Where did Indonesia go wrong?

Where did Indonesia go wrong?

The following is the first of two articles by Olle Tornquist,
professor of political science and development research at the
University of Oslo.

OSLO, Norway (JP): Not so long ago, Indonesian democratization
seemed impossible. But the old theories that modernization is
insufficient, or international dependency too extensive, have
largely been abandoned.

The efforts at rapid modernization (as in Indonesia), and
extreme independence (as in Cambodia) mainly produced
authoritarianism. And the third wave of democracy reached several
parts of the developing world anyway.

So while the deterministic schools of thought proved wrong, a
new idealist post cold war truth was born: the possibility to
craft instant democracies, no matter what the conditions, by the
introduction of internationally sponsored minimum human rights,
free and fair elections, and "good governance".

And that is what finally was attempted in Indonesia as well,
from late May 1998, as the west and major parts of the domestic
elite suddenly changed their loyalties and realized that the lack
of legitimate governance was the root cause of the crisis.

So when the economists had failed by "getting the prices
right" (ironically even triggering the end game by the reduction
of subsidies on May 4), somewhat softer colleagues were then
parachuted to also "put the institutions right".

Within a year or two, it was argued, Indonesia would thus be
put on the right track by the combination of, on one hand,
economic and financial reconstruction, and on the other hand, the
engineering of "appropriate" governance, decentralization, civil
societies, and rights, and liberties -- as a basis for free and
fair elections, plus pacts among "moderate incumbents and
realistic reformers".

What went wrong? Why may now the historical chance to sustain
the rise of the world's third largest democracy end in a
similarly historical failure? Let us make a brief summary of the
major factors involved and draw the general conclusions.

First, it was not the development of modernization but a
political crisis of despotic liberalism (the symbiosis between
political monopolization and economic liberalization) that gave
birth to Indonesia's new democracy.

Hence, the space was limited even for the combination of
elitist political pacts and the idea of "letting the economy take
care of itself". This may make sense (irrespective of political
turmoil) in less politically dominated economies, but not in
Indonesia.

Rather, the institutions crumbled and there were few
independent and forceful actors that could take command and
propel change; economically, administratively, politically. The
democracy movement had been suppressed for decades, and business
could either escape or was as dependent on political patronage as
ever.

Formally liberal politics became a battlefield for
increasingly scattered, privatized, and localized military,
administrative, and economic interests (like now over Gus Dur's
presidency).

There was a shift from centralized corruption, where the
repressive godfather put some limitations to promote his own high
returns, to a laissez faire regime -- without alternative
democratic coordination -- where it is perfectly rational for
symbiotic political, economic and military leaders to instantly
grab and extract as much as possible.

Even the enlightened establishment thesis of the need to first
promote "rule of law" and "good governance" was out of context.
For when a constitutional rechtstaat (state of law) does not
precede popular sovereignty, as it did in western Europe through
rather authoritarian state and bourgeois measures, we either have
to say (as many supporters of Asian developmental states used to
do) that time is not yet ripe for democracy -- or discuss what
social, economic, and political forces would simultaneously be
able to enforce constitutionalism and democracy.

And this is not even addressed by World Bank proponents of
"good governance". So while the determinists were right in
stressing the insufficient preconditions for democracy, the
idealists had a point in saying that one should not miss the
chance to promote it anyway.

But to craft democracy by only betting, then, on elementary
institutions, civil and political rights, plus national
elections, within a vacuum of supportive mechanisms, forces, and
organizations -- that was doomed to fail.

Second, therefore, let us go beyond both the deterministic and
the idealist elite perspectives and consider instead
democratization from the level of the citizens, the ones that are
supposed to be equals and control public affairs.

Many say that this is unrealistic and a waste of time. But the
same argument caused most experts to neglect basic conflicts,
hidden opposition, and the potential for democracy already during
Soeharto's rule.

So why should we repeat the same mistake now? Rather, let us
simply start with the basic questions about the substance and
scope of the four fundamental prerequisites and instruments that
most scholars, including of democratic audits, agree are
necessary to develop if the principles of democracy (popular
control and political equality regarding collective binding
decisions) shall be real.

(1) Free and fair elections: The country's most severe
problems turned non-issues in elections that avoided the basic
local level. Only the military, political, and religious elite
with old organizations and loyalties stood a fair chance. The
pro-democratic movement and the students in particular were
marginalized.

There was neither space for local parties in local elections
or for new popular organizations and parties based on interests
and societal ideas. Worse: major foreign democracy-makers did
little to alter the picture.

(2) Open and accountable government (which also require
independent public knowledge, movement, organization, and
government responsiveness to public opinion): Aside from informal
contacts and networks, much of state and politics remains closed
for those who thus lost out, and has often turned non-operative
and disintegrated in the process of fragmentation and
localization of power.

Boss politicians have taken over -- brokering religious and
ethnic leaders with mass following, businessmen and
administrators with resources, and military and militias with
muscles.

While pro-democratic NGOs are comparatively well funded but
atomized, the new attempts at popular organizations and parties
are poor and fragmented. Beyond the limited elections, there are
few chances for people to influence the system other than to
return to informal contacts or resort to lobbying or pressure
politics.

Worse (again): this is partly nourished by foreign support,
limited as it usually is to urban elite circles with good
international connections.

Priority is given precisely to watch and lobby groups, not to
the universal accepted need for mass based popular organization
to enforce open and accountable government.

Ironically, even the organization of the foreign support
itself is a good illustration of lack of transparency and
accountability, at least in relation to those who matter (and are
supposed to learn from foreign experiences) -- the Indonesian
population in general and the pro-democracy movement in
particular.

Furthermore, the decisive public sphere that had evolved among
pro-democrats during the struggle against authoritarianism has
been difficult to expand locally and to ordinary people,
especially when abandoned by foreign democracy-makers that bet
instead on their own non government organizations (NGOs) and
consultants.

Hence, speculative media has filled most of the empty
"liberal" spaces.

(3) Civil and political rights: The liberalization of civil
and political life is vital and a relative success, but remains
of limited significance for major parts of the population.

Political violence is localized, semi-privatized, and
nourished by instigation and manipulation of ethnic and religious
loyalties. The lack of social and cultural rights is part of the
problem.

This became established state policy already during the
massacres in the mid-1960s but is no longer controlled by a
supreme godfather. Truth and justice is a precondition for
reconciliation but primarily a topic for NGO seminars.

(4) A reasonably democratic society for citizens to be
sufficiently self-confident: The elements of a democratic
culture, and the interest and ideology-based popular organizing,
that grew out of the struggle for freedom and national
liberation, have been thoroughly undermined by decades of
"floating mass politics" and boosting of feudal-like customs.

In fact it has even affected the pro-democracy movement which
continue to suffer from divisive elitism (nourished by equally
elitist and divisive foreign support), while many people have to
weather the crisis before they can make use of the new democratic
options.