Why retired officers joining opposition ranks?

Why retired officers joining opposition ranks?

By Aleksius Jemadu

BANDUNG (JP): Some people were taken aback recently when
several retired officers joined government critic Megawati
Soekarnoputri's camp of the deeply splintered Indonesian
Democratic Party (PDI).

Among the officers are Maj. Gen. (ret) Theo Syafei, a former
Udayana regional commander and former legislator from the
military faction in the House of Representatives (DPR), and Maj.
Gen. (ret) R.K. Sembiring Meliala, also once a member of the
House.

The two well-known figures argued they could no longer
tolerate the government's high-handedness in dealing with PDI's
internal conflict.

Megawati was deposed from the PDI leadership by a government-
backed rival leadership two years ago.

Through their deed, the retired officers showed they regarded
the government's persistent refusal to recognize Megawati's
leadership as harking back to the old practice of political
injustice.

Many analysts consider their decision to be quite provocative.
They are now pondering the reasons for their decision and its
broader implications for Indonesian politics.

One issue on their minds is whether the move is linked to the
severe criticism leveled at the Armed Forces (ABRI) for its
supportive role during president Soeharto's authoritarian 32-year
rule.

Any political move must be understood within the context it is
made. The officers have joined the opposition when there is
growing criticism against ABRI's "dual function" role. Critics
argue the military was so immersed within Soeharto's power
structure that its present leaders find it difficult to confront
its past wrongdoings.

Between 1992 and the downfall of Soeharto last May, there was
strong evidence the military played partisan politics. Evidence
of this was the statement of then army chief of staff Gen.
Hartono in 1997 that the military was obliged to support the
ruling Golkar grouping in the election that year.

Hartono's close relationship with a prominent Golkar figure
during that period gave rise to suspicions that the two were
forming a strategic alliance with a clear political agenda.

Considering the connection between military leaders and
Golkar's power elite, many were not surprised when the military
leadership gave its support to the toppling of Megawati at a
government-sponsored congress in Medan, North Sumatra, in June
1996.

Megawati, then forming a groundswell of popular support, was
perceived by the authorities as a potential political contender
who should be removed as a threat.

Soeharto's successor B.J. Habibie continues this stance with
his refusal to accept Megawati as the legitimate PDI leader. The
military has done nothing to change this.

There are two opposing views on the implications of the
retired officers' moves. Pessimistic is the fear the military
could be divided along their conflicting political affiliations,
losing its role as an integrative element in the country.

Not all political parties want to accept the state ideology
Pancasila as their party ideology. Even though the retired
officers may choose whatever political party they want to join, a
careless decision could lead to an outright betrayal of several
military doctrines they once vowed to respect.

Optimists would argue the move could tame "extreme" right or
left elements in the party due to the military's strong
nationalistic orientation. The officers' presence could also
counter the emergence of sectarian politics promoting
primordialism.

But the military would also do well to learn some lessons from
the episode.

First, if the military leadership, driven by personal ambition
or power maneuvering, practices partisan politics, their
integrity will be called into question.

Experience tells us this will only leave the dual function
doctrine profoundly vulnerable to criticism and cynicism.

The military should also check itself from becoming too
embedded within the ruling power structure. The people would be
proud of a military which serves as the instrument of the state,
not merely the political tool of an authoritarian leader.

The military leadership should be open and willing to
appreciate criticism conveyed by its own members even if it runs
counter to its tight organizational hierarchy.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that a political entity
which is unwilling and incapable of reforming itself will not
survive in the new era of democratization.

Of course, the Indonesian Armed Forces would not want to
suffer this fate, right?

The writer is head of the school of international relations at
the University of Parahyangan, Bandung. He is also a researcher
at the Parahyangan Center for International Studies at the same
university.