Where did Indonesia go wrong?

The following is the first of two articles by Olle Tornquist, professor of political science and development research at the University of Oslo.

OSLO, Norway (JP): Not so long ago, Indonesian democratization seemed impossible. But the old theories that modernization is insufficient, or international dependency too extensive, have largely been abandoned.

The efforts at rapid modernization (as in Indonesia), and extreme independence (as in Cambodia) mainly produced authoritarianism. And the third wave of democracy reached several parts of the developing world anyway.

So while the deterministic schools of thought proved wrong, a new idealist post cold war truth was born: the possibility to craft instant democracies, no matter what the conditions, by the introduction of internationally sponsored minimum human rights, free and fair elections, and "good governance".

And that is what finally was attempted in Indonesia as well, from late May 1998, as the west and major parts of the domestic elite suddenly changed their loyalties and realized that the lack of legitimate governance was the root cause of the crisis.

So when the economists had failed by "getting the prices right" (ironically even triggering the end game by the reduction of subsidies on May 4), somewhat softer colleagues were then parachuted to also "put the institutions right".

Within a year or two, it was argued, Indonesia would thus be put on the right track by the combination of, on one hand, economic and financial reconstruction, and on the other hand, the engineering of "appropriate" governance, decentralization, civil societies, and rights, and liberties -- as a basis for free and fair elections, plus pacts among "moderate incumbents and realistic reformers".

What went wrong? Why may now the historical chance to sustain the rise of the world's third largest democracy end in a similarly historical failure? Let us make a brief summary of the major factors involved and draw the general conclusions.

First, it was not the development of modernization but a political crisis of despotic liberalism (the symbiosis between political monopolization and economic liberalization) that gave birth to Indonesia's new democracy.

Hence, the space was limited even for the combination of elitist political pacts and the idea of "letting the economy take care of itself". This may make sense (irrespective of political turmoil) in less politically dominated economies, but not in Indonesia.

Rather, the institutions crumbled and there were few independent and forceful actors that could take command and propel change; economically, administratively, politically. The democracy movement had been suppressed for decades, and business could either escape or was as dependent on political patronage as ever.

Formally liberal politics became a battlefield for increasingly scattered, privatized, and localized military, administrative, and economic interests (like now over Gus Dur's presidency).

There was a shift from centralized corruption, where the repressive godfather put some limitations to promote his own high returns, to a laissez faire regime -- without alternative democratic coordination -- where it is perfectly rational for symbiotic political, economic and military leaders to instantly grab and extract as much as possible.

Even the enlightened establishment thesis of the need to first promote "rule of law" and "good governance" was out of context. For when a constitutional rechtstaat (state of law) does not precede popular sovereignty, as it did in western Europe through rather authoritarian state and bourgeois measures, we either have to say (as many supporters of Asian developmental states used to do) that time is not yet ripe for democracy -- or discuss what social, economic, and political forces would simultaneously be able to enforce constitutionalism and democracy.

And this is not even addressed by World Bank proponents of "good governance". So while the determinists were right in stressing the insufficient preconditions for democracy, the idealists had a point in saying that one should not miss the chance to promote it anyway.

But to craft democracy by only betting, then, on elementary institutions, civil and political rights, plus national elections, within a vacuum of supportive mechanisms, forces, and organizations -- that was doomed to fail.

Second, therefore, let us go beyond both the deterministic and the idealist elite perspectives and consider instead democratization from the level of the citizens, the ones that are supposed to be equals and control public affairs.

Many say that this is unrealistic and a waste of time. But the same argument caused most experts to neglect basic conflicts, hidden opposition, and the potential for democracy already during Soeharto's rule.

So why should we repeat the same mistake now? Rather, let us simply start with the basic questions about the substance and scope of the four fundamental prerequisites and instruments that most scholars, including of democratic audits, agree are necessary to develop if the principles of democracy (popular control and political equality regarding collective binding decisions) shall be real.

(1) Free and fair elections: The country's most severe problems turned non-issues in elections that avoided the basic local level. Only the military, political, and religious elite with old organizations and loyalties stood a fair chance. The pro-democratic movement and the students in particular were marginalized.

There was neither space for local parties in local elections or for new popular organizations and parties based on interests and societal ideas. Worse: major foreign democracy-makers did little to alter the picture.

(2) Open and accountable government (which also require independent public knowledge, movement, organization, and government responsiveness to public opinion): Aside from informal contacts and networks, much of state and politics remains closed for those who thus lost out, and has often turned non-operative and disintegrated in the process of fragmentation and localization of power.

Boss politicians have taken over -- brokering religious and ethnic leaders with mass following, businessmen and administrators with resources, and military and militias with muscles.

While pro-democratic NGOs are comparatively well funded but atomized, the new attempts at popular organizations and parties are poor and fragmented. Beyond the limited elections, there are few chances for people to influence the system other than to return to informal contacts or resort to lobbying or pressure politics.

Worse (again): this is partly nourished by foreign support, limited as it usually is to urban elite circles with good international connections.

Priority is given precisely to watch and lobby groups, not to the universal accepted need for mass based popular organization to enforce open and accountable government.

Ironically, even the organization of the foreign support itself is a good illustration of lack of transparency and accountability, at least in relation to those who matter (and are supposed to learn from foreign experiences) -- the Indonesian population in general and the pro-democracy movement in particular.

Furthermore, the decisive public sphere that had evolved among pro-democrats during the struggle against authoritarianism has been difficult to expand locally and to ordinary people, especially when abandoned by foreign democracy-makers that bet instead on their own non government organizations (NGOs) and consultants.

Hence, speculative media has filled most of the empty "liberal" spaces.

(3) Civil and political rights: The liberalization of civil and political life is vital and a relative success, but remains of limited significance for major parts of the population.

Political violence is localized, semi-privatized, and nourished by instigation and manipulation of ethnic and religious loyalties. The lack of social and cultural rights is part of the problem.

This became established state policy already during the massacres in the mid-1960s but is no longer controlled by a supreme godfather. Truth and justice is a precondition for reconciliation but primarily a topic for NGO seminars.

(4) A reasonably democratic society for citizens to be sufficiently self-confident: The elements of a democratic culture, and the interest and ideology-based popular organizing, that grew out of the struggle for freedom and national liberation, have been thoroughly undermined by decades of "floating mass politics" and boosting of feudal-like customs.

In fact it has even affected the pro-democracy movement which continue to suffer from divisive elitism (nourished by equally elitist and divisive foreign support), while many people have to weather the crisis before they can make use of the new democratic options.