Who's in charge here?

The unexpected turn of events in East Timor has put President B.J. Habibie's political future on the line. Not only is he facing a barrage of criticisms for his administration's failure in preventing violence in East Timor, but he is also coming under strong pressure on the domestic front, including from within his own Cabinet, the military and Golkar Party, as well as his political opponents.

This condition partly explains why Jakarta was abuzz with rumors of his impending resignation all day on Wednesday. They only receded after Gen. Wiranto, the minister of defense and security-cum-chief of the Indonesian Military (TNI), denied them later in the day. Habibie appeared to have lost the initiative, at least as far as East Timor policy is concerned. On Tuesday, he declared martial law in East Timor although the proposal, which originated from Wiranto, had been rejected by his own Cabinet and the House of Representatives a day earlier. Then on Wednesday, he canceled his out-of-town engagements for the next few days, including the summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Auckland this weekend.

Although the rumors of his resignation, or a military take over, have been denied, the events of the past few days left a deep impression that Habibie's wings have been clipped, especially on the question of East Timor. Abroad, he is blamed for the violence in East Timor. At home, he is more criticized for letting the ballot proceed and then consequently losing it. Under an agreement his administration signed with the United Nations, Indonesia will have to let go of the territory which it annexed 23 years ago at a huge cost in terms of lives and money.

Essentially, Habibie is being blamed for everything that has happened, and about to happen in East Timor. Politically, the fallout from the East Timor explosion may yet finish him off. Habibie, who stepped into Soeharto's shoes in May last year, has governed the nation with weak legitimacy and with his credibility constantly undermined by his own actions. His chances of retaining the presidency in November must surely be diminished now. East Timor adds to a long list of failures that makes him an unlikely serious presidential candidate.

In other cases where he failed -- the violence in Ambon and Aceh, the corruption investigation of Soeharto and the Bank Bali scandal to name just a few of the big ones -- he relied on the support of Golkar, TNI or the House of Representatives. In facing the East Timor fallout, he is virtually alone. But then, it was Habibie who made East Timor his personal policy when in January he reversed Indonesia's 23-year policy and offered East Timorese the option of a self-determination vote. This policy came with little consultation beyond his closest aides. The military and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two institutions most involved in East Timor, were only brought in at a very late stage of the policy discussion.

The East Timor reversal policy won Habibie international acclaims at the time, and it set him apart from his predecessor- and-political mentor Soeharto. His close aides never tirelessly touted East Timor among the breakthroughs that should make him a "reformist". If it was not for the violence which erupted in East Timor after the Aug. 30 ballot, his international standing would surely rise, and this, in turn, would boost his chances in the November presidential election. Alas, this is not the case. East Timor was Habibie's personal gambit which did not pay off. He now has to pay the heavy price.

The German-trained aircraft engineer naively overestimated his own power, and underestimated the institutions around him that could provide him with the political support. When he offered East Timorese the chance to determine their own future, he overlooked the constitutional process: such a decision must come from the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). He failed to foresee the strong resistance from within the military against his decision to let the ballot in East Timor, and to risk losing the territory for which many soldiers gave up their lives. Habibie is no Soeharto, who almost always had his way because he controlled the MPR and the military.

Now politicians of all colors are only too happy to seize the opportunity to attack Habibie, even as he faces a grave crisis with all the international criticisms over East Timor. The Golkar Party is expected to review its nomination of Habibie as its presidential candidate. It would surprise no one if cabinet members began keeping their distance from him. His presidential accountability report must also stand little chance of being accepted by the MPR in November.

Habibie's days are virtually numbered. Even if he remains in charge of the government until November, he will find the going even rougher as he will rule with even less credibility than he had before. Whatever happens now, Indonesia is entering a new period of uncertainty, with the disturbing question: Who is really in charge of the country now?