Who's in charge here?

Who's in charge here?

The unexpected turn of events in East Timor has put President
B.J. Habibie's political future on the line. Not only is he
facing a barrage of criticisms for his administration's failure
in preventing violence in East Timor, but he is also coming under
strong pressure on the domestic front, including from within his
own Cabinet, the military and Golkar Party, as well as his
political opponents.

This condition partly explains why Jakarta was abuzz with
rumors of his impending resignation all day on Wednesday. They
only receded after Gen. Wiranto, the minister of defense and
security-cum-chief of the Indonesian Military (TNI), denied them
later in the day. Habibie appeared to have lost the initiative,
at least as far as East Timor policy is concerned. On Tuesday, he
declared martial law in East Timor although the proposal, which
originated from Wiranto, had been rejected by his own Cabinet and
the House of Representatives a day earlier. Then on Wednesday, he
canceled his out-of-town engagements for the next few days,
including the summit of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum in Auckland this weekend.

Although the rumors of his resignation, or a military take
over, have been denied, the events of the past few days left a
deep impression that Habibie's wings have been clipped,
especially on the question of East Timor. Abroad, he is blamed
for the violence in East Timor. At home, he is more criticized
for letting the ballot proceed and then consequently losing it.
Under an agreement his administration signed with the United
Nations, Indonesia will have to let go of the territory which it
annexed 23 years ago at a huge cost in terms of lives and money.

Essentially, Habibie is being blamed for everything that has
happened, and about to happen in East Timor. Politically, the
fallout from the East Timor explosion may yet finish him off.
Habibie, who stepped into Soeharto's shoes in May last year, has
governed the nation with weak legitimacy and with his credibility
constantly undermined by his own actions. His chances of
retaining the presidency in November must surely be diminished
now. East Timor adds to a long list of failures that makes him an
unlikely serious presidential candidate.

In other cases where he failed -- the violence in Ambon and
Aceh, the corruption investigation of Soeharto and the Bank Bali
scandal to name just a few of the big ones -- he relied on the
support of Golkar, TNI or the House of Representatives. In facing
the East Timor fallout, he is virtually alone. But then, it was
Habibie who made East Timor his personal policy when in January
he reversed Indonesia's 23-year policy and offered East Timorese
the option of a self-determination vote. This policy came with
little consultation beyond his closest aides. The military and
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, two institutions most involved
in East Timor, were only brought in at a very late stage of the
policy discussion.

The East Timor reversal policy won Habibie international
acclaims at the time, and it set him apart from his predecessor-
and-political mentor Soeharto. His close aides never tirelessly
touted East Timor among the breakthroughs that should make him a
"reformist". If it was not for the violence which erupted in East
Timor after the Aug. 30 ballot, his international standing would
surely rise, and this, in turn, would boost his chances in the
November presidential election. Alas, this is not the case. East
Timor was Habibie's personal gambit which did not pay off. He now
has to pay the heavy price.

The German-trained aircraft engineer naively overestimated his
own power, and underestimated the institutions around him that
could provide him with the political support. When he offered
East Timorese the chance to determine their own future, he
overlooked the constitutional process: such a decision must come
from the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). He failed to
foresee the strong resistance from within the military against
his decision to let the ballot in East Timor, and to risk losing
the territory for which many soldiers gave up their lives.
Habibie is no Soeharto, who almost always had his way because he
controlled the MPR and the military.

Now politicians of all colors are only too happy to seize the
opportunity to attack Habibie, even as he faces a grave crisis
with all the international criticisms over East Timor. The Golkar
Party is expected to review its nomination of Habibie as its
presidential candidate. It would surprise no one if cabinet
members began keeping their distance from him. His presidential
accountability report must also stand little chance of being
accepted by the MPR in November.

Habibie's days are virtually numbered. Even if he remains in
charge of the government until November, he will find the going
even rougher as he will rule with even less credibility than he
had before. Whatever happens now, Indonesia is entering a new
period of uncertainty, with the disturbing question: Who is
really in charge of the country now?