Why national elections will not be democratic in Aceh

Otto Syamsuddin Ishak, Civil Society Alliance for Democracy (Yappika), Jakarta

Pro-democracy activists are convinced that as a political system, democracy also serves as a mechanism capable of transforming a violent clash (war) into a peaceful conflict. This, however, is only true if people are allowed to live by democratic values, including pluralism, tolerance, transparency and negotiation.

In the context of Aceh, now firmly under martial law, the questions have arisen about the possibility of whether the general election of 2004 will proceed democratically. Anyone committed to democracy will return with the query: Do the Acehnese live in an atmosphere imbued with the social ethics of pluralism, tolerance, openness and negotiation?

This atmosphere involves horizontal social relations between individuals and groups, as well as vertical relations between individuals and groups on one side and the government on the other.

Under normal circumstances, social relations in Aceh are egalitarian in nature. But under martial law -- in which the local administration is in the hands of soldiers from outside -- egalitarian relationships are being changed into those characterized by commanded centralism, a polarization and the spirit of destruction.

In an undemocratic militaristic government system, people have no sovereignty. Social structures are subordinate to military ranks. The local people have to become part of the separatist movement or the militaristic nationalists. Under such conditions, floating masses will follow the agenda set forth for them by the military authorities. For instance, they must participate in a pledge-of-allegiance ceremony, followed later by a protest demonstration against peace, a demand for militaristic life and a rally to get everyone fired up to hunt for separatists.

Pluralism offers a way out of this social divisiveness. Ethnic differences have been emphasized so that a split occurs along the lines of Aceh's coastal regions and Gayo (with its many transmigrants from outside of Sumatra) areas fomenting a state of confusion characterized by inter-Acehnese mistrust, and then the historical similarities can easily be replaced by militaristic nationalism. Tolerance that reflects appreciation for fellow humans is turned into "our" solidarity and "yours" (enemy's).

Organizations previously based on the awareness of the importance of upholding human rights and applying a democratic and peaceful system are substituted by those founded on militaristic nationalism and an uncompromising system seeking settlement by force -- a sign of the revival of pseudo-military (militia) power. In other words, egalitarian social relations at the horizontal level are disrupted for the establishment of commanded relations.

Vertical ties in the context of martial law are, as a whole, hypocritical. The attitudes and behavior of the local population are designed to suit the situation for survival. The experiences during general elections in the military operation zone (DOM) era, in 1992 and 1997, are relevant in this case. Some people participated in a pledge of loyalty to the unitary state, others joined a militia rally with the consent of local Muslim clerics and still others moved as a shield in the siege of Free Aceh Movement (GAM) strongholds.

The current political situation is designed for the Acehnese to be "reeducated" back to the way of thinking during the DOM period (after several years of relative peace/democracy), through mobilization for mass pledges, militia rallies, military raids, and possession of party membership cards (especially for parties affiliated with the military). Such activities are expected to be seen as soldiers' successful attempts to "win the hearts" of the Acehnese. In their entirety, the DOM and martial law political milieus offer nothing new in the general election context except for the local administration's military control.

The general election of 2004 constitutes a political arena for the old, crooked elite and militia. Lists of candidates for the regional representatives council and the provincial legislature reveal many of the old faces from the heyday of the DOM bureaucracy and political parties. Some of the candidates are known as former GAM deserters and/or pro-Jakarta militia leaders. Others are infamous for their flawed social morality. Only a tiny number do not fall into one or more of these categories. Such candidates result from the military administration's deconstruction of democratic groups and the labeling of critical figures as GAM supporters (with all its attendant dangers).

Under this reign of soldiers, it is in fact pointless to link the 2004 election in Aceh with democracy, let alone the connection of this election with conflict transformation in Aceh. The 2004 election's relationship with the upholding of human rights in Aceh is even more remote.

Therefore, instead of asking whether or not the election in Aceh can be seen as a true democratic expression, the only legitimate question that can be asked is: Will the Acehnese participate in such an election with only one type of candidate? The answer is: That will be a 110 percent success, they will go to the polls with all the sincerity that they go to the loyalty rallies, unless the militaristic nationalists foresee some kind of negative reaction and call it off.