Who's to blame for the East Timor debacle

By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat

JAKARTA (JP): Some things just bring out the worst in us and in the case of East Timor, everything that could go wrong, did go wrong.

Just as most eagerly blame the evils of the New Order on one man, Soeharto, responsibility for East Timor's tumultuous saga of the past 12 months has been heaped on his successor B.J. Habibie.

Although attention ultimately swung to the post-ballot violence, one has to return to why the decision to allow a referendum giving the option to reject a wide-ranging autonomy within Indonesia was made in the first place.

If the intent was a benevolent one of allowing the East Timorese to determine their future, how did it end up being so destructive?

Perhaps one can conclude that it was the right decision made for the wrong reasons.

Turning the clock back exactly one year, the country was swept up in a period of almost unprecedented "change".

God only knows what Habibie and his aides were thinking about East Timor before the momentous decision was taken, but a letter from Australian Prime Minister John Howard to Habibie dated Dec. 21 and a statement by Australian foreign minister Alexander Downer on Jan. 12, 1999, prodded a policy upheaval which would shake the nation.

Australia made an abrupt change in deciding to withdraw its support for Jakarta's right to East Timor, despite having been one of the first and most steadfast nations in recognizing Indonesia's both de facto and de jure sovereignty over the territory.

Canberra said it preferred an option where an autonomous East Timor remained part of Indonesia, but would back a political settlement that held out the eventual possibility of self- determination.

In short, Australia recognized independence as a long-term option.

East Timorese may one day look at this as a historic turning point which was the catalyst for their independence, but it also set the tone for how Indonesia's top executive and aides perceived Australia's overbearing attitude.

By all accounts, Howard's letter left Habibie irate; then Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas would later say that it made Habibie "mad".

Habibie's close adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar claimed Habibie planned to "release" East Timor from the beginning of his administration. But she conceded that "the letter disappointed the President".

Resentment then became the tone for describing the diplomatic dealings on East Timor.

While experienced government officials were still drafting proposals for the wide-ranging autonomy option, Habibie and his trusted associates were busy grinding their ax in a decision which would chop up the troubled territory.

Exactly a month after Downer made his statement, Habibie on Feb. 11 was already talking of discarding East Timor in one year.

One can only imagine how East Timorese felt as the former scientist described the province as a burden which offered nothing of value.

Habibie callously called the integration of the former Portuguese colony an act of "charity" because the territory was "nothing but rocks", noting that it received an annual budget six times bigger than neighboring East Nusa Tenggara.

"What did they give us? Natural resources? No. Human resources? No. Technology? No. Abundant gold? No. Rocks? Yes!"

Some suggest Habibie may have had ulterior motives in making the decision.

A palace official quoted Habibie as saying that he wanted to leave a historic legacy, with East Timor, long a smear on Indonesia's international reputation, sure to win him recognition.

Many also contended that Habibie's decision to forsake the predominantly Catholic province was related to religion.

Whatever lay behind the announcement, the entire decision process was a complete miscarriage of sound policy making.

Not only was the People's Consultative Assembly, the main legislative body which legally integrated the province through decree No. 6/1978, bypassed, but Alatas was also sidelined.

The man at the forefront in international negotiations on East Timor was informed of the decision only a few days before the official announcement on Jan. 27.

Sources say Habibie consulted a few members of his intimate circle, which included Gen. Wiranto, justice minister Muladi, Secretary of Development Operation (Sesdalopbang) Lt. Gen. (ret.) Sintong Panjaitan and Dewi Fortuna Anwar.

Dewi said Habibie's decisions were often made after meeting with other officials or guests.

Describing her boss' offbeat style, Dewi said "Pak Habibie is a talking and simultaneously a thinking president".

Given the significance of the decision, it might have been wiser if he had done one thing at a time.

Ballot

During negotiations with the United Nations and Portugal, Jakarta initially rejected a vote, arguing that it would spark civil war.

In retrospect, the argument could be interpreted as a warning and a threat.

After much international haggling and the seeming desire of the government to quickly rid itself of a "problem", an agreement for a direct ballot was reached in New York on May 5.

The agreement also stipulated responsibility for the security in the run-up, during and immediately after the ballot with the Indonesian government.

From there the process snowballed.

Whether it was due to the euphoria or negligence, many of the warning signs about an escalation of violence were ignored altogether or received a half-hearted response.

People forgot that it was a winner take all gamble, with one side left with everything to lose. The question was whether the loser would graciously accept defeat.

Even with the almost daily reports of clashes, the United Nations, Portugal and Indonesia did little than express concern about the mounting tension.

Despite having to postpone the original Aug. 8 ballot date twice due to deteriorating security, the United Nations decided to go ahead with the ballot on Aug. 30.

The decision contradicted its profession that there can be no real ballot in a hostile setting.

It appeared Indonesian, UN and foreign diplomats were overly eager to rush headlong into the ballot despite the warning signals before them.

In established democratic systems, referendums are a normal process of decision making. In underdeveloped East Timor, where over half the population is illiterate, the charged emotions made for an explosive situation.

Only a few days before the ballot, then East Timor Military commander Col. Noer Muis warned of a new civil war regardless of the outcome.

"The post-ballot period will be very critical since neither of the two conflicting factions seems able to accept the possibility of defeat. This has been reflected by numerous clashes during the campaigning," he said.

As scheduled, the East Timorese went to the polls on Aug. 30. The world applauded the peaceful ballot, the ominous calm before the storm.

As vote counting began and mounting accusations of cheating were leveled at the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor, tensions boiled over.

With East Timor gripped by fear, the UN on Sept. 4 announced that 344,580 -- 78.5 percent of valid votes cast -- rejected Indonesia's offer for autonomy, and only 94,388, or 21.5 percent, voted in favor.

"The people of East Timor have thus rejected the proposed special autonomy and expressed their wish to begin a process of transition toward independence," UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said.

But there was little celebration on the streets of Dili.

There are many debates about what the Indonesian Military (TNI) should have done to prevent the post-ballot violence.

Of course, it could have done more.

The excuse that military personnel stationed there faced a "psychological obstacle" in cracking down on pro-Jakarta militias is unacceptable.

Although nobody said managing security in East Timor would be easy, why did Jakarta agree to it in the first place if it felt it could not cope?

A UN force may have helped curb violence prior to the ballot, but it too would have had trouble securing support from the opposing East Timorese sides.

On the other hand, TNI faced an insurmountable hurdle in trying to win the trust of the proindependence camp.

As the violence escalated, Indonesia became the target of international recriminations when it initially resisted the presence of a multinational force.

In response to the foreign pressure, most Indonesians were goaded by their national leaders into adopting a jingoistic attitude.

Instead of admitting its mistakes, Indonesia accused the world of biased reporting over the violence, using words like "international conspiracy" to explain the mounting death toll.

Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono aptly called this maneuver "nationalistic jingoism".

In hindsight, many now admit the media glare was overly harsh.

Human rights violations and wanton destruction did occur. Everyone, including the perpetrators themselves, admit militias and TNI were in some way involved. The question is how severe and widespread were the atrocities.

Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo told the world after fleeing Dili that some 10,000 were dead. The world was in an indignant mood toward Indonesia, with Australia and the United States severing military ties with Jakarta as a result.

Most have come to quietly admit that while there was rampant destruction, the death toll was not as high as initially claimed.

In mid-October UN officials said there was no evidence to support allegations of mass murder in East Timor.

"We've heard horrendous stories for which so far there's not a shred of evidence," said Michel Barton, spokesman for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) in Dili.

"There have been murders. There have been terrible things happening here. But we don't believe people in their thousands were killed".

Postscript

East Timor is now opening a new chapter.

East Timorese are embarking on the independence process and soliciting aid, while Indonesia and the UN are in a tug-of-war over allegations and possible legal proceedings of rights abuses involving the military's top brass.

Amid the multitude of complex domestic problems across the archipelago, East Timor is no longer a concern for most Indonesians.

But some still wonder why the East Timorese rejected the autonomy proposal, since any pragmatic calculation would have shown that it made more economic sense to remain with Indonesia.

Facing and answering that question may also help in dealing with other areas of the country clamoring for independence.

Presumably many who voted in East Timor could not grasp what their choices entailed; independence for the mere sake of independence would be the most likely answer.

As political scientist Kusnanto Anggoro pointed out, when one talks about independence, common sense does not prevail. "When we (Indonesia) proclaimed independence in 1945, did we think about those things?"

Those who have seen East Timor up close for many years can understand that the equation is not about economics, politics or independence.

A senior diplomat said: "When the East Timorese vote, their consideration is that if their homeland was independent, they also would be free of ABRI (the Indonesian Military)".

J. Soedjati Djiwandono in his article on East Timor in this paper in September wrote that overall it may be pointless to place blame on any particular leader, government or nation for past mistakes.

"History is a jigsaw puzzle, formed by the complex interaction of innumerable factors and therefore never fully revealed or understood," he said.

"The point is that it has been a learning process for all of us. It is just that some of us learn the right lessons while others the wrong one."