Who started the fire?

You did not have to be military intelligence to foresee last week's violence in the streets of Jakarta. The writing has been on the wall since the Indonesian Military (TNI), ignoring mounting public opposition, virtually coerced the House of Representatives to endorse the state security bill before it ended its session on Sep. 24. TNI was testing the will of the bill's opponents, who had no other recourse but take their battle to the streets. The House's insensitivity to public opinion has left the people no proper, less confrontational channels through which to pursue their objections.

Clashes between opponents of the bill, represented by students, and the main sponsors of the bill, in this case TNI, were inevitable. The students were as determined as the military to have their way. Both appeared ready for battle. Students came armed with Molotov cocktails, and the National Police, still an organ of TNI rather than the state, were deployed in full force to check the students. In retrospect, violence could have been avoided and lives and property spared if only one of the groups had backed down.

This was a near replica of the November 1998 clashes between students and ABRI, as TNI was then known. In this episode of violence, students attempted to march to the House to press for greater reform at a faster pace than the People's Consultative Assembly, which was holding a Special Session, was willing to adopt. Layer upon layer of armed security forces confronted the students. Like last week, clashes and the resulting casualties were inevitable.

Both incidents took place near the Semanggi flyover, the nearest the students could get to the House. Like the House last week, the Assembly ignored the students and endorsed the gradual approach to reform preferred by the ruling Golkar Party and the military. Events since November proved the skeptics right in their belief this gradualist approach was simply an effort on the part of Golkar and the military to buy time to consolidate their respective positions, which were increasingly being threatened.

The authorities, in this case TNI and the National Police, not only failed to investigate and resolve the earlier violence at the Semanggi flyover, they also failed to learn any lessons from the event. While we leave it to the military and the police to come to terms with their mistakes, the biggest lesson the latest Semanggi violence taught us is that we need to speed up the process of removing TNI from politics altogether.

Ending the military's political role was on the agenda when the students launched the reformasi movement in early 1998 to bring president Soeharto down. When they succeeded in forcing Soeharto to resign in May of last year, they pressed on with their demand that the military's dual sociopolitical role end. But reform leaders -- Megawati Soekarnoputri, Abdurrahman Wahid and Amien Rais -- in keeping with the reality of the military's power, gave five to six years to phase the military out of politics.

The military, in response to public criticism, introduced a new paradigm and scaled back its involvement in politics, at least at the lower levels. At the top levels of politics, however, TNI is very much involved in the current power struggle. TNI has also been consolidating its power. Its 38 seats in the House are powerful bargaining chips in light of the failure of any one political party to win outright the June general election and the division among reformist parties over the formation of a new government. And with B.J. Habibie becoming a lame duck President after the East Timor debacle earlier this month, real power has shifted from him to TNI Commander Gen. Wiranto.

Events over the past few weeks have confirmed public suspicion about who is really calling the shots in Bina Graha presidential office. First there was the declaration of a state of emergency in East Timor, and now there is the government's strong-arming the House into endorsing the state security bill, which when enacted will give the president and the military immense power. With this new legislation nicely tucked in his pocket, the stage is open for Wiranto, not Habibie, to push the agenda of his choosing. Let us not forget that while the next government will be elected in November, it will not assume power until Jan. 1. A lot of things could happen during this time.

It came as no surprise that the announcement that the President would delay signing the new bill into law came from Wiranto's office rather than Habibie's. The reason cited for the delay, to "familiarize" the ignorant public with the virtues of the new legislation, was patronizing and an insult to the intelligence of opponents of the bill.

If TNI was so concerned about the public's understanding of the legislation, it would have allowed a public debate of the bill instead of rushing it through the House.

In defending the military's dual function, TNI officers have often said they could not see themselves playing the role of firefighters. Politics, in their eyes, is too precious to be left entirely to unruly politicians. Through its political role, they argue that TNI is able to play an active part in promoting stability and prosperity in the country.

Events over the past year, however, have proved the military has become too much of a political player. Rather than extinguishing fires, it has been starting its own, East Timor and last week's violence two cases in point. Which begs the question: If the firemen become arsonists, who will put out the fires?