Why autonomy is not well received by Papuans

Neles Kebadabi Tebay, The Jakarta Post, Pontifical Urbaniana University, Rome, Italy

Following the death of Theys H. Eluay, a key Papuan independence leader, it remains doubtful whether Papuans will be willing to accept the bill on special autonomy for the province of Irian Jaya (often referred to locally as Papua). When legislators traveled to the regencies of Mimika, Biak and Jayawijaya to promote the bill, local Papuans made their opposition to it abundantly clear.

As many in Papua have said, the main reason for rejecting the bill has been the absence of a genuine dialog between the central government and Papuans.

Since the fall of president Soeharto, an atmosphere of greater openness has prevailed in Indonesia. Papuans have used this atmosphere to press their demands for independence, which they have done through peaceful demonstrations, including by raising the West Papuan flag known as the 'Morning Star'.

In all their demonstrations, the Papuans have demanded and urged the central government to hold a genuine dialog with them. The dialog would be aimed at clarifying the problems and grievances that have been faced by Papuans since the integration of the province with the Republic of Indonesia, establishing the root cause of these problems and determining together how they might be resolved, in a peaceful, democratic and dignified manner.

This demand for a dialog was also put forward during the Second Papua Congress held in Jayapura in May/June 2000.

However, the Papuans' demands have been ignored by the central government, and Jakarta has refused to engage in a genuine dialog.

Instead, the House of Representatives (DPR) has decided to implement what it calls "special autonomy". Rather than inviting the Papuans to discuss the matter peacefully, the government chose to send thousands of members of the elite mobile brigade and Army special forces to various parts of the province, to crack down on the "separatist movement".

Unwilling to determine the root cause of the province's problems, the armed forces have instead chosen to focus on the raising of the Morning Star flag as the province's key security issue. The military and police conducted "clearing operations" throughout Papua, forcibly removing the flag. This continued the tradition of killing, intimidation, torture and terror committed by security personnel against many Papuans under former president Soeharto.

In the absence of dialog prior to the implementation of special autonomy, and in the context of ongoing security operations, many Papuans do not even want to hear the term "autonomy".

If the central government can be likened to a doctor, and Papuans to patients, then Jakarta has made its own decision about the best medicine to 'cure' the Papuans -- special autonomy -- without properly diagnosing the root cause of the illness.

Thus, the problem is not whether to accept or reject the bill on special autonomy. Rather, the fundamental question becomes: Is special autonomy a solution based on a genuine dialog?

The search for any solution needs to be founded on dialog. If special autonomy results from a genuine dialog, then Papuans will welcome the bill by performing their traditional dance.

The second reason for rejecting special autonomy is that many ordinary Papuans have not yet seen the form of the bill or its content.

Papuans will say, "Show us the contents of the bill first". They are afraid of being deceived once again by Jakarta's empty promises following decades of experience. They want to make sure that the bill addresses their suffering and hopes.

Jakartan people have always said, "We will draw our conclusions later"; "We will accommodate your considerations as part of the process"; "We will convey your opinion to the person responsible". But the final decisions have always overlooked the Papuans' aspirations. Jakarta's will has been imposed on the Papuans for years and they have become victims of the central government's policies.

The campaign in support of the bill could even be interpreted as a trick by the legislators in Jakarta. It is like the story of a father who lies to his son: the father decides to buy a goat at the market to celebrate his only son's birthday. But he tells his son that he is going buy a special animal for the celebration, and asks his son what sort of animal he would like.

The son says he wants a sheep. The father agrees. The father asks his son to list some special characteristics that he wants the sheep to have. Having "accommodated the aspirations" of his son, he goes to the market. When the father returns, his son sees that he has bought a goat. The son says, "Father, you agreed to buy a sheep for my birthday. Why did you buy a goat instead?"

The father replies, "I am sorry, my son. First, there were no sheep being sold at the market. Second, your father only had enough money for a goat. So, don't complain. Let's celebrate your birthday by enjoying goat meat". Thus, the son was intentionally deceived by his own father.

The Papuans have now realized that they have been deceived by Jakarta for many years.

Many of them therefore reject the bill, not because Papuans are uneducated, not because they want to destroy the territorial integrity of Indonesia, and not necessarily because they don't like the autonomy being offered. Rather, it is because the solution of special autonomy has not resulted from a genuine dialog between the central government and the Papuans, and because they have yet to see the contents of the bill.

So, are they wrong to reject it? Does their rejection of the bill necessarily make them separatists? If the Papuans reject the bill, who should be blamed?