Why retired officers joining opposition ranks?

By Aleksius Jemadu

BANDUNG (JP): Some people were taken aback recently when several retired officers joined government critic Megawati Soekarnoputri's camp of the deeply splintered Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI).

Among the officers are Maj. Gen. (ret) Theo Syafei, a former Udayana regional commander and former legislator from the military faction in the House of Representatives (DPR), and Maj. Gen. (ret) R.K. Sembiring Meliala, also once a member of the House.

The two well-known figures argued they could no longer tolerate the government's high-handedness in dealing with PDI's internal conflict.

Megawati was deposed from the PDI leadership by a government- backed rival leadership two years ago.

Through their deed, the retired officers showed they regarded the government's persistent refusal to recognize Megawati's leadership as harking back to the old practice of political injustice.

Many analysts consider their decision to be quite provocative. They are now pondering the reasons for their decision and its broader implications for Indonesian politics.

One issue on their minds is whether the move is linked to the severe criticism leveled at the Armed Forces (ABRI) for its supportive role during president Soeharto's authoritarian 32-year rule.

Any political move must be understood within the context it is made. The officers have joined the opposition when there is growing criticism against ABRI's "dual function" role. Critics argue the military was so immersed within Soeharto's power structure that its present leaders find it difficult to confront its past wrongdoings.

Between 1992 and the downfall of Soeharto last May, there was strong evidence the military played partisan politics. Evidence of this was the statement of then army chief of staff Gen. Hartono in 1997 that the military was obliged to support the ruling Golkar grouping in the election that year.

Hartono's close relationship with a prominent Golkar figure during that period gave rise to suspicions that the two were forming a strategic alliance with a clear political agenda.

Considering the connection between military leaders and Golkar's power elite, many were not surprised when the military leadership gave its support to the toppling of Megawati at a government-sponsored congress in Medan, North Sumatra, in June 1996.

Megawati, then forming a groundswell of popular support, was perceived by the authorities as a potential political contender who should be removed as a threat.

Soeharto's successor B.J. Habibie continues this stance with his refusal to accept Megawati as the legitimate PDI leader. The military has done nothing to change this.

There are two opposing views on the implications of the retired officers' moves. Pessimistic is the fear the military could be divided along their conflicting political affiliations, losing its role as an integrative element in the country.

Not all political parties want to accept the state ideology Pancasila as their party ideology. Even though the retired officers may choose whatever political party they want to join, a careless decision could lead to an outright betrayal of several military doctrines they once vowed to respect.

Optimists would argue the move could tame "extreme" right or left elements in the party due to the military's strong nationalistic orientation. The officers' presence could also counter the emergence of sectarian politics promoting primordialism.

But the military would also do well to learn some lessons from the episode.

First, if the military leadership, driven by personal ambition or power maneuvering, practices partisan politics, their integrity will be called into question.

Experience tells us this will only leave the dual function doctrine profoundly vulnerable to criticism and cynicism.

The military should also check itself from becoming too embedded within the ruling power structure. The people would be proud of a military which serves as the instrument of the state, not merely the political tool of an authoritarian leader.

The military leadership should be open and willing to appreciate criticism conveyed by its own members even if it runs counter to its tight organizational hierarchy.

Finally, it should be kept in mind that a political entity which is unwilling and incapable of reforming itself will not survive in the new era of democratization.

Of course, the Indonesian Armed Forces would not want to suffer this fate, right?

The writer is head of the school of international relations at the University of Parahyangan, Bandung. He is also a researcher at the Parahyangan Center for International Studies at the same university.