Who wrote the proclamation of independence text?

By Hermawan Sulistyo

PHOENIX, Arizona, U.S.A. (JP): It has never been clear who actually wrote the draft of the text of the proclamation of independence in 1945. All leaders involved in the drafting of the text claimed that they contributed more than the others to the wording.

The flow of events started, when, on Aug. 15, 1945, Japan surrendered to the Allies. The news hardly reached the nationalist leaders because listening to the radio, except for the government's station, was prohibited.

But Sutan Sjahrir (later to become the first prime minister), who operated his own illegal radio, heard the news. Not long after, he went to inform Sukarno and Hatta, but both hesitated because they had just arrived back from Dalat, Vietnam, to have a "conference" with the Japanese authority.

Sjahrir urged them to seize the chance during a period of vacuum of power -- Japan had surrendered, while the Allies had not arrived -- to proclaim independence. Sjahrir, never being a collaborator during the Japanese occupation, believed that they should declare independence without delay, in order to avoid an impression in the West that Indonesian independence was a gift from Japan.

But being hesitant about the news, and the situation in general, Sukarno refused. His reason was that he did not want to do so without consulting other members of the Preparatory Committee for the Independence of Indonesia. Sukarno's refusal is understandable since it was dangerous to proclaim independence while the Japanese still held their armaments, and he wanted to have wide support before doing so.

Meanwhile, the news about Japan's surrender spread among the society, especially among the youth. Some youth in Jakarta, led by Sukarni and Wikana, insisted Sukarno proclaim independence. Failing to convince Sukarno and Hatta, they decided to take their own action.

On the night of Aug. 15, they kidnapped both leaders and kept them under house "detention" in Rengasdengklok, several miles from Jakarta.

Considering the fact that Rengasdengklok was not a strategic place from which to proclaim independence -- and partly because of the role of Ahmad Subardjo, a prominent collaborator during the Japanese occupation (later becoming minister of foreign affairs), who had a personal link with the youth through his aides -- the kidnappers released the two leaders on the night of Aug. 16.

Sukarno and Hatta asked to see the Army Commander concerning the request for an immediate proclamation. Being refused, they went to see Rear Admiral Maeda, the Navy liaison officer stationed in Jakarta.

Maeda offered his house as the meeting place for members of the Preparatory Committee for Independence.

During the meeting, the youths urged the elder nationalist leaders to proclaim independence without any sign of cooperation or help from the Japanese. After a hotly contested debate, it was decided that the text of proclamation would be read early the next morning by Sukarno and Hatta, as the representatives of the Indonesian people.

Participants of this meeting, held prior to the reading of the proclamation, did not agree on how far they contributions were.

Hatta's testimony in Sekitar Proklamasi (About the Proclamation, 1969) and quoted in C.L.M Penders' Mohammad Hatta: Indonesian Patriot, Memoir (1981), clarifies that he was the one who actually wrote the text, after being asked by Sukarno himself. Of his literary skills, Hatta writes, "I replied that it would be best if I dictated it and that everybody write it down. Everyone agreed that the first sentence should be taken from the end of the third line of the draft Preamble to the Constitution, which spoke about the Proclamation... Then I dedicated the following sentence... "

According to Sukarno, as quoted in Cindy Adam's Sukarno: An Autobiography as Told to Cindy Adams (1965),"The actual words were scribbled on a torn piece of paper. Somebody located a pad with the blue lines on it, such as are in the children's lesson books. I ripped out a sheet and with my own hand wrote lengthwise across the blue lines."

It should be noted, however, that this autobiography incited strong reactions from many leaders, including Hatta himself and Gatot Mangkuprodjo. Yet, Sukarno's claim is now widely accepted, since the original text was in his handwriting.

Ahmad Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, one of the most important figures with a link to the youth, wrote differently. In his autobiography, Kesadaran Nasional: Sebuah Otobiography (National Consciousness: an Autobiography, 1978), he claimed that he himself wrote the text, based on his recollection of the text in Piagam Jakarta (the Jakarta Charter).

The fact that the original text is in Sukarno's handwriting did not discourage Ahmad Subardjo from asserting that he was chosen as the principal actor in the wording of the text since everyone else acknowledged his strong memory.

Unconfirmed sources also mention Sayuti Melik's contribution to the wording, since he was the person who typed up Sukarno's handwritten text. Melik was then another youth leader.

Similar to the historical problem of determining who was involved and how far their involvement in the wording of the text of the proclamation went, there is also a debate over the meeting itself.

For example, how much were the Japanese actually involved in the arrangement of the meeting and the drafting of the text?

Nishijima Shigetada, the most prominent Japanese figure leaning to the Indonesian side, declared in his memoirs, which are republished in Anthony Reid and Oki Akira's The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected memoirs of 1942-1945 (1986), that at least two Japanese officials were present and were even involved in the debate during the meeting.

The confusion partly stemmed from the fact that there were two groupings of the time. First, a meeting of all the participants in the Maeda's living room. Second, a small group selected from the larger group. This smaller group was the drafter of the text.

Benedict Anderson, a noted Indonesianist, in his Java in a Time of Revolution: Occupation and Resistance, 1944-1946 ( 1972) even states that "Maeda, Sukarno, Hatta, Nishijima, Subardjo, Miyoshi and Yoshizumi then retired into the Admiral's study to work out the actual wording of the proclamation."

Anderson does not cite any source for this information; I cannot find sources of similar statements on the involvement of these Japanese.

Japanese involvement in the meeting, let alone the wording of the proclamation, was strongly denied by other Indonesians present at the meeting.

Adam Malik, who was then a prominent youth leader of a left wing faction, and later became vice president in the peak of his political career, refuted the claim by saying in his memoirs that, "When the proclamation was signed, and when the meeting at Oranje Boulevard was held, there were no Japanese listening or present." (Mengabdi Republik, or Serving the Republic, 1978). No other Indonesian source mentioned the involvement of any Japanese at the meeting. By contrast, all Japanese sources mention their involvement.

High political tension, stress and fatigue among the participants of the time, added by fading memories and even personal interest of the actors in the later years, all played a role in contributing to the confusion and claims for the wording of the proclamation.

It is now impossible to reconstruct the events because all participants (except the Japanese) have passed away; even when they were still alive, it was impossible to conduct any research on this particular issue.

The writer is a fellow with the Program for Southeast Asian Studies, Arizona State University, U.S.A.