Who's to blame for the East Timor debacle

Who's to blame for the East Timor debacle

By Meidyatama Suryodiningrat

JAKARTA (JP): Some things just bring out the worst in us and
in the case of East Timor, everything that could go wrong, did go
wrong.

Just as most eagerly blame the evils of the New Order on one
man, Soeharto, responsibility for East Timor's tumultuous saga of
the past 12 months has been heaped on his successor B.J. Habibie.

Although attention ultimately swung to the post-ballot
violence, one has to return to why the decision to allow a
referendum giving the option to reject a wide-ranging autonomy
within Indonesia was made in the first place.

If the intent was a benevolent one of allowing the East
Timorese to determine their future, how did it end up being so
destructive?

Perhaps one can conclude that it was the right decision made
for the wrong reasons.

Turning the clock back exactly one year, the country was swept
up in a period of almost unprecedented "change".

God only knows what Habibie and his aides were thinking about
East Timor before the momentous decision was taken, but a letter
from Australian Prime Minister John Howard to Habibie dated Dec.
21 and a statement by Australian foreign minister Alexander
Downer on Jan. 12, 1999, prodded a policy upheaval which would
shake the nation.

Australia made an abrupt change in deciding to withdraw its
support for Jakarta's right to East Timor, despite having been
one of the first and most steadfast nations in recognizing
Indonesia's both de facto and de jure sovereignty over the
territory.

Canberra said it preferred an option where an autonomous East
Timor remained part of Indonesia, but would back a political
settlement that held out the eventual possibility of self-
determination.

In short, Australia recognized independence as a long-term
option.

East Timorese may one day look at this as a historic turning
point which was the catalyst for their independence, but it also
set the tone for how Indonesia's top executive and aides
perceived Australia's overbearing attitude.

By all accounts, Howard's letter left Habibie irate; then
Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas would later say that it
made Habibie "mad".

Habibie's close adviser Dewi Fortuna Anwar claimed Habibie
planned to "release" East Timor from the beginning of his
administration. But she conceded that "the letter disappointed
the President".

Resentment then became the tone for describing the diplomatic
dealings on East Timor.

While experienced government officials were still drafting
proposals for the wide-ranging autonomy option, Habibie and his
trusted associates were busy grinding their ax in a decision
which would chop up the troubled territory.

Exactly a month after Downer made his statement, Habibie on
Feb. 11 was already talking of discarding East Timor in one year.

One can only imagine how East Timorese felt as the former
scientist described the province as a burden which offered
nothing of value.

Habibie callously called the integration of the former
Portuguese colony an act of "charity" because the territory was
"nothing but rocks", noting that it received an annual budget six
times bigger than neighboring East Nusa Tenggara.

"What did they give us? Natural resources? No. Human
resources? No. Technology? No. Abundant gold? No. Rocks? Yes!"

Some suggest Habibie may have had ulterior motives in making
the decision.

A palace official quoted Habibie as saying that he wanted to
leave a historic legacy, with East Timor, long a smear on
Indonesia's international reputation, sure to win him
recognition.

Many also contended that Habibie's decision to forsake the
predominantly Catholic province was related to religion.

Whatever lay behind the announcement, the entire decision
process was a complete miscarriage of sound policy making.

Not only was the People's Consultative Assembly, the main
legislative body which legally integrated the province through
decree No. 6/1978, bypassed, but Alatas was also sidelined.

The man at the forefront in international negotiations on East
Timor was informed of the decision only a few days before the
official announcement on Jan. 27.

Sources say Habibie consulted a few members of his intimate
circle, which included Gen. Wiranto, justice minister Muladi,
Secretary of Development Operation (Sesdalopbang) Lt. Gen. (ret.)
Sintong Panjaitan and Dewi Fortuna Anwar.

Dewi said Habibie's decisions were often made after meeting
with other officials or guests.

Describing her boss' offbeat style, Dewi said "Pak Habibie is
a talking and simultaneously a thinking president".

Given the significance of the decision, it might have been
wiser if he had done one thing at a time.

Ballot

During negotiations with the United Nations and Portugal,
Jakarta initially rejected a vote, arguing that it would spark
civil war.

In retrospect, the argument could be interpreted as a warning
and a threat.

After much international haggling and the seeming desire of
the government to quickly rid itself of a "problem", an agreement
for a direct ballot was reached in New York on May 5.

The agreement also stipulated responsibility for the security
in the run-up, during and immediately after the ballot with the
Indonesian government.

From there the process snowballed.

Whether it was due to the euphoria or negligence, many of the
warning signs about an escalation of violence were ignored
altogether or received a half-hearted response.

People forgot that it was a winner take all gamble, with one
side left with everything to lose. The question was whether the
loser would graciously accept defeat.

Even with the almost daily reports of clashes, the United
Nations, Portugal and Indonesia did little than express concern
about the mounting tension.

Despite having to postpone the original Aug. 8 ballot date
twice due to deteriorating security, the United Nations decided
to go ahead with the ballot on Aug. 30.

The decision contradicted its profession that there can be no
real ballot in a hostile setting.

It appeared Indonesian, UN and foreign diplomats were overly
eager to rush headlong into the ballot despite the warning
signals before them.

In established democratic systems, referendums are a normal
process of decision making. In underdeveloped East Timor, where
over half the population is illiterate, the charged emotions made
for an explosive situation.

Only a few days before the ballot, then East Timor Military
commander Col. Noer Muis warned of a new civil war regardless of
the outcome.

"The post-ballot period will be very critical since neither of
the two conflicting factions seems able to accept the possibility
of defeat. This has been reflected by numerous clashes during the
campaigning," he said.

As scheduled, the East Timorese went to the polls on Aug. 30.
The world applauded the peaceful ballot, the ominous calm before
the storm.

As vote counting began and mounting accusations of cheating
were leveled at the UN Assistance Mission in East Timor, tensions
boiled over.

With East Timor gripped by fear, the UN on Sept. 4 announced
that 344,580 -- 78.5 percent of valid votes cast -- rejected
Indonesia's offer for autonomy, and only 94,388, or 21.5 percent,
voted in favor.

"The people of East Timor have thus rejected the proposed
special autonomy and expressed their wish to begin a process of
transition toward independence," UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan
said.

But there was little celebration on the streets of Dili.

There are many debates about what the Indonesian Military
(TNI) should have done to prevent the post-ballot violence.

Of course, it could have done more.

The excuse that military personnel stationed there faced a
"psychological obstacle" in cracking down on pro-Jakarta militias
is unacceptable.

Although nobody said managing security in East Timor would be
easy, why did Jakarta agree to it in the first place if it felt
it could not cope?

A UN force may have helped curb violence prior to the ballot,
but it too would have had trouble securing support from the
opposing East Timorese sides.

On the other hand, TNI faced an insurmountable hurdle in
trying to win the trust of the proindependence camp.

As the violence escalated, Indonesia became the target of
international recriminations when it initially resisted the
presence of a multinational force.

In response to the foreign pressure, most Indonesians were
goaded by their national leaders into adopting a jingoistic
attitude.

Instead of admitting its mistakes, Indonesia accused the world
of biased reporting over the violence, using words like
"international conspiracy" to explain the mounting death toll.

Political analyst J. Soedjati Djiwandono aptly called this
maneuver "nationalistic jingoism".

In hindsight, many now admit the media glare was overly harsh.

Human rights violations and wanton destruction did occur.
Everyone, including the perpetrators themselves, admit militias
and TNI were in some way involved. The question is how severe and
widespread were the atrocities.

Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo told the world after fleeing
Dili that some 10,000 were dead. The world was in an indignant
mood toward Indonesia, with Australia and the United States
severing military ties with Jakarta as a result.

Most have come to quietly admit that while there was rampant
destruction, the death toll was not as high as initially claimed.

In mid-October UN officials said there was no evidence to
support allegations of mass murder in East Timor.

"We've heard horrendous stories for which so far there's not a
shred of evidence," said Michel Barton, spokesman for the UN
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) in
Dili.

"There have been murders. There have been terrible things
happening here. But we don't believe people in their thousands
were killed".

Postscript

East Timor is now opening a new chapter.

East Timorese are embarking on the independence process and
soliciting aid, while Indonesia and the UN are in a tug-of-war
over allegations and possible legal proceedings of rights abuses
involving the military's top brass.

Amid the multitude of complex domestic problems across the
archipelago, East Timor is no longer a concern for most
Indonesians.

But some still wonder why the East Timorese rejected the
autonomy proposal, since any pragmatic calculation would have
shown that it made more economic sense to remain with Indonesia.

Facing and answering that question may also help in dealing
with other areas of the country clamoring for independence.

Presumably many who voted in East Timor could not grasp what
their choices entailed; independence for the mere sake of
independence would be the most likely answer.

As political scientist Kusnanto Anggoro pointed out, when one
talks about independence, common sense does not prevail. "When we
(Indonesia) proclaimed independence in 1945, did we think about
those things?"

Those who have seen East Timor up close for many years can
understand that the equation is not about economics, politics or
independence.

A senior diplomat said: "When the East Timorese vote, their
consideration is that if their homeland was independent, they
also would be free of ABRI (the Indonesian Military)".

J. Soedjati Djiwandono in his article on East Timor in this
paper in September wrote that overall it may be pointless to
place blame on any particular leader, government or nation for
past mistakes.

"History is a jigsaw puzzle, formed by the complex interaction
of innumerable factors and therefore never fully revealed or
understood," he said.

"The point is that it has been a learning process for all of
us. It is just that some of us learn the right lessons while
others the wrong one."