Who started the fire?

Who started the fire?

You did not have to be military intelligence to foresee last
week's violence in the streets of Jakarta. The writing has been
on the wall since the Indonesian Military (TNI), ignoring
mounting public opposition, virtually coerced the House of
Representatives to endorse the state security bill before it
ended its session on Sep. 24. TNI was testing the will of the
bill's opponents, who had no other recourse but take their battle
to the streets. The House's insensitivity to public opinion has
left the people no proper, less confrontational channels through
which to pursue their objections.

Clashes between opponents of the bill, represented by
students, and the main sponsors of the bill, in this case TNI,
were inevitable. The students were as determined as the military
to have their way. Both appeared ready for battle. Students came
armed with Molotov cocktails, and the National Police, still an
organ of TNI rather than the state, were deployed
in full force to check the students. In retrospect, violence
could have been avoided and lives and property spared if only one
of the groups had backed down.

This was a near replica of the November 1998 clashes between
students and ABRI, as TNI was then known. In this episode of
violence, students attempted to march to the House to press for
greater reform at a faster pace than the People's Consultative
Assembly, which was holding a Special Session, was willing to
adopt. Layer upon layer of armed security forces confronted the
students. Like last week, clashes and the resulting casualties
were inevitable.

Both incidents took place near the Semanggi flyover, the
nearest the students could get to the House. Like the House last
week, the Assembly ignored the students and endorsed the gradual
approach to reform preferred by the ruling Golkar Party and the
military. Events since November proved the skeptics right in
their belief this gradualist approach was simply an effort on the
part of Golkar and the military to buy time to consolidate their
respective positions, which were increasingly being threatened.

The authorities, in this case TNI and the National Police, not
only failed to investigate and resolve the earlier violence at
the Semanggi flyover, they also failed to learn any lessons from
the event. While we leave it to the military and the police to
come to terms with their mistakes, the biggest lesson the latest
Semanggi violence taught us is that we need to speed up the
process of removing TNI from politics altogether.

Ending the military's political role was on the agenda when
the students launched the reformasi movement in early 1998 to
bring president Soeharto down. When they succeeded in forcing
Soeharto to resign in May of last year, they pressed on with
their demand that the military's dual sociopolitical role end.
But reform leaders -- Megawati Soekarnoputri, Abdurrahman
Wahid and Amien Rais -- in keeping with the reality of the
military's power, gave five to six years to phase the military
out of politics.

The military, in response to public criticism, introduced a
new paradigm and scaled back its involvement in politics, at
least at the lower levels. At the top levels of politics,
however, TNI is very much involved in the current power struggle.
TNI has also been consolidating its power. Its 38 seats in the
House are powerful bargaining chips in light of the failure of
any one political party to win outright the June general election
and the division among reformist parties over the formation of a
new government. And with B.J. Habibie becoming a lame duck
President after the East Timor debacle earlier this month, real
power has shifted from him to TNI Commander Gen. Wiranto.

Events over the past few weeks have confirmed public
suspicion about who is really calling the shots in Bina Graha
presidential office. First there was the declaration of a state
of emergency in East Timor, and now there is the government's
strong-arming the House into endorsing the state security bill,
which when enacted will give the president and the military
immense power. With this new legislation nicely tucked in his
pocket, the stage is open for Wiranto, not Habibie, to push the
agenda of his choosing. Let us not forget that while the next
government will be elected in November, it will not assume power
until Jan. 1. A lot of things could happen during this time.

It came as no surprise that the announcement that the
President would delay signing the new bill into law came from
Wiranto's office rather than Habibie's. The reason cited for the
delay, to "familiarize" the ignorant public with the virtues of
the new legislation, was patronizing and an insult to the
intelligence of opponents of the bill.

If TNI was so concerned about the public's understanding of
the legislation, it would have allowed a public debate of the
bill instead of rushing it through the House.

In defending the military's dual function, TNI officers have
often said they could not see themselves playing the role of
firefighters. Politics, in their eyes, is too precious to be left
entirely to unruly politicians. Through its political role, they
argue that TNI is able to play an active part in promoting
stability and prosperity in the country.

Events over the past year, however, have proved the military
has become too much of a political player. Rather than
extinguishing fires, it has been starting its own, East Timor and
last week's violence two cases in point. Which begs the question:
If the firemen become arsonists, who will put out the fires?