, however, that such
a step would be a last resort in ASEAN's common efforts on the
issue.

Indeed, Malaysia played a major role in trying to bring
Myanmar into ASEAN simultaneously with Cambodia and Laos --
although Cambodia could only join the organization in 1998 -- on
the occasion of ASEAN's 30th anniversary in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, in July 1997. While Myanmar's entry into ASEAN at that
stage was an issue of debate in various ASEAN forums, it was
almost unthinkable for ASEAN to reverse the decision.

Too much prestige was at stake in that ASEAN heads of state
and government had earlier made the commitment to admit the three
countries together into the association. The stake could have
been double for Malaysia, which was to host the occasion. To do
so might have created the impression of kowtowing to Western
pressure.

Indeed, when asked to join ASEAN before its establishment in
1967, Burma turned down the offer on the ground that it would be
contrary to its non-aligned foreign policy. Then, however, there
might have been a risk that failure of entering ASEAN at a later
stage not of its own making, Myanmar might never wish to join
again also for consideration of prestige. The country had
isolated itself for decades, on the ostentatious pretext that it
was the only truly non-aligned nation.

If that should have been the case, the dream of One Southeast
Asia would have been shattered. Though for long not as yet in the
"ASEAN-10" formula, the relevant provision in the Bangkok
Declaration of 1967 that the association was open for membership
to the other countries of the region expressed that aspiration.
Moreover, such an aspiration would justify the reference to
Southeast Asia in the designation of the association.

Reservations have been expressed on Mahatir's suggestion by
Thailand and Indonesia. Thailand's considerations may relate to
its delicate problems in its bilateral relations with Myanmar.
One might well wonder, however, about Indonesia's considerations.
Would they relate to its disillusion with the West in general,
particularly with the U.S., often regarded as representing the
Western world?

Indeed, there is a strong tendency on the part of the European
members against the inclusion of Myanmar in ASEM. Now, however,
the view that to stand by Maynmar should be thought of as a way
of avoiding an impression of kowtowing to Western (European)
pressure ignores the degree of transatlantic rupture since the
Iraqi war by the U.S.-led coalition.

Indonesia's attitude may also relate to its strong and
consistent support for ASEAN's traditional policy of non-
interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. This
principle is, as frequently maintained by Indonesia, a "cardinal
rule" for ASEAN, which goes back to the Asia-African Conference
and to the rules contained in the charter of the United Nations.
It is not something that ASEAN has invented, although ASEAN has
usually even restrained from criticizing Myanmar.

A policy of "conditional engagement", originally concerned
U.S.'s relations with China, in search of a new pattern of
relationship between the two countries in the post-Cold War era.
ASEAN also pursued a policy of "constructive engagement" towards
China within the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
This meant that rather than "confronting" or "containing" China,
ASEAN would attempt to engage China in a regional structure so as
to help China to play its proper role in regional affairs for the
security and stability of the region and thus the world.

"Constructive engagement" was also attempted by the ASEAN
states in their relationship with one another, particularly then
with the prospect of Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar joining the
association, especially in the face of pressure by the Western
countries on ASEAN against admitting Myanmar because of the
country's record on violations of human rights. Against Western
pressure, ASEAN did admit Myanmar, together with Laos. But
because of adverse domestic developments in Cambodia, its entry
into ASEAN was postponed.

Seemingly caught between the pressures for the pursuit of a
somewhat extreme policy of economic sanction and isolation on
Myanmar by the West and practically "no policy" of non-
interference, ASEAN seemed to have tackled the dilemma by the
horns. It would rather try to help, as stated the then Indonesian
foreign minister Ali Alatas, through "constructive engagement",
meaning, that as fellow Southeast Asians, the ASEAN states would
"show our understanding and support for a peaceful reconciliation
among the people of Myanmar," and that "constructive engagement"
did not mean "turning a blind eye to developments that could be
detrimental to the country, because any negative development
could affect the whole region". But what this meant in practical
terms was never clear.

One might well be concerned over the possibility that ASEAN's
reticence on Myanmar, except its appeal conveyed to Yangon at the
end of the last ASEAN meeting in Phnom Penh, may be due to a
tacit recognition that its own records on human rights, at least
with respect to some of its member states like Indonesia, the
largest member state, are not particularly brilliant. Who are
they, then, to criticize the Myanmarese?

If "constructive engagement" should not refer to nor burying
our heads in the sand, pretending as though everything was fine
and in good order, then it needs to be clearly translated into
policy. This must be made unmistakably clear to the Myanmarese
regime.ASEAN has done little about Myanmar despite its blatant
suppression of democracy.

No mention, however, has ever been made relating to any
conditions for ASEAN's policy of constructive engagement towards
Myanmar since its entry into the association. The threat of its
expulsion from it, if as a last resort, would now be probably be
effective.

To make it credible, the policy of constructive engagement
should be pursued in concrete terms by all the ASEAN states in
relations with one another, so as to ensure that their membership
in ASEAN would help enhance their own security, individually as
well as collectively. In the present-day world, which is
increasingly open, interlinked, and interdependent, it is not
easy to draw a clear line between what is strictly a domestic
affair of a nation and what should be the concern of humankind,
and thus of the international community.

The promotion of good governance and the establishment of a
civil society marked by democratic pluralism, equality and
justice for everyone, and respect for human rights, are problems
common to all the ASEAN states. Concern with such problems should
be translated into a common or coordinated policy, which would
give the policy of constructive engagement its real value. ASEAN
would enhance its credibility and respectability in the
international community by demonstrating in good faith its
commitment to universal values and by adhering to certain
internationally accepted standards and norms of behavior.